



The Not So Illusory Truth Effect: Source Credibility Provides an Adaptively Rational Foundation for Repetition Effects

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Overview


The illusory truth effect – the finding that repeated statements are believed more¹ – is thought to be a deep cognitive bias leading to widespread belief in misinformation.² However, people generally adapt to environments that they encounter frequently.^{3,4} Rather than a deep bias, could the illusory truth effect be an adaptively rational heuristic? We present a formal model showing that when sources are credible, as is the case in the American media ecosystem,⁵ this pattern of belief is rational. We capture four key findings in the literature and predict a boundary condition: when sources are not credible. In two large (N=4,966; 2,484) experiments, the illusory truth effect is largely or fully moderated by source credibility highlighting its adaptively rational foundations.

An adaptively rational model

- Increasing belief in repeated statements is rational when the source i) is credible (likely to tell the truth) and ii) sometimes makes errors
- Prediction: the illusory truth effect is diminished or reversed for noncredible senders

P($True|times\ seen=n, plausibility=\gamma) \propto z\left(\frac{\alpha}{z\alpha+w}\right)^n\left(\frac{1}{z\alpha+w}\right)^{m-n}\gamma$ where z is the number of possible true statements, w is the number of possible false statements, α is the sender's credibility, and m is the total statements made

Experimental Design




9 True, Novel


3 False, Novel

3 True, Novel


9 False, Novel




The model captures key findings in the literature



Study 1: source credibility moderates illusory truth



Study 2: credibility is best predictor of illusory truth



Takeaways and Limitations

- Rather than a deep cognitive limitation, the illusory truth effect appears to be an adaptive and normatively-grounded heuristic that is beneficial in many real-world environments
- People demonstrate a remarkable ability to employ adaptive heuristics efficiently while limiting their harms
- Suggests that cognition is not being hijacked by misinformation, at least in this manner
- Repetition in the lab may be meaningfully different, and work should move to the field to test when, where, and why heuristics are applied

References

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