

Imperfect Selection of Cheaters in Cheating-Enabling Environments

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Will a higher societal costs of cheating motivate honest individuals to get selected into cheating-enabling environments?

Method and Procedure


We used a modified mind game (Jiang, 2013; Houdek et al., 2021) where participants played two versions of the game that reward correct predictions of die rolls. In the "before" version, the outcome of the die roll is determined by chance, and participants cannot influence it. In the "after" version, participants self-report correct guesses, giving them an opportunity to cheat.

"Before" version

You have to decide whether an odd or an even number will be rolled on a die in this trial. Now, select your prediction and then click on the button to roll the die.

Odd (1,3,5) Even (2,4,6)

Roll a die




In this trial, your prediction was correct and you earned 10 RMB.

Continue

"After" version

You have to decide whether an odd or even number will be rolled on a die in this trial. Now, please make your prediction, remember it, and then click on the button to roll the die.


I made a prediction. Roll a die



Select whether you predicted correctly and earned 10 RMB or whether you predicted incorrectly and earned nothing in this trial.

Predicted correctly Predicted incorrectly

We expect that the higher societal costs of cheating will motivate honest individuals to try to get selected into a cheating-enabling environment to prevent others from causing harm. Thus, we let participants choose their preferred charity, and we endow each charity with a starting sum, which is affected by the participants' collective gameplay.



Random assignment to low-loss vs. high-loss groups & Charity choice and charity endowment (100 CZK)

Low-loss: 10-12 correct predictions (-25, -50, -75 CZK)

High-loss: 10-12 correct predictions (-100, -200, -300 CZK)

Modified mind game

Manipulations

Measures

First round 12 rolls

Second round 12 rolls

Randomized "before" / "after" versions of the mind game

Cheating baseline

Third round 12 rolls

BDM auction for "after" version of the mind game

Willingness to pay at T1 (operationalized without possibility of interfering with others bidding)

Fourth round 12 rolls

Fifth round 12 rolls

Sixth round 12 rolls

Second price sealed-bid auction for "after" version

Random assignment to information disclosure vs. control condition

Prediction of number of guesses reported as correct in the "after" version

Willingness to pay in auction

Seventh round 12 rolls

BDM auction for "after" version of the mind game



Willingness to pay at T2 (operationalized without possibility of interfering with others bidding)

Hypotheses


- Higher baseline cheating will lead to larger bets in BDM and Second-price auction.
- Higher baseline cheating won't lead to larger bets in high-loss condition.
- Participants with low-cheating baseline will have larger differences in BDM and Second-price auction bids.
- Participants who will estimate correct number of correct bids in the "after" version will bid more for the "after" version.
- Participants who score low on honesty-humility scale will have higher bets for the "after" version.
- Participants assigned to information disclosure treatment will have larger bids.
- Participants will have lower number of correct guesses in the high loss condition.
- Participants will have lower number of correct guesses in the information treatment.

Preliminary Results

We conducted a preregistered laboratory experiment with targeted sample size of N = 400. The final sample is N = 405 (55 % Males, 45 % Females, Mdn age = 22).



Correlation with the willingness to pay



References