

The Advice Less Taken

On the Consequences of Receiving Unexpected Advice

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How many chocolate bars?

You will have a **second try incl. advice** on the next slide!





How many chocolate bars?

One participant's guess: 129





Did you change your estimate on the second try?



• If you did change your estimate, in which direction and by how much?

 $- \text{ Weight of Advice: } WOA = \frac{\text{final judgment} - \text{initial judgment}}{\text{advice} - \text{initial judgment}} \times 100$

 Do the judgment formation processes (specifically advice weighting) depend on the conventionally high expectation of advice in traditional advice taking experiments?

Lower expectation of advice may trigger ...

- A. ... lower levels of construal \Rightarrow less assimilative mindset
 - Construal Level Theory (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2010)
- B. ... closing mental jobs \Rightarrow less open mindset
 - Evaluative Priming (e.g., Alexopoulos et al., 2012)
- C. ... cognitive dissonance \Rightarrow coping
 - Cognitive Dissonance (e.g., Knox & Inkster, 1968; Liberman & Förster, 2006)



Lower expectation of advice implies

- 1. ... a reduced weighting of unexpected advice.
 - Less assimilative mindset (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Trope & Liberman, 2010) and/or cognitive dissonance (Knox & Inkster, 1968; Liberman & Förster, 2006)
- 2. . . . diminished benefits from wise crowds.
 - Reduced advice weighting \Rightarrow attenuated increase in accuracy from initial to final judgment (e.g., Larrick et al., 2012)
- 3. ... internal sampling interference.
 - More narrow and less Thurstonian sampling (Juslin & Olsson, 1997; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Thurstone, 1927) + law of large numbers \Rightarrow more extreme and noisy (normalized) initial judgments

Between Designs: Deterministic Expectations





Note. One-sided * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 for fixed effects of expectation in multilevel models with random intercepts for participants and items. Data and material is available at \href{https://osf.io/bez79/}.

Between Designs: Deterministic Expectations





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Between Designs: Deterministic Expectations



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Within Designs: Probabilistic Expectations





Note. One-sided * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 for fixed effects of expectation in multilevel models with random intercepts for participants and items. Data and material is available at \href{https://osf.io/bez79/}.

Between Design: Probabilistic Expectations





Conclusion and Outlook

- Weighting of unexpected advice reduced in within designs (Experiments 3&4) ⇒ The conventional paradigm fails to capture a class of judgment processes in which expectations to receive advice are low
 - Uncertainty about the availability of external support: Important boundary condition for the ecological study of advice taking
- Limitations and future research:
 - Salience of uncertainty (i.e., trial-by-trial contrast): necessary but also sufficient
 - Natural confounding of advice and revision opportunities
 - Extensions to other measures of advice taking (e.g., sampling; Hütter & Ache, 2016)
 - Hypothesis testing vs. estimation: Continuous expectations proper (Cumming, 2014)

Thanks for your attention!



STATISTICAL MODELING in PSYCHOLOGY

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