

## Introduction

- The risky framing effect is a well-documented bias: People tend to be risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses.
- De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan (2006) showed neural activity active during frame-consistent decision making was similar to patterns related to anxiety in both frames.
- The present study tests whether measures of anxiety can predict frame-consistent choice patterns, as opposed to generalized risk-aversion.
- Also tested for differences between
  - framing and reflection paradigms
  - subjective certainty and probability estimation procedures
- Primary Hypothesis: **anxiety measures will predict more robust frame-consistent choice patterns; greater risk aversion for gains and greater risk seeking for losses**

## Methods

**Sample:** 161 Qualtrics Participants; 76% female; mean age = 39.0 yrs (SD=14.5)

**Procedure:** For each frame (gains and losses), 5 subjective certainty and 5 subjective probability elicitation blocks via bisection algorithm, with 2-6 individual comparisons per block. Each block consisted of all or nothing \$100 lotteries with starting EVs of \$5, \$25, \$50, \$75, \$95. Mean total individual comparisons per participant = 89.68

## Manipulations:

- Within: Frame (gains vs. losses) and elicitation target (subjective certainty vs. probability estimates)
- Between: Item type (framing vs. reflection, framing represents true violations of invariance and reflection absolute magnitudes across the reference point).



## Measures of Anxiety: Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS), Behavioral Inhibition/Activation Scale (BIS/BAS)

You can either **get paid** the amount shown on the left, or play the lottery on the right where if you win you will **get paid** \$100 and if you lose you won't get anything.

You have \$100. You can either **keep** the amount shown on the left, or play the lottery on the right.

Choice #1

Choice #1





You can either **pay** the amount shown on the left, or play the lottery on the right where if you lose you must **pay** \$100 and if you win you don't have to **pay** anything.

You have \$100. You can either **forfeit** the amount shown on the left, or play the lottery on the right.

Choice #1

Choice #1



(3)



(4)

Comparison between item type and frame (1) Reflection + Gain item. (2) Framing + Gain item. (3) Reflection + Loss item. (4) Framing + Loss item

Non-risky Option	Risky Option	Non-risky Option	Risky Option
<b>\$75</b>	75% chance of \$100	<b>\$25</b>	25% chance of \$100
<b>\$38</b>	<b>75% chance of \$100</b>	<b>\$25</b>	<b>62% chance of \$100</b>
<b>\$56</b>	75% chance of \$100	<b>\$25</b>	<b>44% chance of \$100</b>
<b>\$47</b>	<b>75% chance of \$100</b>	<b>\$25</b>	34% chance of \$100
<b>\$52</b>	<b>75% chance of \$100</b>	<b>\$25</b>	<b>39% chance of \$100</b>
Term Step: <b>\$54</b>	75% chance of \$100	Term Step: <b>\$25</b>	37% chance of \$100
<b>\$53</b>	<b>Inferred SCE</b>	<b>\$25</b>	<b>Inferred SPE</b> 38% chance of \$100

Stepwise certainty (left) and probability (right) elicitation examples, with selected items in **bold**.


## Effects of Condition and Elicitation Target




Group means for SCE. A significant interaction was detected between EV and Item Type.

Group means for SPE. Significant interactions were detected between EV and Item Type, and between EV


### Parameters of SCE for Gains




### Parameters of SPE for Gains




### Parameters of SCE for Losses



### Parameters of SPE for Losses



Estimated Prospect Theory parameter estimates by elicitation target and condition, where  $\alpha$  = exponential parameter for subjective utility and  $\gamma$  = probability weighting parameter.



Significant interaction between Condition and Frame on  $\alpha$ .

**Tentative Conclusion:** There is a meaningful behavioral difference between framing and reflection, even if general patterns are similar. No effect of elicitation target was detected.

## Effects of Anxiety Measures

**Modeling Approach:** Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Model at item level predicting log odds of selecting risky option, including covariates for risky and non-risky expected values ( $E_r$  and  $E_{nr}$  respectively).

**Highest order Terms at Level-1 (item level):** ( $E_r$ )( $E_{nr}$ )(Frame)


**Highest order Terms at Level-2 (participant level):** (Frame<sub>i</sub>)(IUS<sub>i</sub>)(Frame<sub>i</sub>)(BIS<sub>i</sub>)(BAS<sub>i</sub>)

**Random Intercepts:** Participant


**Random Slopes:** Frame

## Key Results


Interaction	G <sup>2</sup>	p
Frame x IUS	5.56	.02
Frame x BIS	1.04	.31
Frame x BIS x BAS-D	3.91	.05
Frame x BIS x BAS-F	4.28	.04



### Interaction Between BIS and Frame on Risk Preference at Different Levels of BAS-D



### Interaction Between BIS and Frame on Risk Preference at Different Levels of BAS-F







Solid lines represent model predictions. Points are participants' empirical means for risk preference, and dotted lines are binned mean empirical traces; however, empirical data representation does not factor for covariates.

**Conclusion:** IUS predicts robustness of frame consistency, BIS does not

## Differential Effects of Covariates Across Frame

To focus on IUS effects, we fit model including interaction term between Frame, IUS,  $E_r$  and  $E_{nr}$ ; interaction was statistically significant  $G^2(1) = 12.01$ ,  $p < .001$ . Suggests effects of covariates vary across frame by IUS level.

## Model Predictions



**Conclusion:** Differential effect of IUS, primarily for gains, where high IUS predicts reflexivity. In loss frame, flat slopes across IUS levels indicate **all participants** showed high reflexivity. Loss frame may induce anxiety/intolerance of uncertainty.