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## Abstract

This study investigates various factors that may influence the willingness to give resources to people in need. To this end, we created an experiment based on lottery-games. The results suggest that the willingness to share depends on the identifiability of the recipient, and the framing of the decision problem. Furthermore, individual distribution strategies could be observed.

## Background


Past research suggest that the willingness to give resources to another person depends on:

- Identifiability of a victim [1].
- Framing of the decision [2].
- Time constraints for the decision [3].
- Uncertainty: Reduced responsibility for giving person [4].

## Hypothesis


- 1 Identifiability: Higher willingness to share with an identified recipient (physically present).
- 2 Framing Effect: Higher willingness to share in loss-framed compared to gain-framed lottery-games.
- 3 Time pressure: Shorter time limits influence the amount of sharing.
- 4 Stronger framing effects under shorter time constraints.

## Materials




- 3 betting options: 1, 10, 50 points.
- Probabilities (win/lose): 0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.7.
- Time limit to respond: 1s or 3s.
- 4 experimental blocks of 200 lotteries each.


## Need-Game



## Unexpected Results



## Results



## Conclusion

- Higher willingness to share when the recipient is identified.
- People share more points in gain-framed lotteries.
- Amount of bets increase with the amount of probabilities.
- Individual differences in distribution strategies.
- Fourfold pattern not shown.
- No effect of time pressure.

## References

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- [4] Jason Dana, Roberto A Weber, and Jason Xi Kuang (2007) Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. *Economic Theory*, 33(1):67-80
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