

# **Society for Judgment and Decision Making**

## **The 2013 34<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference**



**Sheraton Centre Toronto Hotel**  
**123 Queen Street West**  
**Toronto, ON M5H 2M9**  
**November 15 -18, 2013**

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2013 Program Committee: Robyn LeBoeuf (chair), Bernd Figner, Jack Soll, Katy Milkman

Thanks to Mare Appleby (conference coordinator), Jon Baron (webmaster), Craig Fox (President), Amy Summerville (student poster awards), Anuj Shah (communication), Katherine Burson (social event), Ana Franco-Watkins (book auction), Tim Pleskac (Einhorn Award Committee chair), Daniel Read (Beattie Award Committee chair) and the ad hoc reviewers: Adam Alter, Dan Bartels, Lyle Brenner, Clayton Critcher, Jason Dana, Jeff Galak, Ayelet Gneezy, Kelly Goldsmith, Dena Gromet, Crystal Hall, Yoel Inbar, Ellie Kyung, Wendy Liu, Julia Minson, Don Moore, Carey Morewedge, Leif Nelson, Nathan Novemsky, Chris Olivola, Danny Oppenheimer, Jason Riis, Jane Risen, Aner Sela, Suzanne Shu, Joe Simmons, Uri Simonsohn, Deb Small, Mary Steffel, Abby Sussman, Oleg Urminsky, Elanor Williams.



**2013 SJDM Conference Master Schedule  
Sheraton Centre Toronto Hotel  
November 15 -18, 2013**

**FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15**

Psychonomic Society JDM Sessions (See the Psychonomic Society [www.psychonomic.org](http://www.psychonomic.org) website for details)

5:00-7:00 pm **Welcome Reception / Early Registration** w/ Cash Bar - Civic Foyer

8:00-10:00 pm **Duncan Luce Tribute** - Civic Ballroom

**SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 16**

7:30-8:30 am **Registration & Continental Breakfast** - Civic Foyer

8:30 -10:00 am **Paper Session #1** - Willow East, Essex, Simcoe/Dufferin,

10:00 -10:30 am Morning Coffee Break - Civic Foyer

10:30-12:00 pm **Paper Session #2** - Willow East, Essex, Simcoe/Dufferin

12:00-1:30 pm Lunch Break (on your own)

1:30-3:00 pm **Paper Session #3** - Willow East, Essex, Simcoe/Dufferin

3:15-4:45 pm **Paper Session #4** - Willow East, Essex, Simcoe/Dufferin

4:45-5:15 pm Afternoon Coffee Break - Civic Foyer

5:15-6:45 pm **Paper Session #5** - Willow East, Essex, Simcoe/Dufferin

6:45-8:45 pm **Graduate Student Social Event** - Willow Centre

7:00-9:00 pm **Executive Board Dinner** - Donatello Restaurant, 37 Elm Street, [www.donatellorestaurant.ca](http://www.donatellorestaurant.ca)

**SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 17**

8:30-10:30 am **Poster Session #1 & Book Auction** - w/ Continental Breakfast - Sheraton Hall

10:30-12:00 pm **Paper Session #6** - Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin

12:00-1:30 pm **Women in SJDM Networking Event** - Essex Room

12:00-1:30 pm Lunch Break (on your own)

1:30-2:30 pm **Keynote Address** by **Susan Carey** - Grand West

2:45-4:15 pm **Paper Session #7** - Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin

4:15-4:45 pm Afternoon Coffee - Civic Foyer

4:45-5:30 pm **Presidential Address** by **Craig Fox** - Grand West

5:30-7:30 pm **Poster Session #2 & Book Auction** w/ Cash Bar - Sheraton Hall

9:00 pm-1:00 am **SJDM Evening Social Event** (for more information see pg. 6)

**MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18**


8:00-8:45 am **Business Meeting & Awards Breakfast** - Conference B & C

9:00-9:30 am **Einhorn Award** - Essex Room

9:45-11:15 am **Paper Session #8** - Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin

11:15-11:45 am Morning Coffee Break - Civic Foyer

11:45-1:15 pm **Paper Session #9** - Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin



You are invited to join us for a  
  
**Special Session Commemorating the Life and Work of Duncan Luce at SJDM**  
  
on Friday Nov 15, 2013  
  
8:00 – 10:00 pm  
  
Civic Ballroom, Sheraton Hotel

## **SJDM Tribute to R. Duncan Luce**

**Friday, Nov. 15, 8 -10 pm  
Civic Ballroom, Sheraton Hotel  
Toronto, Canada**

### **Introductory Recollections**

***Elke U. Weber***

R. Duncan Luce: Scientist and (Gentle)man

***Michel Regenwetter***

What it meant to be Duncan's student and house sitter

***L. Robin Keller***

Recalling Duncan Luce at UC Irvine

### **Theories of Strategic Choice**

***George Wu***

Games and Decisions Revisited

### **Theories of Individual Choice**

***Michael H. Birnbaum***

Theories of decisions under risk and uncertainty

***James Townsend***

From the Luce IIA (independence from irrelevant alternatives) to Process Models for Configural Decision Making

***Barbara Mellers***

Remembering Duncan Luce

### **Foundations of Measurement and Psychophysics**

***David H. Krantz***

Think, Write, Love, and Publish, or What I Learned from Duncan Luce

***Ragnar Steingrimsen***

Connecting Perception and Choice via Axiomatic Modeling

### **Closing Recollections**

***Carolyn Scheer Luce***

Duncan's Zest for Life and Work

SATURDAY NOV 16, 2013			
Rooms - Willow East, Essex, Simcoe/Dufferin			
	TRACK I Willow East	TRACK II Essex	TRACK III Simcoe/Dufferin
Session #1	Motivations and Conflicts of Interest	Risk 1	Health and the Environment
8:30am	Woolley - Money Matters Less	Dellaert - Decisions under Risk	VanEpps - Promote Healthy Eating
8:50am	Davidai - Extrinsic Incentives Bias	Schley - Assessing "economic value"	Zaval - Green and Graying
9:10am	Sah - I am Immune	Weber - Behavioral Effects	Schwartz - Consumer Energy Behavior
9:30am	Packard - No Idle Boast	Luckman - Risky/inter-temporal choice	Benjamin - Decisions/climate change
Session #2	Choice Architecture 1	Reflection, Intuition, and Insight	Biases in Judgment and Choice
10:30am	Shu - Architecture Acceptable	Meyer - Bat and Ball Problem	Bar-Hillel - "Heads or Tails?"
10:50am	Tannenbaum - Partitioning option	Baron - Open-minded thinking	Brough - Probability Judgments
11:10am	Colby - Healthy Defaults	Urminsky - Outcome neglect	Tam - Standard anchoring task
11:30am	Goswami - Search Of Optimally	Tennant - Method of deciding matters	Schrift - The Effort-Outcome Link
Session #3	Morality and Ethics 1	The Past vs. The Future	Choice 1
1:30pm	Ames - Intentional Harms	Caruso - Temporal Doppler Effect	Rader - Misjudging the impact
1:50pm	Piazza - Harmfulness and morality	Williams - Starting Your Diet	Campbell - Gaga for Lady Gaga?
2:10pm	Dillon - To kill or not to kill	Norton - Belief in a favorable future	Spiller - Matters of Taste
2:30pm	Vosgerau - Judging morality of others	Critcher - Performance Heuristic	Evangelidis - Choice Utility
Session #4	Choice Architecture 2	Risk 2	Symposium: The Relationship Between Altruism and Personal Benefits
3:15pm	Mazar - Applying Behavioral Economics	Kupor - Risky Decisions	Newman - Tainted Altruism
3:35pm	Mochon - Healthier by Precommitment	Webb - Choice Bracketing	Barasch - Selfish or selfless?
3:55pm	Hadar - Subjective Knowledge	Garcia-Retamero - Communicating Health Risks	Imas - On Prosocial Incentives
4:15pm	Kyung - "Privacy Paradox"	Yip - Following Your Gut	Olivola - Welfare-Distorting Role
Session #5	Morality and Ethics 2	Self-Control	Financial Decision Making
5:15pm	Gromet - Deviance of triangles	McGuire - Delay-of-gratification	Cryder - Spending Credit
5:35pm	DeWitt - Grouping Promotes Equality	Milkman - Hunger Games Hostage	Kettle - Debt Repayment Strategy
5:55pm	Bryan - Cheating makes you 'a cheater'	Dai - The Fresh Start Effect	Berman - Forecasting Personal Finances
6:15pm	Burns - "It all happened so slow!"	Zhou - The Burden of Responsibility	Greenberg - Spending Underestimation

**SUNDAY NOV 17, 2013**

**Rooms – Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin**

	<b>TRACK I Civic North</b>	<b>TRACK II Civic South</b>	<b>TRACK III Simcoe/Dufferin</b>
<b>Session #6</b>	<b>Altruism and Charitable Giving</b>	<b>Predictions and Forecasts</b>	<b>Choice and Probability Modeling</b>
<b>10:30am</b>	<b>Banker</b> - Altruistic Patience	<b>Simmons</b> - Elephants Weigh More	<b>Broomell</b> - Parameter Recovery
<b>10:50am</b>	<b>Yang</b> - Altruistic Performance	<b>Swift</b> - Fast & Frugal Forecasting	<b>Fisher</b> - Are People Naive Probability
<b>11:10am</b>	<b>Dickert</b> - Explaining the processes	<b>Dietvorst</b> - Seeing Algorithms Err	<b>Bhatia</b> - Reference-Dependent Choice
<b>11:30am</b>	<b>Sussman</b> - Exceptional Framing	<b>Larrick</b> - The fragile wisdom of dyads	<b>Diecidue</b> - Delay resolution of uncertainty
<b>Session #7</b>	<b>Intertemporal Choice</b>	<b>Research and Academia</b>	<b>Judgment</b>
<b>2:45pm</b>	<b>Walters</b> - Loss Aversion	<b>Simonsohn</b> - Failure to Replicate?	<b>Koehler</b> - Psychology of self-prediction
<b>3:05pm</b>	<b>Scholten</b> - Virtues and Vices	<b>Davis-Stouber</b> - Experimental findings	<b>Lucas</b> - Motivated mental imagery
<b>3:25pm</b>	<b>Read</b> - Hidden Zero Effect	<b>Larkin</b> - Across Workplace Hierarchies	<b>de Langhe</b> - Heteroscedastic randomness
<b>3:45pm</b>	<b>Fisher</b> - The Role of Attention	<b>Oppenheimer</b> - Peer Assessment	<b>Bjalkebring</b> - Multiple numeric

**MONDAY NOV 18, 2013**

**Rooms – Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin**

	<b>TRACK I Civic North</b>	<b>TRACK II Civic South</b>	<b>TRACK III Simcoe/Dufferin</b>
<b>Session # 8</b>	<b>Morality and Ethics 3</b>	<b>Consumer Decision Making</b>	<b>Choice 2</b>
<b>9:45am</b>	<b>Zhang</b> - Does Could Lead to Good?	<b>Shah</b> - Psychological tangibility of costs	<b>Reeck</b> - Reining in regret
<b>10:05am</b>	<b>Moore</b> - Competence by any Means	<b>Ulkumen</b> - Impact of Comparison Frames	<b>Parker</b> - Staying the Course
<b>10:25am</b>	<b>Haran</b> - Know who you're up against	<b>Popovich</b> - Acquire Wish List Items	<b>Thomas</b> - Knowing without Remembering
<b>10:45am</b>	<b>Hilbig</b> - Minor lies preserving	<b>Kumar</b> - Questioning the "I"	<b>Baskin</b> - What was I Thinking?
<b>Session #9</b>	<b>Gambling and Insurance</b>	<b>Emotions, Optimism, and Well-Being</b>	<b>Framing and Response Elicitation</b>
<b>11:45pm</b>	<b>Zeelenberg</b> - Hidden cost of insurance	<b>Yang</b> - Hedonic Durability	<b>Goldstein</b> - Understanding Distributions
<b>12:05pm</b>	<b>McKenzie</b> - Longshots Only for Losers?	<b>Pierce</b> - Intense Well-Being Consequences	<b>Levav</b> - Imago Animi Sermo Est
<b>12:25pm</b>	<b>Morewedge</b> - Superstitious Reluctance	<b>Moran</b> - Issue specific emotionality	<b>Schiro</b> - Dichotomizing data changes
<b>12:45pm</b>	<b>Tang</b> - Differences in betting behavior	<b>Tenney</b> - Optimistic About Optimism	<b>Barasz</b> - Greater than the Sum

# 2013 SJDM Conference Special Events

## FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15

5:00-7:00 pm **SJDM Welcome Reception / Early Registration** - Civic Foyer

Please join us at the Welcome Reception which will feature appetizers and a cash bar. This event will also provide an opportunity for early conference registration so that you can avoid the lines Saturday morning.

8:00-10:00 pm **Duncan Luce Tribute** - Special Session Commemorating the Life and Work of Duncan Luce at SJDM - Civic Ballroom (see page 2)

## SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 16

7:00-9:00 pm **Executive Board Dinner** - TBA

Members of the Executive Board, JDM officers, and program chairs for this year and next year are invited to a working dinner.

6:45-8:45 pm **Graduate Student Social Event** - Willow Centre

This informal event will provide student members of SJDM an opportunity to imbibe and network with the future stars of the field. But wait, there's more: SJDM is buying the first round of drinks! For more information contact Elina Halonen at [elina@theirrationalagency.com](mailto:elina@theirrationalagency.com).

## SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 17

8:30-10:30 am AND 5:00-7:00 pm **SJDM Book Auction** - Sheraton Hall

If you love academic books, come to the SJDM book auction table during the poster sessions. Bid on the books for a fraction of the retail cost through a sealed auction. Bidding ends at 7:00 pm during the evening poster session. Any books without bids will be offered for \$1, first come first served! For graduate students, don't miss this great opportunity to get books at discounted prices. Proceeds from the book auction support student-related travel. For more information, contact Ana Franco-Watkins at [afrancowatkins@auburn.edu](mailto:afrancowatkins@auburn.edu).

12:00-1:30 pm **Women in SJDM Networking Event** - Essex Room

All (women and men) are welcome to attend the eighth annual Women in SJDM Luncheon, focused on promoting the advancement of women in JDM. The event will feature lunch, networking opportunities, and a keynote speech from Professor Laura Kray of the University of California at Berkeley's Haas School of Business. The event is organized this year by Katy Milkman, Leslie John, and Ellie Kyung. To inquire about the event, please email Katy Milkman at [milkman@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:milkman@wharton.upenn.edu). We will open registration up online through the SJDM mailing list and accept a maximum of 140 people, and we will keep a waiting list if necessary. In addition, when registering for the meeting: [<http://www.sjdm.org/join.html>], you will notice an option to donate to the Women in SJDM event. We encourage you (especially faculty!) to consider a donation to the event fund. With all of our support, we can ensure that this event will continue to be an annual tradition.

### THANK YOU TO THE SPONSORS OF THE 2013 WOMEN IN SJDM LUNCHEON

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The Wharton School | University of Pennsylvania  
Cindy Cryder | Michael DeKay | Robin Keller | Ellie Kyung | George Wu

#### **This event is made possible entirely through sponsorship.**

To help keep this event an annual tradition, please consider donating to the Women in SJDM Annual Lunch Fund.

(To make a contribution, go to: <http://www.sjdm.org/join.html>, scroll down to the statement:

"Donate to the Women in SJDM Annual Lunch Fund", and click "Donate".)

1:30-2:30 pm **Keynote Address by Susan Carey** - Grand West

### **The Origin of Concepts**

*Susan Carey (Harvard University)*

Alone among animals, humans can ponder the causes and cures of pancreatic cancer or global warming. How are we to account for the human capacity to create concepts such as electron, cancer, infinity, galaxy, and democracy?

A theory of conceptual development must have three components. First, it must characterize the innate representational repertoire—that is, the representations that subsequent learning processes utilize. Second, it must describe how the initial stock of representations differs from the adult conceptual system. Third, it must characterize the learning mechanisms that achieve the transformation of the initial into the final state. I defend three theses. With respect to the initial state, contrary to historically important thinkers such as the British empiricists, Quine, and Piaget, as well as many contemporary scientists, the innate stock of primitives is not limited to sensory, perceptual or sensory-motor representations; rather, there are also innate conceptual representations. With respect to developmental change, contrary to “continuity theorists” such as Fodor, Pinker, Macnamara and others, conceptual development involves qualitative change, resulting in systems of representation that are more powerful than and sometimes incommensurable with those from which they are built. With respect to a learning mechanism that achieves conceptual discontinuity, I offer Quinian bootstrapping.

I take on two of Fodor's challenges to cognitive science: 1) I show how (and in what ways) learning can lead to increases in expressive power and 2) I challenge Fodor's claim that all learning is hypothesis testing, and that the only way new concepts can be constructed is by assembling them from developmental primitives, using the combinatorial machinery of the syntax of the language of thought.

#### **Biographical Note**

Susan Carey has been Professor of Psychology at Harvard since 2001, having previously taught at MIT (24 years) in the Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, and at NYU (5 years) in the Psychology Department. Her work concerns the origin of knowledge on three time scales-- evolutionary, historical, and, mainly, ontogenetic.

4:45-5:30 pm **Presidential Address by Craig Fox** - Grand West

### **The Wisdom of Donald Rumsfeld: Metacognitive Knowledge in Decision Under Uncertainty**

*Craig R. Fox (UCLA Anderson School and Department of Psychology)*

“There are known knowns... known unknowns... [and] unknown unknowns.” In my talk I will argue that decisions under uncertainty are critically influenced by what we think we know and don't know, as well as our impressions of the extent to which outcomes are knowable—and these metacognitive judgments are often biased in systematic and predictable ways. First, I will examine “known knowns” and show that appraisals of one's level of knowledge are inherently comparative and labile, and they influence a number of choice behaviors. Second, I will examine “known unknowns” and show that illusions of understanding (i.e., lack of sensitivity to what we know we don't know) contribute to judgmental overconfidence and political extremism. Third, I will examine unknown unknowns, such as “black swan” effects, and explore a hidden insight from research on decisions from experience. Finally, I will examine perceptions of what is inherently knowable in advance and show that such assessments predict judgment extremity and investment behaviors. These findings collectively reveal underappreciated wisdom in the former Secretary of Defense's most memorable public statement.

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
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**The great annual tradition returns!**

## **SJDM SOCIAL EVENT 9:00pm-1:00am**

Be sure to make your way over to **Courthouse** <http://www.liveatcourthouse.com/> to catch up with all your SJDM friends. Courthouse has plenty of comfortable seating areas for quiet conversations, a dance floor for loosening up, light and not so light snacks (poutine!), and of course a bar. Drink tickets will be distributed to the first JDMers to arrive. See you there! **Courthouse** is located at **57 Adelaide Street East**, just a 10 minute walk from the hotel. Google Maps suggests walking east (right) on **Queen St. W.**, turning right on **Yonge St.**, and then turning left onto **Adelaide St. E.**



### **MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18**


8:00-8:45 am **Business Meeting and Awards Breakfast** - Conference B & C

All members of SJDM are invited to attend the business meeting (and it's where the food is). Every vote counts. Student poster awards will be announced.

9:00-9:30 am **Einhorn Award** - Essex Room

If you want to know who won this prestigious award, you'll have to come to this session of the conference! The winner will make a presentation of the research paper for which s/he won the award.

**NOTE: there will be no Monday Luncheon at this year's conference.**



**Let the bidding begin for the**

**Annual SJDM Book Auction**

**held during the Sunday Poster Sessions**

**Bidding ends at 7pm.**

***Proceeds support student travel!***

If you love academic books, come to the SJDM book auction table during the Sunday poster sessions. Bid on the books for a fraction of the retail cost through a sealed auction. Bidding ends at 7:00 pm during the evening poster session. Any books without bids will be offered for \$1, first come first served! For graduate students, don't miss this great opportunity to get books at discounted prices. Proceeds from the book auction support student-related travel. For more information, contact Ana Franco-Watkins at [afrancowatkins@auburn.edu](mailto:afrancowatkins@auburn.edu).

## **Session #1 Track I: Motivations and Conflicts of Interest – Willow East**

### **Money Matters Less Than You Think: External Incentives Weigh More in Planning than Doing**

*Woolley, Kaitlin (University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Fishbach, Ayelet (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)*

We demonstrate people judge external incentives as more important when deciding to pursue an activity (e.g., applying for a job or college) than during pursuit (e.g., pursuing a job or a college degree, Studies 1& 2). Because external incentives receive greater weight in planning than in pursuit, people erroneously choose to pursue an activity for reasons that turn out to be less important during pursuit, resulting in poorer performance (increased slacking and decreased persistence) on tasks high on external, but low on internal incentives compared with tasks low on internal, but high on external incentives (Studies 3& 4). Contact: [kwoolley@chicagobooth](mailto:kwoolley@chicagobooth).

### **The Extrinsic Incentives Bias at Work: Why Tenure Is Bad For Others, But Not For Me**

*Davidai, Shai (Cornell University); Gilovich, Thomas D. (Cornell University)*

People believe extrinsic incentives affect others more than they affect themselves. However, the consequences of this bias have received little empirical attention. In three studies, we show that lay theories of motivation shape attitudes about public policies that involve extrinsic incentives. We find that policy-related attitudes are better predicted by their anticipated effect on others' motivation than by their anticipated effect on one's own motivation. For example, attitudes regarding the academic tenure system (Study 2) and unemployment benefits programs (Study 3) are better predicted by their perceived demotivating effect on others' productivity than by their predicted effect on the self. Contact: [sd525@cornell.edu](mailto:sd525@cornell.edu)

### **I am Immune: A Sense of Invulnerability Predicts Increased Acceptance of, and Influence from, Conflicts of Interest**

*Sah, Sunita (Georgetown University); Richard Larrick (Duke University)*

Many scandals in government, medicine, law and industry, concern conflicts of interest in which professionals accept gifts or other incentives that appear to be barely disguised bribes. We examined managers' sense of invulnerability to the biasing effects of conflicts of interest. Managers who scored higher on professionalism, (i.e., the ability to remain objective and impartial in their decision-making), were more likely to accept, and be influenced by, small gifts, while denying, or remaining oblivious to, any bias in their decision-making. Contact: [sunitasahcmu@gmail.com](mailto:sunitasahcmu@gmail.com)

### **No Idle Boast: Consumer Responses to Self-Enhancing Sources of Product Information**

*Packard, Grant (Wilfred Laurier University); Gershoff, Andrew D. (University of Texas-Austin); Wooten, David B. (University of Michigan)*

We examine the impact of source self-enhancement on recipient perceptions of source credibility and persuasion. Three experiments find that cues highlighting uncertainty about a boastful (self-enhancing) source's motives moderate whether the source's advice is heeded. Participants are less likely to accept recommendations from a boastful individual when: (a) the source's motivation is linked with self-interest, (b) the recipient and source are dissimilar, (c) the recipient is exposed to an external suspicion prime, and (d) the source's self-enhancement is irrelevant to the conversation. Perceived trustworthiness mediates the relationship between source self-enhancement and persuasion. Implications for consumer judgment and decision-making are discussed. Contact: [gpackard@wlu.ca](mailto:gpackard@wlu.ca)

## **Session #1 Track II: Risk 1 - Essex**

### **Using Preferred Outcome Distributions to Estimate Value and Probability Weighting Functions in Decisions under Risk**

*Donkers, Bas (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Lourenço, Carlos (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Dellaert, Benedict (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Goldstein, Daniel (Microsoft Research)*

We propose the use of preferred outcome distributions to elicit individuals' value and probability weighting functions in decisions under risk. Extant approaches typically rely on chained sequences of lottery choices. In contrast, preferred outcome distributions can be elicited through an intuitive graphical interface and two preferred outcome distributions are sufficient to identify the parameters of rank-dependent utility models. We ran an incentive-compatible lab study in which participants constructed their preferred outcome distributions subject to a budget constraint. Results show that estimates of the value function are in line with previous research while probability weighting biases are diminished. Contact: [dellaert@ese.eur.nl](mailto:dellaert@ese.eur.nl)

## **Assessing “economic value”: Abstract magnitude representations underlie risky and riskless valuations**

*Schley, Dan R. (The Ohio State University); Peters, Ellen (The Ohio State University)*

Diminishing marginal utility (DMU) is a basic tenet of judgment and choice models, but its determinants are little understood. We propose that individuals' representations of abstract magnitudes explain DMU in risky and riskless choice. Numerical-cognition research indicates that individuals have curvilinear representations of numeric magnitudes (e.g., perceiving the difference between 5 and 15 as larger than that between 85 and 95). In three studies we demonstrated that curvilinear representations underlie valuation and mediate numeracy's relations with riskless valuations and risky choice. Current results highlight the fundamental notion that valuing \$100 depends critically on perceptions of the abstract magnitude “100.” Contact: [schley.5@osu.edu](mailto:schley.5@osu.edu)

## **Expected Risks and Returns in Children's, Adolescents', and Adults' Dynamic Risky Choice: Behavioral Effects and Neural Correlates**

*Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University); van Duijvenvoorde, Anna C. (Leiden University); Somerville, Leah H. (Harvard University); Powers, Alisa (Sackler Institute for Developmental Psychobiology); Weeda, Wouter D. (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Delgado, Mauricio R. (Rutgers University); Casey, B. J. (Sackler Institute for Developmental Psychobiology); Huizenga, Hilde M. (University of Amsterdam); Figner, Bernd (Radboud University Nijmegen; Columbia University)*

Adolescence is a phase of increased risk taking, neurodevelopmentally attributed to earlier-maturing subcortical versus later-maturing prefrontal networks, implicated in affective-motivational versus controlled-deliberative processes. The few relevant studies' results are difficult to reconcile, often lacking formal decision-frameworks. Using risk-return decomposition, we investigated the psychological and neural processes in children, adolescents, and adults in a dynamic risky choice task. Developmental behavioral and neural results indicate monotonically increasing return sensitivity, quadratic risk effects, and risk insensitivity in children. Conceptually, our work shows the advantages of using well-characterized decision-making frameworks, allowing more precise interpretation of results and operationalization of crucial concepts in risky choice.

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## **Are risk and delay psychologically equivalent? Testing a common process account of risky and inter-temporal choice.**

*Luckman, Ashley J. (University of New South Wales); Newell, Ben R. (University of New South Wales); Donkin, Chris (University of New South Wales)*

This series of experiments investigated the relationship between risk and temporal delay in choice. The primary interest was how risk and delay are evaluated comparatively. One possibility is that risk and delay are discounted by a common process, and thus psychologically equivalent and interchangeable. Individuals' risk and delay tolerance were calculated separately for various amounts. Choices between risks and delays were then constructed based on these tolerances. In contrast to a common process account we found an overall preference for delay over risk, suggesting non-equivalence. The implications of the results for common process and utility-based accounts of choice are discussed. Contact:

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## **Session #1 Track III: Health and the Environment - Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **Field Tests of Informational Strategies to Promote Healthy Eating**

*VanEpps, Eric M. (Carnegie Mellon University); Downs, Julie (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)*

Despite successful implementations in lab settings, real-world implementations of nutrition labeling on restaurant menus typically fail to reduce calorie consumption, raising the question of whether informational strategies can change eating behavior. Using an Internet-based lunch-ordering system in a corporate field setting, we experimentally manipulated different strategies designed to promote lower-calorie ordering, measuring their effects among the same individuals over multiple weeks. In this context, separating decisions from visceral cues such as aroma and visual imagery, participants were responsive to nutrition information displayed on the menu at the point of purchase, significantly reducing the total calories in their orders. Contact: [eric.m.vanepps@gmail.com](mailto:eric.m.vanepps@gmail.com)

### **Green and Graying: Age Differences in Environmental Decision Making**

*Zaval, Lisa (Columbia University); Spada, Erica (Columbia University); Weber, Elke (Columbia University)*

Across two studies, we test theoretical arguments about age differences in environmental decision-making using a heterogeneous sample of healthy adults from early to late adulthood. We adjudicate among hypotheses on the relationship between age and climate change judgments that are related to temporal focus, generative motives, and age-related changes in affect. We find an enduring negative correlation between age and pro-environmental attitudes. Age differences were mediated by future time perspective and moderated by generative concern. These results suggest that examining sustainability as an intergenerational issue may encourage elders to defer immediate gains in order to take responsibility for future generations. Contact: [erica@decisionsciences.columbia.edu](mailto:erica@decisionsciences.columbia.edu)

## **Empirical Approaches to Examine the Hawthorne Effect in Consumer Energy Behavior**

*Schwartz, Daniel (Carnegie Mellon-SDS / University of Pennsylvania-Wharton); Fischhoff, Baruch (Carnegie Mellon University-SDS/EPP); Krishnamurti, Tamar (Carnegie Mellon University-Teppei/EPP); Sowell, Fallaw (Carnegie Mellon University-Teppei)*

Often referred to as the “Hawthorne Effect,” changes in behavior due to novel treatment or subject knowledge of being in an experiment, is a phenomenon reported as one of the most influential in the social sciences. We conducted a field experiment with electricity customers notifying them about their participation in a study about household electricity usage. We found evidence for a Hawthorne (study participation) Effect, seen in a reduction of electricity usage. Responses to the follow-up survey suggested that the effect reflected heightened awareness of energy consumption. Contact: [danielsp2318@gmail.com](mailto:danielsp2318@gmail.com)

## **The effect of type and source of uncertainty on decisions regarding climate change**

*Benjamin, Daniel (Fordham University); Budescu, David (Fordham University)*

Policy-makers must make tough decisions to mitigate the effects of climate change using limited resources. We examine how two different types and sources of uncertainty affect people’s interpretation of climate projections. We distinguish (1) between uncertainty within one expert (intra-personal) and between multiple experts (inter-personal) and (2) between uncertainty in interpreting models (judgmental) and uncertainty regarding the model’s structure (structural). In a study involving 4 scenarios regarding the effects of climate change, participants who received projections from multiple experts were more sensitive to model uncertainty. Specifically, they reduced their estimated ranges more (compared to the experts’ projections) under structural uncertainty. Contact: [dbenjamin3@fordham.edu](mailto:dbenjamin3@fordham.edu)

## **Session #2 Track I Choice Architecture 1 - Willow East**

### **What Makes Choice Architecture Acceptable? The Role of Trust and Perceived Effectiveness**

*Shu, Suzanne B. (UCLA); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University); Bang, Min (Duke University)*

Critics of choice architecture argue that it is coercive, altering individuals’ decisions without consent. However, little is known about how average decision-makers react to choice architecture interventions once made aware of them, or whether they have preferences for some interventions over others. To better understand their reactions, we test framing and transparency interventions in within-subjects designs, with additional source-of-intervention manipulations and measurement of individual characteristics. We find that while interventions continue to influence choice, individuals are generally positive about such interventions, have clear ideas about which are acceptable, and are also sensitive to perceived motivations of the intervention’s source. Contact: [suzanne.shu@anderson.ucla.edu](mailto:suzanne.shu@anderson.ucla.edu)

### **Partitioning option menus to nudge single-item choice**

*Tannenbaum, David (UCLA); Fox, Craig R. (UCLA); Goldstein, Noah J. (UCLA); Doctor, Jason N. (USC)*

Three studies demonstrate a new decision architecture tool for single-item riskless choice-partitioning option menus. The number of options comprising a choice-set can be organized in any number of ways; we show that whenever options are individually listed out or “unpacked” they are more likely to be chosen than when those same options are grouped into a superordinate category. These partitioning effects occur both in laboratory and field settings, when participants are experts in the task domain, and when participants are motivated to accurately state their preferences. Contact: [david.tannenbaum@anderson.ucla.edu](mailto:david.tannenbaum@anderson.ucla.edu)

### **Healthy Defaults Drive Away Sales**

*Colby, Helen (Rutgers University); Li, Meng (University of Colorado, Denver); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University)*

Defaults are widely recognized as powerful tools to encourage desirable behavior. Many recommendations focus on improving choice by changing default options to healthier foods, higher contribution rates to 401(k)s, and organ donor statuses. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate the effectiveness of healthy food defaults using real-world consumption settings. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that while improving healthy eating, these changes also can have negative consequences in the form of lowered sales in both a real store and hypothetical online setting. Studies 5 and 6 investigate the mechanism through which healthy defaults cause lowered sales. Contact: [hcolby@rci.rutgers.edu](mailto:hcolby@rci.rutgers.edu)

### **In Search Of Optimally Effective Defaults**

*Goswami, Indranil (University of Chicago, Booth School); Urminsky, Oleg (University of Chicago, Booth School)*

Extant research has suggested that high defaults may be detrimental, and in practice, low defaults are most common (for 401(k) contribution rates, charitable contributions, etc.). In ten completed studies across various domains with both hypothetical and real stakes we investigated whether setting defaults too low or too high is likely to have a greater impact. Pooling data from these experiments, a meta-analysis shows very limited evidence for backlash against high defaults but instead, reduced efficacy for low defaults. High reactance and low trust reduces the effect of all defaults. Meta-analysis of other published and unpublished work reveals similar results. Contact: [oleg.urminsky@chicagobooth.edu](mailto:oleg.urminsky@chicagobooth.edu)

## **Session #2 Track II: Reflection, Intuition, and Insight - Essex**

### **The Bat and Ball Problem**

*Meyer, Andrew (Yale); Spunt, Bob (UCLA); Frederick, Shane (Yale)*

We examine three explanations why people miss the “Bat and Ball” problem (Frederick, 2005): (1) failure to check answers against the problem’s constraints; (2) checking answers against a distorted version of the problem’s constraints and (3) checking answers against the actual constraints, yet violating basic arithmetic to maintain initial impressions. Though we find some evidence for each of these explanations, to our surprise, we find considerable support for the third. Mere exposure to the problem increases the rate at which respondents explicitly endorse the idea that a \$1.00 object costs \$1.00 more than a \$0.10 object. Contact: [andrew.meyer@yale.edu](mailto:andrew.meyer@yale.edu)

### **The CRT, system 2, reflection-impulsivity, and actively open-minded thinking**

*Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania); Fincher, Katrina (University of Pennsylvania); Metz, S. Emlen (University of Pennsylvania); Scott, Sydney (University of Pennsylvania)*

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is thought to measure system-2 correction of an initial intuitive response. We find, however, that CRT-type items (using logic as well as arithmetic) can work just as well when they do not have obvious intuitive answers. Moreover, long response times, as well as high accuracy, are sometimes valid predictors of other effects. The CRT might thus be considered as a test of reflection-impulsivity (R-I). However, R-I is only part of actively open-minded thinking (AOT). Tests of AOT are also useful in predicting cognitive biases. We report data from such measures. Contact: [baron@psych.upenn.edu](mailto:baron@psych.upenn.edu)

### **Outcome neglect: How insight failure undermines simple utility maximization.**

*Urminsky, Oleg (University of Chicago, Booth School); Yang, Adelle (University of Chicago, Booth School)*

In a jackpot guessing game (in lab and field studies), people neglected the equal probabilities of winning across guesses but a higher conditional payoffs for larger guesses. Participants made sub-optimal guesses in the middle of the range, as opposed to guessing the highest valid number, which could not be explained by beliefs about the probabilities. Consistent with insight failure, guesses are improved (but remain non-optimal) in a simplified game or when probability and outcome are decoupled. The effect persists but is somewhat reduced for experts (MBA students, SJDM attendees), those higher in CRT or with more economics or statistics training. Contact: [oleg.urminsky@chicagobooth.edu](mailto:oleg.urminsky@chicagobooth.edu)

### **The method of deciding matters: lessons from research on intuitive and unconscious choice**

*Tennant, Raegan (University of Chicago, Booth School); Xia, Jane (University of Chicago); Hastie, Reid (University of Chicago, Booth School)*

Researchers have long debated which method of deciding is the best one. Some have argued intuitive choice is good, while others have advocated specific methods to help overcome bounded cognition. Our paper discusses these different approaches and empirically examines the most recent, the Unconscious Thought Effect [UTE], and we show that two psychological processes, overthinking and selective forgetting, account for the effect. Moreover, we test a novel method of deliberation that outperforms all others. We conclude by discussing the implications of the present research for the debate about the functions of consciousness and the role of procedural rationality in decision-making. Contact: [rtennant@uchicago.edu](mailto:rtennant@uchicago.edu)

## **Session #2 Track III: Biases in Judgment and Choice - Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **“Heads or Tails?” First tosses (and choices) are biased**

*Bar-Hillel, Maya (Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Peer, Eyal (Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University); Aquisti, Alessandro (Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University)*

Studies of people attempting to “be-like-a-coin” concluded that people are incapable of generating random sequences in their minds. None, however, ever investigated the very 1st toss of a mentally generated sequence. Existing data sets show that about 80% of respondents started their coin-toss sequence with Heads, rather than Tails. This we attribute to the linguistic preponderance of “Heads-or-Tails” over “Tails-or-Heads.” Our experiments revealed, however, that this bias -- though genuine -- can be reversed by task instructions or response format. We propose that the “1st-toss” bias might be a special case of a more general “1st-available-option” response bias. Contact: [maya@huji.ac.il](mailto:maya@huji.ac.il)



## **Judging a Part by the Size of its Whole: The Category Size Bias in Probability Judgments**

*Isaac, Mathew S. (Seattle University); Brough, Aaron R. (Pepperdine University)*

The notion that categorization influences probability estimates is referred to as partition dependence and has been attributed to variation in the number of categories into which the set of possible outcomes is divided. In this research, we propose that partition dependence can also occur because of variation in category size (i.e., the number of outcomes in each category), even when the number of categories is held constant. Five studies show that a specific outcome is perceived as more (less) likely to occur when classified into a large (small) category, even when categories are arbitrarily constructed and non-diagnostic. Contact: [aaron.brough@gmail.com](mailto:aaron.brough@gmail.com)

## **On the role of automatic and deliberate processes in the standard anchoring task**

*Tam, Cory (University of Alberta); Schweickart, Oliver (University of Alberta); Brown, Norman R. (University of Alberta)*

We introduce a new perspective on anchoring, “consistency theory,” which embeds anchoring within the broader context of information uptake, and which highlights the role of deliberate processes in numerical judgment. Consistent with this view, we demonstrate (a) that the influence of anchors on numerical estimates increases as a function of source credibility, and (b) that the standard anchoring effect is practically eliminated when people are required to evaluate the quality of the anchor value and consider it to be a bad estimate of the true value. These findings challenge the view that anchoring is primarily the result of automatic, activation-based processes. Contact: [ctam2@ualberta.ca](mailto:ctam2@ualberta.ca)

## **Harder Than it Should Be: The Effort-Outcome Link and the Construction of Deliberative Choice Processes**

*Schrift, Rom Y. (The Wharton School); Kivetz, Ran (Columbia University); Netzer, Oded (Columbia University)*

The notion that effort and hard work yield desired outcomes is ingrained in many cultures and affects our thinking and behavior. However, could the belief in the value of effort complicate our lives? In this research, we show that a strong tendency to link effort and hard work with positive outcomes leads to complicating what should be easy decisions. In four studies we find that decision-makers alter their preferences, distort the information they recall, and selectively interpret information in a manner that intensifies the conflict experienced during the deliberation phase. Contact: [roms@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:roms@wharton.upenn.edu)

## **Session #3 Track I: Morality and Ethics 1 - Willow East**

### **Intentional harms are worse, even when they're not**

*Ames, Daniel L. (Princeton University); Fiske, Susan T. (Princeton University)*

Three sets of experiments demonstrate that people judge intended harms as worse than unintended harms, even when the two harms are objectively identical. Notably, this bias persists even when the damage is clearly quantified (in dollars) and when participants have financial incentives to be accurate. A motivational account fully mediates the effect. The potential scope of this bias is explored across diverse contexts, including humanitarian disasters, economic losses in a corporate setting, and interpersonal affective outcomes. This work provides a novel psychological mechanism for previous observations regarding the misallocation of public funds, and also has implications for legal damage assessments. Contact: [dames@princeton.edu](mailto:dames@princeton.edu)

### **Cruel nature: Harmfulness as an overlooked dimension in judgments of moral standing**

*Piazza, Jared (University of Pennsylvania); Landy, Justin (University of Pennsylvania); Goodwin, Geoffrey (University of Pennsylvania)*

Past perspectives on the attribution of moral standing have focused exclusively on the role of “patience” (or experience) and “agency” (or intelligence). We contend that harmful intent is an equally, if not more important, determinant of moral standing. We provide support for this hypothesis across four studies using non-human animals as targets. We show that the effect of harmful intent on attributions of moral standing is not reducible to agency and primarily reflects a motivation to prevent human suffering. Our results also call into question the extent to which people perceive patience and agency as truly independent dimensions. Contact: [jpiazza@psych.upenn.edu](mailto:jpiazza@psych.upenn.edu)

### **To kill or not to kill: Self-regulatory affect in moral behavior**

*Dillon, Kyle D (Harvard University); Cushman, Fiery (Brown University)*

We judge others not just by the outcomes they cause, but also by the actions they perform. We condemn actions more than omissions, harm as a means more than as a side-effect, and typical harmful behaviors more than atypical ones. Might our focus on the “act itself” when judging others ultimately derive from self-regulatory processes--that is, our aversion to performing the action ourselves? We asked participants to engage in pretend harmful behaviors, testing whether mere action--absent any harmful outcome--was sufficient to elicit self-regulatory affect, and whether this affect responded to principles that guide third party moral judgment. Contact: [kdillon@g.harvard.edu](mailto:kdillon@g.harvard.edu)

### **For trust not him that hath broken faith once: Judging the morality of others**

*Vosgerau, Joachim (Carnegie Mellon/Tilburg University); Brandimarte, Laura (Carnegie Mellon University); Kuehn, Sarah (Slippery Rock University); Acquisti, Alessandro (Carnegie Mellon University)*

Do people heed the advice given in Shakespeare's play? We show that a person's past immoral/unfair behaviors have a much longer lasting impact on how s/he is evaluated and treated than her past moral/fair behaviors. The lesser depreciation over time is caused by immoral behaviors being perceived as more indicative of a person's character than moral behaviors. We also test whether people's morality judgments of others are accurate by comparing estimated recidivism likelihood ratios for violent and property offenses to actual recidivism likelihood rates. US respondents are found to grossly overestimate the stability of immorality over time and across domains. Contact: [vosgerau@cmu.edu](mailto:vosgerau@cmu.edu)

### **Session #3 Track II: The Past vs. The Future - Essex**

#### **The Temporal Doppler Effect: When the Future Feels Closer than the Past**

*Caruso, Eugene M. (University of Chicago); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado at Boulder); Chin, Mark (Swarthmore College); Ward, Andrew H. (Swarthmore College)*

People routinely remember events that have passed and imagine those that are yet to come. The past and the future are sometimes psychologically close ("just around the corner") and sometimes psychologically distant ("ages away"). We demonstrate a systematic asymmetry whereby future events are psychologically closer than past events of equivalent objective distance. We suggest that this asymmetry arises because the subjective experience of movement through time (whereby future events approach and past events recede) is analogous to the physical experience of movement through space. We discuss how reducing psychological distance to the future may function to prepare for upcoming action. Contact: [eugene.caruso@chicagobooth.edu](mailto:eugene.caruso@chicagobooth.edu)

#### **Starting Your Diet Tomorrow: People Believe They Will Have More Control Over the Future Than They Did Over the Past**

*Williams, Elanor F. (University of California, San Diego); LeBoeuf, Robyn A. (University of Florida)*

Insanity is "doing the same thing over and over again but expecting different results." We propose a potential cause for this kind of insanity: people believe the future is different from, and specifically, more controllable than, the past. Across several real and hypothetical scenarios, participants expressed the belief that, despite the future's inherent uncertainty, future outcomes, both good and bad, would be more controllable than identical past outcomes would have been. We consider implications of this effect and discuss how it fits with the growing body of work suggesting that people perceive past and future to be fundamentally different. Contact: [ewilliams@ucsd.edu](mailto:ewilliams@ucsd.edu)

#### **The belief in a favorable future**

*Rogers, Todd (Harvard Kennedy School); Norton, Michael I (Harvard Business School)*

We explore people's belief in a "favorable future"--the tendency to predict that the future will align with one's preferred views of the world. People believe that their ideological, policy and entertainment preferences - from same sex marriage to American Idol - will become more common in the future. However, people's construction of the future is not a projection of their current self, but a motivated projection of a favorable future. People believe their bad attributes will become more common in the future and their good attributes rarer - such that only people's positive aspects will stand out in the crowd. Contact: [todd\\_rogers@hks.harvard.edu](mailto:todd_rogers@hks.harvard.edu)

#### **The Performance Heuristic: A Misguided Reliance on Past Success When Predicting Future Improvement**

*Critcher, Clayton R. (University of California, Berkeley); Rosenzweig, Emily L. (Tulane University)*

Three studies show people use a performance heuristic: When forecasting the likelihood of subsequent performance improvement, people lean on previous absolute performance as a positive cue. That is, when participants' initial performance was better -- either at a darts or an anagram task -- participants bet more money, or estimated a higher subjective likelihood, that their subsequent performance would show specified improvement. Reliance on the heuristic hurt forecasting accuracy. Additional evidence distinguished two mechanistic accounts, showed how to debias participants, and established the performance heuristic as a general-purpose heuristic that is applied to non-self-related (i.e., mutual fund) improvement forecasting as well. Contact: [ClaytonCritcher@haas.berkeley.edu](mailto:ClaytonCritcher@haas.berkeley.edu)

### **Session #3 Track III: Choice 1 - Simcoe/Dufferin**

#### **Misjudging the impact of advice: How advisors systematically misperceive their influence**

*Rader, Christina (Duke University); Sah, Sunita (Georgetown University); Larrick, Richard (Duke University)*

We study advisors' perceptions of their influence and find that advisors exhibit systematic biases. In two studies we show that when advisors do not know what the advisee would have done absent the advice, advisors do not sufficiently account for that missing information. Therefore, advisees may appear to have taken advice, when in fact they were planning on taking that action in any case, leading advisors to overestimate their influence. Likewise, advisees can appear to have ignored the advice, when in fact, they shifted substantially from a position that was even further removed, resulting in advisors underestimating their influence. Contact: [christina.rader@duke.edu](mailto:christina.rader@duke.edu)

#### **Would Others Be Gaga for Lady Gaga? Making Decisions For Others After Repeated Exposure**

*Campbell, Troy (Duke University); O'Brien, Ed (University of Michigan); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado); Schwarz, Norbert (University of Michigan); Ubel, Peter (Duke University)*

People often seek out individuals who are distinguished by their repeated experience with emotional content (comedy, art, Lady Gaga) to make decisions for them. However, as a result of the repeated experiences, these individuals can become desensitized. After repeated exposure, we find that these individuals incorrectly use their own desensitized reactions to predict unexposed others' reactions to similar experiences. Thus, they become worse at deciding for unexposed others. However, unexposed others predict the opposite and choose to follow recommendations from well exposed others. These studies suggest that repeated exposure can dramatically and negatively influence sharing, recommendations, and social behavior. Contact: [tcampbel@gmail.com](mailto:tcampbel@gmail.com)

#### **Matters of Taste: Differences in Perceived Preference Structures**

*Spiller, Stephen A. (UCLA); Belogolova, Helen (UCLA)*

Products vary on horizontal (taste) and vertical (quality) attributes. We find significant disagreement regarding attribute classification. Classifying an attribute as horizontal is associated with lower perceived consensus and greater connection of one's choice to one's self, as indicated by greater use of self-referential language. Explaining the choice of someone who chose a different option (compared to the choice of someone who chose the same option or one's own choice) increases the likelihood of classifying an attribute as horizontal. The relationship between horizontal quality and self-referential language is corroborated using a publicly available dataset of movie reviews. Contact: [stephen.spiller@anderson.ucla.edu](mailto:stephen.spiller@anderson.ucla.edu)

#### **Choice Utility**

*Evangelidis, Ioannis (Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam); Levav, Jonathan (Graduate School of Business, Stanford University)*

We introduce the concept of choice utility, which describes the utility obtained by how people attain an outcome independent of what the actual outcome is. We focus on two normatively equivalent processes for obtaining the same outcome: action and inaction. Our studies show that under low (high) preference uncertainty the choice share of a high utility option (any option) decreases (increases) when it is framed as an inaction than as an action. We document preference reversals in classic decision problems such as the Asian Disease problem, Money Illusion, Asymmetric Dominance, and the Disjunction Effect. Contact: [jlevav@stanford.edu](mailto:jlevav@stanford.edu)

### **Session #4 Track I: Choice Architecture 2 - Willow East**

#### **Applying Behavioral Economics in the Field: Nudging Customers to Pay their Credit Card Dues**

*Mazar, Nina (University of Toronto); Ariely, Dan (Duke University)*

In a large-scale field experiment over nine months with over 500,000 credit card accounts, we manipulated the automated phone messaging that customers receive when not paying their monthly dues. Across five experimental conditions plus one control condition (the standard script), we found that creating a sense of urgency, being more informative, and making customers pledge that they will pay in a specific amount of time substantially increased overdue customers' likelihood to pay their dues before the end of the next month -- thereby reducing their credit costs.



## **Healthier by Precommitment**

*Schwartz, Janet (Tulane University); Mochon, Daniel (Tulane University); Wyper, Lauren (Discovery Vitality); Morabe, Josiase (Discovery Vitality); Patel, Deepak (Discovery Vitality); Ariely (Dan, Duke University)*

We tested a voluntary commitment device to help grocery shoppers improve the health of the food they purchased. Thirty-six percent of households who were offered the commitment device agreed, and subsequently showed a 3.5% increase in the percentage of healthy grocery items in each of the study's six months as compared to the control group who made a hypothetical commitment and those who were offered the commitment and declined. These results suggest that self-aware consumers will seize opportunities to create environments for themselves that restrict choices, even at if it comes at some risk of financial loss. Contact: [dmochon@tulane.edu](mailto:dmochon@tulane.edu)

## **Subjective Knowledge Attenuates Default Effects**

*Hadar, Liat (IDC Herzliya); Tannenbaum, David (UCLA); Fox, Craig R. (UCLA)*

Model comparisons have been used to test the central claim of the adaptive toolbox approach that people use fast-and-frugal heuristics and select between them adaptively. We show that there is a methodological problem in core publications supposedly supporting this claim. Weighted compensatory strategies that are considered alternatives to fast-and-frugal heuristics are specified in a way that underestimates their use. Specifically, the common practice of not correcting validities for chance level results in a disadvantage for weighted compensatory strategies. A reanalysis of published data and simulations show overestimation of the reliance on fast-and-frugal heuristics for task environments used in prominent studies. Contact: [lhadar@idc.ac.il](mailto:lhadar@idc.ac.il)

## **Information as a Constrained Resource**

*Kyung, Ellie (Dartmouth College, Tuck School of Business)*

In this digital age, it has become increasingly easy to solicit, collect, and disseminate personal information from individuals. Although people largely agree that privacy is important and that their information is valuable, they regularly share information in relatively unprotected forums in exchange for very little, if anything at all - a "privacy paradox." Four experiments examine the how the lack of perceived constraints, relative to time or money, leads people to undervalue this resource and how priming resource constraints can lead to lower rates of personal disclosure. This research has important implications for educating consumers about valuing their personal information. Contact: [ellie.kyung@tuck.dartmouth.edu](mailto:ellie.kyung@tuck.dartmouth.edu)

## **Session #4 Track II: Risk 2 - Essex**

### **Risky Decisions, Interrupted**

*Kupor, Daniella (Stanford Graduate School of Business); Liu, Wendy (UCSD Rady School of Management); Amir, On (UCSD Rady School of Management)*

Interruptions are ubiquitous. Across three studies, we demonstrate that interruptions in decision making can increase risk taking. When an individual is interrupted during a risky decision, we find that his/her previous consideration of the decision causes it to feel more familiar. This interruption-induced familiarity increases risk taking by decreasing avoidance motivation and increasing the perceived likelihood of a successful risk outcome. These findings have important implications for understanding how risk preferences may be powerfully influenced by the dynamic--and often interrupted--course of decision making. Contact: [dkupor@stanford.edu](mailto:dkupor@stanford.edu)

### **Choice Bracketing and Construal Level Theory: The Effects of Problem Representation and Mental Representation on Sequential Risk-Taking**

*Webb, Elizabeth C. (UCLA Anderson); Shu, Suzanne B. (UCLA Anderson)*

We attempt to integrate the theories of choice bracketing and construal level, uncovering commonalities and/or differences in their effects on risk-taking. In three studies we demonstrate (a) construal level (manipulated through temporal distance) and choice bracketing have independent effects; (b) temporal distance acts through mental construal while bracketing acts through another mechanism; and (c) the effect of temporal distance is mediated by risk perception. We are able to confirm these effects using two types of bracketing (problem and outcome) and across different gambling types (mixed and pure-loss gambles). Ultimately, our results indicate the two theories have independent effects on risk-taking. Contact: [elizabeth.webb.2013@anderson.ucla.edu](mailto:elizabeth.webb.2013@anderson.ucla.edu)

## **Communicating Health Risks with Visual Aids**

*Garcia-Retamero, Rocio (U. Granada; Max Planck Institute, Berlin); Cokely, Edward T. (Michigan Technological Univ.; Max Planck Institute, Berlin)*

Informed and shared decision making require that people understand health risks. Unfortunately, many people are not risk literate and are biased by common risk communication practices. In this talk, we review a collection of studies investigating the benefits of visual aids for communicating health risks to diverse vulnerable individuals (e.g., varying in abilities, ages, risk characteristics, and cultural backgrounds). Studies show that appropriately designed visual aids are often highly effective, transparent, and ethically desirable tools for improving decision making, changing attitudes, and reducing risky behavior. Theoretical mechanisms, open questions, and emerging applications are discussed. Contact:

[retamer@ugr.es](mailto:retamer@ugr.es)

## **Following Your Gut: Emotion-Understanding Ability Enables the Use of Somatic Markers as Signals for Risk Avoidance**

*Yip, Jeremy A. (Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Cote, Stephane (Rotman School, University of Toronto); Carney, Dana R. (Haas School, University of California Berkeley)*

We examined whether a key dimension of emotional intelligence, emotion-understanding ability, enables individuals to use their physiological reactions to make better decisions. When physiological reactions are triggered by potential danger associated with risky decision options, they provide a valuable source of information to avoid risk. While all normal individuals can generate physiological reactions, we propose that only individuals with high emotion-understanding ability are able to correctly identify their relevance and rely on their reactions to avoid risk. The results from the Iowa Gambling Task confirmed our prediction, suggesting that adaptive utilization of our physiology when making decisions requires emotional intelligence. Contact: [jeremy.yip2011@gmail.com](mailto:jeremy.yip2011@gmail.com)

## **Session #4 Track III: Symposium - The Relationship Between Altruism and Personal Benefits - Simcoe/Dufferin**

Symposium description: The logic of altruism suggests that prosocial actions are tainted when the actor receives material, social or intrapsychic benefits from their good deeds. For instance, individuals often reconstrue selfless behavior as self-interested and discount prosocial acts in the presence of personal benefits (Critcher & Dunning, 2011; Lin-Healy & Small, 2011). The present symposium explores the boundaries of this skepticism and the ways in which benefits to the self-influence prosocial behavior and perceptions of altruism. The first two papers explore how individuals give others credit for their good deeds. First, Newman & Cain find that people view charitable behaviors that result in personal benefits as worse than selfish behaviors that produce no charitable benefits. Second, Barasch et al. examine when emotional benefits signal altruistic character rather than selfishness. The latter two papers explore how attitudes towards altruism influence actual behavior. Imas, Gneezy and Kennan find that individuals work harder for charity than for themselves, but only when incentive stakes are low. Finally, Olivola demonstrates that people prefer altruistic actions that involve self-sacrifice over easier, but more efficient alternatives. Together, these papers give insight into when and why personal benefits affect the judgment and performance of prosocial acts.

### **Tainted Altruism: When doing some good is evaluated worse than doing no good at all**

*Newman, George E. (Yale); Cain, Daylian M. (Yale)*

Four studies find that people evaluate efforts that realize both charitable and personal benefits as worse than analogous selfish behaviors that produce no charitable benefit. This “tainted altruism effect” is observed across a variety of contexts, extending to both moral evaluations of others as well as participants’ own behavioral intentions. This effect seems to be driven by the accessibility of different counterfactuals: when someone is charitable for self-interested reasons, people consider their behavior in the absence of the self-interest. However, when someone is only selfish, people do not spontaneously consider whether the person could have been more altruistic. Contact: [george.newman@yale.edu](mailto:george.newman@yale.edu)

### **Selfish or selfless? On the signal value of emotion in altruistic behavior**

*Barasch, Alixandra (Wharton, UPenn); Levine, Emma E. (Wharton, UPenn); Berman, Jonathan Z. (Wharton, UPenn); Small, Deborah A. (Wharton, UPenn)*

Theories that reject the existence of altruism argue that emotional benefits imply selfishness. We find that lay beliefs about the relationship between emotion and altruism reflect the opposite: emotions signal authentic concern for others. Five studies find that emotion-driven prosocial deeds merit greater charitable credit than the same deeds performed without emotion. Furthermore, a lack of emotion, even when accompanied by logical reasons for giving, triggers suspicion. Individuals only penalize emotional prosocial actors when they are explicitly described as motivated by emotional benefits. Results suggest that authenticity of motives may be more important than selflessness for judgments of altruism. Contact:

[abarasch@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:abarasch@wharton.upenn.edu)

## Prosocial Incentives

*Imas, Alex (UC San Diego); Gneezy, Ayelet (UC San Diego); Keenan, Elizabeth (UC San Diego)*

Recent studies have shown that individuals report greater happiness when spending on others than on themselves. We explore this finding using a prosocial incentive scheme, where effort is tied directly to charitable contributions. In a real-effort task, individuals indeed work harder for charity than for themselves, but only when incentive stakes are low. When stakes are raised, the difference in provided effort disappears. Additionally, individuals correctly anticipated these effects, choosing to work for charity at low incentives and for themselves at high incentives. The results have implications for optimal incentive design and the use of subjective well-being measures. Contact: [aimas@ucsd.edu](mailto:aimas@ucsd.edu).

## The Welfare-Distorting Role of Self-Sacrifice in Altruism

*Olivola, Christopher Y. (Carnegie Mellon University)*

When faced with several different routes to helping others in need (e.g., volunteering times vs. donating money), what factors do people consider? Common sense and most normative theories dictate that altruistic options bringing about the most good should be preferred, *ceteris paribus*. We demonstrate a striking violation of this principle: People prefer (and judge more positively) altruistic actions that involve self-sacrifice (on the part of the giver) than easier alternatives, even when the former are transparently less efficient (i.e., fewer people benefit). We explore the causes and moderators of this puzzling bias and discuss its implications for improving human welfare. Contact: [colivola@andrew.cmu.edu](mailto:colivola@andrew.cmu.edu)

## Session #5 Track I: Morality and Ethics 2 - Willow East

### On the deviance of triangles: Differences in deviance perception partly explain ideological divides in social policy support

*Gromet, Dena (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Okimoto, Tyler (University of Queensland)*

We propose that political differences in social policy support may be partly driven by the tendency for conservatives to perceive greater deviance than liberals, even among non-social targets. In two studies, participants were shown geometric figures and were asked to identify the extent to which they were triangles (or circles, squares, etc.). More conservative participants perceived a larger difference between true and imperfect shapes than more liberal participants. This greater perception of geometric deviance later predicted harsher punishment of wrongdoers and less support for public aid for disadvantaged groups, partly accounting for the relationship between political ideology and social policy. Contact: [denag@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:denag@wharton.upenn.edu)

### Grouping Promotes Equality: Effect of Recipient Grouping in Allocation of Limited Medical Resources

*Colby, Helen (Rutgers University); DeWitt, Jeff (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen B. (Rutgers University)*

The allocation of scarce medical resources often involves a tradeoff between efficiency and equality. Perceptions of fairness can be influenced by subtle features of the question, and the current studies investigated the effect of arbitrary groupings on the allocation of scarce transplant organs. Across three studies (N=746), we find support for the idea that the existence of even unmistakably arbitrary groups decreases the efficiency of resource allocation decisions because decision makers tend to spread the resource across the groups. Contact: [jrd202@rci.rutgers.edu](mailto:jrd202@rci.rutgers.edu)

### When cheating would make you 'a cheater': Noun wording prevents unethical behavior

*Bryan, Christopher J. (University of California, San Diego); Adams, Gabrielle S. (London Business School); Monin, Benoît (Stanford University)*

In three experiments, people were less likely to cheat for personal gain when a subtle change in phrasing framed such behavior as diagnostic of an undesirable identity. Participants were given the opportunity to claim money they were not entitled to; instructions referred to cheating with either a verb (e.g., “cheating”) or a noun (e.g., “being a cheater”). Participants in the verb condition claimed significantly more money than participants in the noun condition. These results demonstrate the power of a subtle linguistic difference to prevent even private unethical behavior by invoking people’s desire to maintain a self-image as good and honest. Contact: [cbryan@ucsd.edu](mailto:cbryan@ucsd.edu)

### “It all happened so slow!”: The impact of action speed on assessments of intentionality

*Burns, Zachary C. (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University); Caruso, Eugene M. (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)*

From YouTube to the courtroom, people have an increasing number of opportunities to view the actions of others. We uncover a novel factor that influences the assessment of an actor’s videotaped behavior: the speed at which the recorded behavior is observed. Using videos of physical contact in various sporting events, we demonstrate that participants who view events in slow motion (compared to regular speed) believe that actions are more intentional and that the actors who committed them deserve more punishment for harmful outcomes. We discuss the implications of this phenomenon for how people evaluate the ethicality of ambiguous behavior. Contact: [z-burns@kellogg.northwestern.edu](mailto:z-burns@kellogg.northwestern.edu)

## **Session #5 Track II: Self-Control - Essex**

### **Delay-of-gratification decisions emerge from rational predictions: Behavioral and neural evidence**

*McGuire, Joseph T. (University of Pennsylvania); Kable, Joseph W. (University of Pennsylvania)*

In an uncertain world, choosing to start waiting for a delayed reward need not imply that one is willing to continue waiting indefinitely. We identify situations in which it is rational to give up on delayed rewards, and hypothesize that the choice to persist (or not) stems from a dynamic reassessment of the awaited reward's subjective value. This hypothesis is supported through behavioral manipulations of timing statistics, surveys of temporal expectations in naturalistic scenarios, and a neuroimaging investigation of value representations during a delay. Our findings suggest a new perspective on both successes and apparent failures in delaying gratification. Contact: [mcguirej@psych.upenn.edu](mailto:mcguirej@psych.upenn.edu)

### **Holding the Hunger Games Hostage at the Gym: An Evaluation of Temptation Bundling**

*Milkman, Katherine (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Minson, Julia (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Volpp, Kevin (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)*

We introduce and evaluate temptation bundling--a method for simultaneously tackling two types of self-control problems by harnessing consumption complementarities. We describe an experiment measuring the impact of bundling tempting rewards (page-turner audiobooks) with visiting the gym. Participants were randomly assigned to a full treatment condition with gym-only access to tempting audiobooks, an intermediate treatment involving encouragement to restrict audiobook enjoyment to the gym, or a control condition. Exercise initially increased in the treatment groups but later waned. Post-study, 61% of participants opted to pay to have tempting audiobook access restricted to the gym, suggesting demand for this commitment device. Contact: [kmilkman@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:kmilkman@wharton.upenn.edu)

### **The Fresh Start Effect: Temporal Landmarks Motivate Aspirational Behavior**

*Dai, Hengchen (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Milkman, Katherine L. (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Riis, Jason (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)*

The popularity of New Year's resolutions suggests that goals may be easier to tackle immediately following salient temporal landmarks. If true, this little-researched phenomenon has the potential to help people overcome important willpower problems that often limit goal attainment. Across three field studies, we show that aspirational behaviors (dieting, exercising, and goal commitment) increase following temporal landmarks (e.g., the outset of a new week/month/year/semester, birthdays, holidays). We propose that temporal landmarks relegate past imperfections to a previous mental accounting period, making the current self feel superior and thus capable of pursuing its aspirations. Results from laboratory studies support this explanation. Contact: [hengchen@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:hengchen@wharton.upenn.edu)

### **The Burden of Responsibility: Some Interpersonal Costs of Having High Self-control**

*Zhou, Christy (Duke University); van Dellen, Michelle R. (University of Georgia); Fitzsimons, Gráinne M. (Duke University)*

Across four studies, we showed that people have higher performance expectations and assign more task responsibilities to individuals who are high on self-control resources compared to those who are low on self-control resources, and they also underestimate how much effort is needed for high (vs. low) self-control individuals in their goal pursuits. We further suggest that the higher performance expectations, greater task responsibilities and underestimation of effort lead to a feeling of burden for high self-control individuals, leaving them feeling overwhelmed and less satisfied with their relationships with their interacting partners. Contact: [christy.zhou@duke.edu](mailto:christy.zhou@duke.edu)

## **Session #5 Track III: Financial Decision Making - Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **Spending Credit Like a Windfall Gain**

*Cryder, Cynthia (Washington University in St. Louis); Xiao, Laura (Washington University in St. Louis)*

People spend more with credit cards than with other currency, but why? This project examines a novel reason for the "credit card premium": the term "credit" encourages people to mentally represent spending as a reduction of a gain rather than as a more subjectively painful loss. Across five experiments, participants considering "credit" compared to "loan" or a control scenario exhibited stronger associations with gain-related words, stronger associations with gain-domain bar graphs, and a greater likelihood of spending. This tendency to view spending as a reduction of a gain could contribute to overspending, and over time, to excess consumer debt. Contact: [cryder@wustl.edu](mailto:cryder@wustl.edu)

## **Debt Repayment Strategy and Consumer Motivation to Get Out of Debt**

*Kettle, Keri (University of Miami); Trudel, Remi (Boston University); Blanchard, Simon (Georgetown University); Häubl, Gerald (University of Alberta); Wendel, Steve (HelloWallet)*

Why does it matter how indebted consumers allocate their debt repayments across accounts? We propose that paying down debt accounts sequentially (focusing on repaying one account) rather than simultaneously (spreading repayments out across accounts) enhances consumers' motivation to repay their debt. Using credit card transaction data on 2,522 indebted consumers, we develop a measure of debt repayment strategy, and demonstrate that paying down debt accounts sequentially rather than simultaneously predicts subsequent debt repayment success in the field. A follow-up experiment shows that a sequential debt repayment strategy enhances perceived progress, and thus increases consumers' motivation to repay their debt. Contact: [kkettle@bus.miami.edu](mailto:kkettle@bus.miami.edu)

## **Expense Neglect in Forecasting Personal Finances**

*Berman, Jonathan Z. (University of Pennsylvania); Tran, An (University of Colorado Boulder); Lynch, John G. (University of Colorado Boulder); Zauberman, Gal (University of Pennsylvania)*

We demonstrate evidence for an “expense neglect bias” in the manner in which individuals forecast their future finances. Specifically, we show that even though individuals expect that both their income and expenses will increase in the future, they systematically under-weigh expenses relative to income when forecasting their future finances (i.e., how much spare money they will have in the future). Six main studies and a meta-analysis demonstrate the robustness of this effect across participants with a wide range of financial conditions. We further show that those who are chronically attuned to expenses (Tightwads) are less likely to demonstrate this bias. Contact: [jberm@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:jberm@wharton.upenn.edu)

## **Spending Underestimation: Field Evidence from a Large Grocery Chain**

*Gneezy, Uri (University of California, San Diego); Greenberg, Adam Eric (University of California, San Diego)*

Many studies have examined the under-saving phenomenon, but few have addressed why individuals fail to meet spending targets. We conduct a field experiment in a large grocery chain in which participants are asked how much they expect they are about to spend directly before checkout. We find that a disproportionate number of participants underestimate spending by economically significant magnitudes. Moreover, those with the lowest incomes (food stamp customers) exhibited a greater bias. We observe that consumers spend more than they expect to, and rule out a number of known biases including memory, inattention, and self-control as causes of spending underestimation. Contact: [aegreenb@ucsd.edu](mailto:aegreenb@ucsd.edu)

**SUNDAY NOV 17, 2013**

**Rooms – Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **Session #6 Track I: Altruism and Charitable Giving – Civic North**

#### **Altruistic Patience: Giving More Beats Giving Now**

*Banker, Sachin (MIT)*

People are known to make altruistic decisions and depart from the standard rational economic model when incurring material costs to oneself to benefit others. While the basic observation that individuals do in fact care about the well-being of others is becoming better accounted for, much remains to be understood about altruistic decision-making as a distinct domain of decision problems. This work aims in particular to characterize the properties of altruistic decisions that are made over time. Here I uncover the altruistic patience bias, or the tendency of individuals to prefer larger, later donations over value-equivalent smaller, sooner donations. Contact: [banker@mit.edu](mailto:banker@mit.edu)

#### **Altruistic Performance, Egoistic Choice**

*Yang, Adelle (University of Chicago, Booth School); Hsee, Chris (University of Chicago, Booth School); Urminsky, Oleg (University of Chicago, Booth School)*

In three studies using simple yet laborious low-pay tasks, we found that participants exerted more effort on the task if they were earning funds for others than if they were earning for themselves, indicating altruistic motivation. However, when given a choice, most participants chose to keep their earnings rather than donate, indicating egoistic choice. We propose that consideration of the possibility of keeping the earnings plays a crucial role in these contradictory results. These findings shed new light on research in pro-social behavior and altruism, and provide important implications for incentivizing donation behaviors. Contact: [oleg.urminsky@chicagobooth.edu](mailto:oleg.urminsky@chicagobooth.edu)

## **Explaining the processes behind identifiability and singularity effects on charitable giving**

*Dickert, Stephan (Vienna University of Economics and Business); Kleber, Janet (University of Vienna); Västfjäll, Daniel (Linköping University); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)*

Two prominent findings on the valuation of human lives highlight the importance of the psychological mechanisms influencing charitable giving: (1) the identified victim effect and (2) the singularity effect. We argue that both phenomena can be understood by their specific affective and cognitive underpinnings. In two studies we present evidence that mental imagery and perceived impact of a donation are mediated by affective motivators, and postulate a model that explains effects of victim identifiability and singularity on charitable giving in terms of the indirect effects of multiple mediators. Contact: [stephan.dickert@wu.ac.at](mailto:stephan.dickert@wu.ac.at)

## **Exceptional Framing Enhances Charitable Behavior**

*Sussman, Abigail (University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Sharma, Eesha (Dartmouth College); Alter, Adam (New York University)*

Previous research has shown that consumers spend more on the same item when they categorize it as an exceptional rather than ordinary expense (Sussman and Alter 2012). While earlier work focused on how this bias might harm individuals, the current research shows that exceptional framing can also yield societal benefits. In three lab studies and one field study, we collaborated with a health-related charity to examine whether exceptional framing of charitable behavior would increase willingness to help the charity. Results suggest that exceptional framing narrows the perceived size of the charitable expenses category and boosts charitable behavior. Contact: [eesha.sharma@gmail.com](mailto:eesha.sharma@gmail.com)

## **Session #6 Track II: Predictions and Forecasts – Civic South**

### **Elephants Weigh More Than...Elephants: Intuitive Biases Can Generate Prediction Bubbles**

*Simmons, Joseph (University of Pennsylvania)*

People's reliance on consensually held intuitions when deciding whether a quantity is too high or too low can generate prediction bubbles. In a sequential prediction task that requires people to consider whether a quantity is higher or lower than an ever-changing price, estimates (and hence prices) of intuitively large quantities tend to increase over time whereas estimates (and hence prices) of intuitively small quantities tend to decrease over time. Contact: [jsimmo@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:jsimmo@wharton.upenn.edu)

### **Fast & Frugal Forecasting for the Individual and the Crowd**

*Swift, Samuel A (UC Berkeley); Tetlock, Philip (University of Pennsylvania); Mellers, Barbara (University of Pennsylvania); Horowitz, Michael (University of Pennsylvania); Atanasov, Pavel (University of Pennsylvania)*

We test fast and frugal approaches to geopolitical forecasting at both the individual and crowd levels in the context of the IARPA ACE forecasting tournament. A largely novel set of decision heuristics derived from political science and psychology performed worse than the average individual forecaster. An investigation into the potential for fast and frugal approaches at the aggregate level was more fruitful and revealed that forecasting performance is subject to sharply diminishing returns with respect to increasing volume, duration, and granularity of crowd judgments. Contact: [samswift@berkeley.edu](mailto:samswift@berkeley.edu)

### **Seeing Algorithms Err Increases Algorithm Aversion**

*Dietvorst, Berkeley (The Wharton School); Simmons, Joseph P. (The Wharton School); Massey, Cade (The Wharton School)*

Forecasters prefer to rely on human judgment rather than superior statistical algorithms, but the basis for this preference is unknown. We asked participants to decide whether to base their incentivized forecasts of MBA applicants' success on their own predictions or on a (superior) statistical model. Participants were less likely to rely on the statistical model when they saw how well the model performed during a practice round, even for those who saw the model outperform their own forecasts. This suggests that people's dislike for algorithmic forecasts springs from seeing algorithms err, even when those errors are smaller than their own. Contact: [diet@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:diet@wharton.upenn.edu)

### **The fragile wisdom of dyads: Discussion undermines the benefits of collaboration on quantitative judgment tasks**

*Minson, Julia A. (Harvard University); Mueller, Jennifer S. (University of San Diego); Larrick, Richard P. (Duke University)*

We examine the effect of discussion for judgment accuracy. When making estimates on a bounded numerical scale, participants working in dyads and making estimates through discussion considered a narrower range of estimates than pairs of individuals working independently. Consequently, the estimates of dyads were no more accurate than those of individuals. When making estimates on an unbounded scale, discussion enabled dyad members to eliminate extreme "order of magnitude" errors, and led to a small accuracy benefit. We document a tradeoff whereby discussion engenders assimilation effects that minimize the benefits of collaboration, while enhancing collaborators' ability to detect egregious errors. Contact: [julia\\_minson@hks.harvard.edu](mailto:julia_minson@hks.harvard.edu)



## **Session #6 Track III: Choice and Probability Modeling - Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **Parameter Recovery for Decision Modeling Using Choice Data**

*Broomell, Stephen (Carnegie Mellon University); Bhatia, Sudeep (Carnegie Mellon University)*

Building on research in information theory and adaptive design optimization, we develop a computational framework for applying Kullback-Leibler divergence to quantify the effectiveness of a set of decision problems for recovering choice model parameters. This method can be applied to analyze the properties of previously used decision sets and for developing new decision sets without responses from a decision maker. We demonstrate our computational approach on three recent experimental decision sets designed for estimating cumulative prospect theory parameters from choice data, and we show that these sets differ strongly in their ability to recover underlying parameters. Contact: [broomell@cmu.edu](mailto:broomell@cmu.edu)

### **Are People Naive Probability Theorists: An Examination of the Probability Theory + Variation Model**

*Fisher, Christopher R. (Miami University); Wolfe, Christopher R. (Miami University)*

In two studies, we found limited support for the Probability + Variation Model. The model assumes that probability judgments follow probability theory, but errors result from noisy judgments. In study 1, averaging judgments increased rather than decreased conjunction and disjunction errors and decreased semantic coherence. No change was observed for minimum conjunction and maximum disjunction errors. In study 2, averaging conditional probability judgments decreased conversion errors, but increased conditional reversals and decreased semantic coherence. An averaging model was more consistent with some but not all of the findings. Both studies highlight the importance of modeling noise in judgments. Contact: [fisherc2@miamioh.edu](mailto:fisherc2@miamioh.edu)

### **Comparing Theories of Reference-Dependent Choice**

*Bhatia, Sudeep (Carnegie Mellon University)*

Reference dependence has traditionally been attributed to loss-averse framing. Recent research has however shown that reference points can also act as primes, affecting the accessibility of associated attributes. We outline diverging choice predictions of priming and framing theories of reference dependence, and present the results of a series of studies that use these diverging predictions to compare the two theories. We find that attribute priming provides a better quantitative fit to choice data, relative to loss-averse framing. Priming can also account for a number of choice patterns not predicted by framing. Contact: [sudeepb@andrew.cmu.edu](mailto:sudeepb@andrew.cmu.edu)

### **Delay resolution of uncertainty: a measurement**

*Abdellaoui, Mohammed (HEC); Diecidue, Enrico (INSEAD); Kemel, Emmanuel (Paris 1); Onculer, Ayse (ESSEC)*

We measure the impact of the delay of resolution of uncertainty in decision under risk. In a series of choices between temporal prospects we detect a systematic effect: decision makers are willing to reduce their probability of winning in order to resolve the uncertainty at an earlier stage. We model the impact of resolution of uncertainty by prospect theory. The decision weights are sensitive to the timing of uncertainty. This dependency is expressed by probability weighting functions whose parameters are affected by the earlier resolution of uncertainty showing less elevation and less sensitivity the later the uncertainty is resolved. Contact: [enrico.diecidue@insead.edu](mailto:enrico.diecidue@insead.edu)

## **Session #7 Track I: Intertemporal Choice - Civic North**

### **Loss Aversion for Time and Money: Reference Dependence in Intertemporal Choice**

*Walters, Daniel (Anderson School of Management, UCLA); Fox, Craig (Anderson School of Management, UCLA); Read, Daniel (University of Warwick)*

We demonstrate that conventional measures of temporal discounting are distorted by loss aversion for both time and money. In discount-delay tasks, more loss-averse individuals are more reluctant to give up the larger-later amount and therefore appear more patient. We introduce a measure of “delay-aversion” showing that people are more sensitive to time losses than time gains. While delay-aversion is highly correlated with loss aversion, it predicts opposite time preferences: more delay-averse individuals are more reluctant to give up the sooner payment and are therefore more impatient. Both effect sizes vary systematically with which payment is primed as the reference point. Contact:

[daniel.j.walters@gmail.com](mailto:daniel.j.walters@gmail.com)

## **Virtues and Vices in Monetary Tradeoffs: Evidence of Comparative Mental Accounting in Intertemporal Choice**

*Scholten, Marc (ISPA University Institute); Read, Daniel (Warwick Business School)*

We provide an integrative analysis of monetary tradeoffs involving single dated outcomes, sequences of single-valence outcomes, virtues (schedules of investment followed by benefits), and vices (schedules of benefits followed by debt). Results include debt aversion, aversion to absolute and relative vices, and attraction to absolute and relative virtues. We propose a comparative mental accounting model, in which people directly compare the outcomes afforded by the options at consecutive delays. Sooner comparative gains are attenuated by later comparative losses, and sooner comparative losses are buffered by later comparative gains. This model accounts for many puzzling phenomena in choice involving sequences. Contact: [scholten@ispa.pt](mailto:scholten@ispa.pt)

## **Zeroing in on the Hidden Zero Effect: Asymmetric Attention to Opportunity Costs Drives Intertemporal Choice**

*Read, Daniel (Warwick Business School); Olivola, Christopher (Carnegie Mellon University); Hardisty, Dave (University of British Columbia)*

Intertemporal choices have opportunity costs. We investigate whether people respond more to nudges that highlight earlier or later opportunity costs. We do this by adapting research showing that patience increases when both opportunity costs are highlighted by an explicit zero frame (“\$100 now AND \$0 in 1 year or \$0 now AND \$150 in one year”) relative to a hidden zero frame that highlights neither opportunity cost. We find patience increases when the later opportunity cost is highlighted (i.e., “\$0 in 1 year”) but that if only the earlier opportunity cost is highlighted (“\$0 now”) patience is unaffected. Contact: [daniel.read@wbs.ac.uk](mailto:daniel.read@wbs.ac.uk)

## **The Role of Attention in Intertemporal Choices**

*Fisher, Geoffrey (Caltech); Rangel, Antonio (Caltech)*

We run an eye tracking experiment designed to understand how visual attention is allocated in a simple intertemporal choice environment. Subjects make decisions between receiving a payment today or a larger, delayed payment. We find that those who are more patient spend significantly more time looking at the monetary amounts, as opposed to the delays when those amounts will be implemented. Those who are impatient spend more time looking at the word “today.” Additionally, we run several experiments designed to exogenously vary how attention is deployed and report how it impacts behavior. Contact: [rangel@hss.caltech.edu](mailto:rangel@hss.caltech.edu)

## **Session #7 Track II: Research and Academia - Civic South**

### **What's a failure to Replicate?**

*Simonsohn, Uri (Penn)*

I revisit published replication attempts of the endowment effect, the impact of weather on life-satisfaction, and the embodiment of morality as cleanliness, to demonstrate the current standard, of calling a replication a failure if  $p > .05$ , is unacceptable. I propose a new standard: replications fail when their results indicate that the effect of interest, if it exists at all, is too small to have been detected by the original study. This new standard: changes the conclusions for several published replications towards more intuitively compelling ones, and leads to a simple sample size requirement for replications: 2.5 times the original sample. Contact: [uws@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:uws@wharton.upenn.edu)

### **When are our experimental findings better than a guess?**

*Davis-Stober, Clinton (University of Missouri); Dana, Jason (University of Pennsylvania)*

We demonstrate that, at sample and effect sizes common to behavioral research, sample means estimate their corresponding population means less accurately than a benchmark estimator that randomizes the direction of treatment effects. Given the factors under an experimenter's control - sample size and number of treatment groups - we derive how much variance must be explained to outperform this benchmark. Using simulation methods, we confirm that sample means are unreliable under these conditions by showing that they do a poor job of even capturing the correct order of the population means. We discuss implications for replication research and possible remedies. Contact: [stoberc@missouri.edu](mailto:stoberc@missouri.edu)

## **Social Comparisons and Deception Across Workplace Hierarchies: Field and Experimental Evidence**

*Edelman, Benjamin (Harvard Business School); Larkin, Ian (Harvard Business School)*

We examine the link between negative social comparisons and deception by employees at different levels in a corporate hierarchy. In a field study, we show that full professors are more likely to deceptively download their own papers on SSRN's working paper network than junior professors when one of their papers is downloaded less often than a peer's paper. This relationship is especially strong for professors with a high degree of previous success, measured by Google Scholar citations. Two scenario-based experiments confirm that employees higher in a hierarchy are more likely to react to negative social comparisons by engaging in deception. Contact: [ilarkin@hbs.edu](mailto:ilarkin@hbs.edu)



## **Peering into Peer Assessment: Expert vs. Novice Judgments of Essay Quality**

*Tsai, Paige (Princeton University); Oppenheimer, Daniel M. (UCLA)*

To provide college credit, Massively Online Open Course platforms (MOOCs, e.g. Coursera) must find ways to grade thousands of students' essays; a problem they have solved through peer-grading. This strategy could be informed by the literature on novice vs. expert judgment. While previous research has shown high correlations between novice (peer) and expert (TA or professor) judgments of essay quality, we show this relation to be spurious. Novices grade on writing quality, while experts grade on factual content. Smart students write both well and accurately, allowing peer-grading to approximate experts, but the relationship breaks down under predictable circumstances. Contact:

[daniel.oppenheimer@anderson.ucla.edu](mailto:daniel.oppenheimer@anderson.ucla.edu)

## **Session #7 Track III: Judgment - Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **On the psychology of self-prediction: How potential obstacles are, and are not, considered when people predict their future behaviour**

*Koehler, Derek J. (University of Waterloo); Poon, Connie S. K. (Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Hong Kong); Buehler, Roger (Wilfrid Laurier University)*

We consider three reasons why people may not adjust sufficiently for potential obstacles when predicting their future behavior. First, self-predictions may focus exclusively on current intentions, ignoring potential obstacles altogether. We test this possibility with manipulations that draw greater attention to obstacles. Second, obstacles may be discounted in the self-prediction process. We test this possibility with prediction models that place greater weight on obstacles. Neither possibility was supported. Instead, the evidence supports a third possibility: In light of the uncertainty introduced by potential obstacles, self-predictions ought to be markedly regressive with respect to current intentions, but they are not.

Contact: [dkoehler@uwaterloo.ca](mailto:dkoehler@uwaterloo.ca)

### **Motivated mental imagery: The role of visual-spatial distance in the mental simulation of threatening outcomes**

*Lucas, Brian J. (Northwestern University)*

Humans have the unique capacity to simulate future outcomes in order to inform their present decisions. In the current research we tested whether self-protection motivation influences the visual-spatial perception of mental images during the simulation of threatening future outcomes. In Studies 1-2 threatening outcomes were simulated with greater visual-spatial distance than non-threatening outcomes. In other words, threatening mental images were perceived as smaller in the mind's eye. Study 3 manipulated visual-spatial distances and found that those who simulated a threatening outcome with greater visual-spatial distance experienced less cognitive depletion and greater positive affect. Contact:

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### **Fooled by heteroscedastic randomness: The biasing effect of heteroscedasticity on cue-outcome inferences**

*de Langhe, Bart (University of Colorado at Boulder); Puntoni, Stefano (Erasmus University); van Osselaer, Stijn (Cornell University); McGill, Ann (University of Chicago)*

Many cue-outcome relationships across a variety of domains (e.g., consumer, managerial, medical, and legal decision making contexts) are characterized by heteroscedasticity. We show that decision makers make outcome inferences that are systematically more extreme when random variation in the outcome is heteroscedastic rather than homoscedastic. This is because experience in the region where random variation in the outcome is low leads them to believe that the cue-outcome relationship is stronger than it really is. We highlight implications of heteroscedasticity, for example, for understanding the emergence and persistence of stereotypical beliefs (e.g., "poor people are criminals," "cheap products have poor quality"). Contact: [bart.delanghe@colorado.edu](mailto:bart.delanghe@colorado.edu)

### **Multiple numeric competencies in judgment and decision-making processes**

*Peters, Ellen (Ohio State University); Bjälkebring, Par (University of Gothenburg)*

Numeracy includes multiple facets-Objective Numeracy Ability (ONS), Subjective Numeracy Sense (SNS), and Approximate Number Sense (ANS). We examined their relations to performance in three judgment-and-decision-related tasks (memory for numeric and non-numeric information, sensitivity to the presence of a small loss in a bet, and risky-choice valuation). We conclude that, although the competencies are correlated, they have dissociable influences. SNS taps into important motivational effects whereas ANS involves the ability to distinguish between magnitudes. ONS itself relates to attending to numbers (and number comparisons) and using logical number-related algorithms. Contact:

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**MONDAY NOV 18, 2013**

**Rooms - Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin**

**Session #8 Track I: Morality and Ethics 3 - Civic North**

**Does Could Lead to Good? When Contemplating Possible Actions Generates More Creative Ethical Solutions**

*Zhang, Ting (Harvard Business School); Gino, Francesca (Harvard Business School); Margolis, Joshua D. (Harvard Business School)*

When faced with difficult dilemmas that feature competing ethical and performance-oriented objectives, individuals naturally ask themselves, “What should I do?” Across four experiments, we demonstrate that asking “What could I do?” instead helps individuals realize that these seemingly incompatible objectives are more compatible, influencing individuals to arrive at moral insights that meet both objectives. We show that individuals asked to consider “coulds” expended more effort to find creative ethical solutions. In contrast, those considering “should” were more likely to view these ethical and performance-oriented objectives as incompatible, forcing them to prioritize one objective while neglecting the other. Contact: [tzhang@hbs.edu](mailto:tzhang@hbs.edu)

**Competence by any Means: Cheating as a Response to Ego Threat**

*Moore, Celia (London Business School); Gino, Francesca (Harvard Business School); Wakeman, S. Wiley (London Business School)*

Research on unethical behavior argues that individuals are willing to cheat up until the point that cheating damages their self-image. Inverting this idea, we demonstrate in 4 studies that threats to self-perceptions of personal competence can motivate cheating, and that cheating provides an alternate route to renew one’s sense of competence, circumventing legitimate routes to performance. We discuss theoretical implications for current theories of both ego-protective behavior and unethical behavior, and identify fruitful directions for future research. Contact: [cmoore@london.edu](mailto:cmoore@london.edu)

**Know who you're up against: Counterpart identifiability enhances competitive behavior**

*Haran, Uriel (Ben-Gurion University); Ritov, Ilana (Hebrew University)*

Prior research has highlighted the role of certain competitors’ attributes in determining competition intensity. We find similar effects even when competitors are anonymous, but are merely identifiable -- their identities have been determined but not revealed. Three experiments demonstrate that arbitrary information about one’s competitors enhances one’s goal-driven behavior: when their counterparts were identifiable, participated exerted more effort and performed better on a competitive task, and offered more money to outbid their counterparts in an auction, than when their counterparts were unspecified. Additionally, identifiability seems to influence both the desire to win and the aversion to losing, albeit in different ways. Contact: [uharan@som.bgu.ac.il](mailto:uharan@som.bgu.ac.il)

**Minor lies preserving a positive self-view or simply avoiding suspicion? A test in ethical decision making.**

*Hilbig, Benjamin E. (University of Mannheim)*

Recent research has consistently shown that most people tend to limit their (un)ethical behavior and resort only to minor lies. This pattern is compatible with the idea that dishonesty poses a threat to one’s self view. However, many findings are actually inconclusive as they can alternatively be explained by people avoiding large (unjustified) payoffs, most plausibly because the latter are more suspicious. We teased the two explanations apart in a large-scale experiment (N = 765) using a modified dice-game paradigm. Findings clearly support the idea that people indeed avoid major lies -- not just suspicious responses. Contact: [hilbig@psychologie.uni-mannheim.de](mailto:hilbig@psychologie.uni-mannheim.de)

**Session #8 Track II: Consumer Decision Making - Civic South**

**How the psychological tangibility of costs affects choice as the number of alternatives increases**

*Shah, Avni M. (Duke University); Bettman, Jim (Duke University); Payne, John (Duke University)*

Research has demonstrated that as the number of alternatives increases, buying initially increases and then decreases, resulting in an inverted U-shape function. However, we propose that increasing (decreasing) how psychologically tangible the costs associated with decision-making are can magnify (mitigate) the negative effects of choosing from increasing assortment sets. Across three studies, we demonstrate that reducing the psychological salience of money in order to pay for an item (debit/credit versus cash), the economic cost of the item (\$0.25 versus \$1 or \$2), and purchasing an item for another person all mitigate choice overload effects. Contact: [avni.shah@duke.edu](mailto:avni.shah@duke.edu)

## **The Impact of Comparison Frames and Category Width On Strength of Preferences**

*Malkoc, Selin (Washington University St. Louis); Ulkumen, Gulden (University of Southern California)*

The strength with which one option is preferred over another generally increases when options are perceived as more different, and thus easier to distinguish. We demonstrate that “width” (granularity) of previously exposed categorizations moderates this effect. Decision makers primed with broad categorizations adopt the salient comparison orientation (i.e., focus on either similarities or differences between options). However, decision makers primed with narrow categorizations employ both salient and non-salient comparison orientations (consider both similarities and differences between options). When differences are more salient, broad categories strengthen subsequent preferences: decisions are faster, and people pay larger premiums for chosen over non-chosen products. Contact: [ulkumen@marshall.usc.edu](mailto:ulkumen@marshall.usc.edu)

## **The Desire to Acquire Wish List Items**

*Popovich, Deidre L. (Emory University); Hamilton, Ryan P. (Emory University)*

Consumers often postpone an online purchase by placing the item onto a wish list. Goal-directed choice theory predicts that deferring a purchase should increase the desire to acquire the item. In contrast, we demonstrate that using a wish list leads to weaker product preferences. A theoretical extension of two-stage decision making explains how and why consumers’ reevaluations decrease subsequent purchase likelihood. The mechanism driving this effect is a focus on desirability of the intended purchase in the first decision stage and later on the feasibility of purchasing the item. Five experiments lend support for the theory and empirical predictions advanced. Contact: [deidre.popovich@emory.edu](mailto:deidre.popovich@emory.edu)

## **Questioning the “I” in Experience: Experiential Purchases Foster Social Connection**

*Kumar, Amit (Cornell University); Mann, Thomas C. (Cornell University); Gilovich, Thomas D. (Cornell University)*

We demonstrate that experiential purchases (money spent on doing) foster social connection more than material purchases (money spent on having). People feel more connected to those who have made the same or similar experiential purchases, even when the other person has made an “upgraded” version of their own purchase (Studies 1 and 2). After reflecting on experiential purchases, participants also report feeling more connected to people in general (Study 3), are more likely to engage in social activities (Study 4), and act more prosocially (i.e. by being more generous when assigned the allocator role in a dictator game; Study 5). Contact: [ak756@cornell.edu](mailto:ak756@cornell.edu)

## **Session #8 Track III: Choice 2 - Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **Reining in regret: Strategic orientations modulate regret in decision making**

*Reeck, Crystal (Duke University); Lai, Carmen G. (Duke University); LaBar, Kevin S. (Duke University)*

Whereas the influence of regret on decision making is well-established, it remains unclear whether different strategic orientations may cognitively modulate both the affective experience of regret and its influence on decisions. The present experiment demonstrates that approaching a series of decisions as a portfolio leads to diminished influence of regret on choices compared to focusing on each decision in isolation. Moreover, this broad, portfolio orientation led to less extreme affective reactions to outcomes and lowered physiological arousal levels. These findings support a role for cognitive strategies in mitigating both the affective experience of regret and its consequences for decision making. Contact: [crystalreeck@gmail.com](mailto:crystalreeck@gmail.com)

### **Staying the Course: The Impact of No-choice Options on Post-Choice Persistence**

*Schriфт, Rom Y. (Wharton); Parker, Jeffrey R. (Georgia State University)*

Decision-makers regularly face adversity in the pursuit of chosen goals. Persistence, the steadfast continuance on a course of action despite obstacles or adversity, is an important factor in determining whether or not they achieve those goals. In this paper we demonstrate that including a seemingly irrelevant no-choice option at the time of choice increases decision-makers’ persistence on their chosen courses of action. In a series of 6 studies we find this effect across several incentive-compatible tasks and show that the effect is driven by self-perception (seeing myself choosing this course of action over doing nothing) mitigating post-choice counterfactual thinking. Contact: [jeffparker@gsu.edu](mailto:jeffparker@gsu.edu)

## **Knowing without Remembering: How Articulation Reduces the Accuracy of Numeric Comparisons**

*Kyung, Ellie (Dartmouth College, Tuck School of Business); Thomas, Manoj (Cornell University, Johnson School of Business)*

Three experiments on memory-based price comparisons demonstrate a paradoxical finding: Participants first asked to articulate the comparison standard before making comparative judgments were less accurate than those not asked to do so. We propose that people rely on a subjective feeling of knowing when making comparative numerical magnitude judgments. Disrupting this FOK through (1) attempting explicit articulation of the comparison standard or (2) negative feedback can make these judgments less accurate. Ironically, merely attempting to articulate a memory-based comparison standard reduces the accuracy of comparative magnitude judgments -- an articulation paradox. A fourth experiment replicated these findings for frequency judgments. Contact: [ellie.kyung@tuck.dartmouth.edu](mailto:ellie.kyung@tuck.dartmouth.edu)

## **What was I Thinking? Effect of Construal Level on Memory-Based Choice**

*Baskin, Ernest (Yale University); Wakslak, Cheryl (University of Southern California); Novemsky, Nathan (Yale University)*

While research in construal level theory typically looks at one-time decisions, we consider decisions that require learning over time. In a series of studies, we show when construal acts through attribute weighting at the point of information retrieval rather than attentional processes in information encoding. Contact: [ernest.baskin@yale.edu](mailto:ernest.baskin@yale.edu)

## **Session #9 Track I: Gambling and Insurance - Civic North**

### **The hidden cost of insurance on trust and reciprocity**

*Calseyde van de, Philippe (Tilburg University); Keren, Gideon (Tilburg University); Zeelenberg, Marcel (Tilburg University)*

To trust is to risk and a common solution to mitigate problems of risk is to buy insurance. In multiple experiments we find that buying insurance may have a hidden cost: Trustees are more likely act opportunistically when trustors choose to be insured against the risk of betrayal. The reason that trustees are less likely to cooperate is that by choosing insurance, trustors signal that they expect the trustee to behave opportunistically. These results shed new light on the weakness of financial safeguards: The remedy against the risk of betrayal may paradoxically increase the probability of betrayal. Contact: [s642391@uvt.nl](mailto:s642391@uvt.nl)

### **Are Longshots Only for Losers? A New Look at the Last Race Effect**

*McKenzie, Craig R. M. (UC San Diego); Sher, Shlomi (Pomona College); Lin, Charlette (Ohio State University); Liersch, Michael J. (Merrill Lynch); Rawstron, Anthony George (PUC Rio de Janeiro)*

Betting on longshots increases in the last race of a day of horse racing. Previous models have assumed that the phenomenon is driven by bettors who have lost money and are trying to recoup their losses. To test this assumption, two laboratory experiments simulated a day at the races. The results showed a clear longshot bias in the last round, regardless of whether, and how many, points were gained or lost in previous rounds. Winning or losing, bettors prefer to "go out with a bang" at the end of a series of gambles. Contact: [cmckenzie@ucsd.edu](mailto:cmckenzie@ucsd.edu)

### **Superstitious Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes**

*Morewedge, Carey K. (Carnegie Mellon University)*

A substantial proportion of people are unwilling to accept an emotional hedge against uncertain desired outcomes. A substantial proportion of US voters, NFL fans, and NCAA basketball fans refused a free hedge against their preferred candidate winning the 2012 Presidential election or the victory of their team, respectively. Participants refused to earn real money (or other goods) with no risk of loss to them, if the outcome did not occur. This reluctance appeared to be due to the belief that hedging against the desired outcome would reduce its probability of occurring. Contact: [morewedge@andrew.cmu.edu](mailto:morewedge@andrew.cmu.edu)

### **I can only bet on my failure, not yours: Differences in betting behavior for the self and close other**

*Tang, Simone (Duke University); Larrick, Richard (Duke University)*

We show that people are willing to experience motivational conflict (winning money or obtaining desired event) for their own outcomes, but unwilling to do so for close others. In Study 1, despite equal expected value gambles, MBA students were more willing to bet on their favorite presidential candidate. In Study 2, participants were more likely to bet on their friends' success than their own or a stranger's. In Study 3, we replicate the effect and show that it was mediated by loyalty towards friends. These results have implications for insurance-based behaviors and reluctance for utilitarianism. Contact: [simone.tang@duke.edu](mailto:simone.tang@duke.edu)

## **Session #9 Track II: Emotions, Optimism, and Well-Being - Civic South**

### **Hedonic Durability**

*Yang, Yang (Carnegie Mellon University); Hsee, Christopher (University of Chicago); Urminsky, Oleg (University of Chicago); Zhang, Li (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)*

Although individuals' happiness with most items fades over time, some items are more hedonically durable than others are. We introduce a simple survey method (i.e., the Hedonic Durability Questionnaire) to estimate the hedonic durability of different items at a single occasion. We test the validity of the HDQ and show that it produces remarkably similar results to real online measures (Study 1), and that it is sensitive to factors that have been shown to influence hedonic adaptation (Studies 2 and 3). Finally, we apply the HDQ to a variety of items in everyday life (Study 4).

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### **Partisan Identity's Intense Well-Being Consequences: Losing 2012 Election Hurt More Than Newtown Shootings and Boston Marathon Bombings**

*Pierce, Lamar (Washington University in St. Louis); Rogers, Todd (Harvard Kennedy School); Snyder, Jason A. (UCLA)*

The hurt of losing an election is worse than the joy of winning one -- and losing hurts a lot. We use a unique large dataset to study the well-being consequences of electoral outcomes for partisans in the 2012 US Presidential election. We find that election outcomes strongly affect partisan losers but have minimal impact on partisan winners, consistent with research on good-bad hedonic asymmetry. Second, this impact is intense: twice the impact of either the Newtown shootings on respondents with children or the Boston Marathon bombings on Bostonians. This highlights how central partisan identity is to the self and well-being. Contact: [pierce@wustl.edu](mailto:pierce@wustl.edu)

### **Issue specific emotionality: Beyond effects of utility**

*Moran, Simone (Ben Gurion University of the Negev); Ritov, Ilana (Hebrew University)*

People often deal with multiple issues varying in utility and in emotional activation. Using negotiations as an example, we manipulate intensity of issues' emotional associations, independent of their utility. Results suggest that being emotionally charged about a particular issue doesn't spill over to other issues. Moreover, negotiators are more reluctant to concede on emotionally charged (vs. neutral) issues and consequently *obtain more efficient outcomes when the higher utility issue is also the more emotional evoking one. Participants seem aware of this effect*: when preparing for negotiations they are more likely to prefer emotional over non-emotional information for high utility issues. Contact: [simone@bgu.ac.il](mailto:simone@bgu.ac.il)

### **Optimistic About Optimism: The Belief That Optimism Improves Performance**

*Tenney, Elizabeth R. (University of California, Berkeley); Logg, Jennifer M. (University of California, Berkeley); Moore, Don A. (University of California, Berkeley)*

A series of experiments investigated why people believe it is good to be optimistic and whether they are right to do so. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants prescribed optimism for someone implementing decisions but not for someone deliberating, indicating that people prescribe optimism selectively, when it can affect performance. Additional experiments tested the accuracy of this belief; optimism did not improve performance as much as participants expected. Thus, people prefer optimism when they believe it has the opportunity to improve the chance of success -- unfortunately, people may be overly optimistic about just how much optimism can do. Contact: [eliz.tenney@gmail.com](mailto:eliz.tenney@gmail.com)

## **Session #9 Track III: Framing and Response Elicitation - Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **Lay Understanding of Observed Distributions: Frequencies versus Fractiles**

*Rothschild, David (Microsoft Research); Goldstein, Daniel G. (Microsoft Research)*

This paper examines a family of related questions concerning graphical and traditional techniques for eliciting distributions from laypeople. It shows that psychologically-grounded graphical interfaces impose lower user costs and lead to more accurate responses than stated methods. When provided the same revealed distributions, respondents can describe the data more accurately in terms of frequency distributions than in terms of fractiles or cumulative distributions. Graphical interfaces expand the range of questions researchers can efficiently ask users and thus the quantity of information obtained. Contact: [davidmr@microsoft.com](mailto:davidmr@microsoft.com)

## **Imago Animi Sermo Est - Speech is the Mirror of The Mind: The Effect of Vocal Expression on Preferences**

*Klesse, Anne-Kathrin (Tilburg University); Levav, Jonathan (Stanford University); Goukens, Caroline (Maastricht University)*

We compare non-vocal elicitation modes (i.e., pushing a button) to vocal preference elicitation (i.e., expressing one's choice by speech). Three laboratory studies and one field study reveal that vocally expressing one's choice increases the likelihood to choose vices rather than virtues. Specifically, speaking prompts individuals to choose a regular ice cream rather than the low-fat version (study 1) or an unhealthy rather than a healthy dessert (study 2). Further, speaking results in snack choices higher in calorie content (study 3 and 4). The tendency to choose something one really likes mediates the effect of expression mode on choice. Contact: [a.k.klesse@uvt.nl](mailto:a.k.klesse@uvt.nl)

## **Dichotomizing data changes perceptions of covariation**

*Schiro, Julie (University of Colorado, Boulder); de Langhe, Bart (University of Colorado, Boulder); Fernbach, Philip (University of Colorado, Boulder)*

When inferring the strength of a relationship between two variables people place unequal weight on different types of data, focusing primarily on cases where the antecedent is present and neglecting cases where it's absent. This cell weight inequality is one of the most replicated phenomena in the judgment literature, but we show that it is substantially reduced when people reason about continuous as opposed to dichotomized data. Merely suggesting dichotomization by placing gridlines on the data is sufficient to replicate the typical effect, suggesting that previous literature has overstated the case for general accounts of reasoning about relationships between variables. Contact: [julie.schiro@colorado.edu](mailto:julie.schiro@colorado.edu)

## **Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: How Whole Unit Framing Increases Effort**

*Barasz, Kate N. (Harvard Business School); John, Leslie K. (Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael I. (Harvard Business School)*

Can arbitrarily framing tasks as whole units (you are now completing task 1 out of 5), as opposed to multiple units of the same total quantity (you are now completing task 1) increase effort levels? Two studies show that whole unit framing increases the number of tasks participants are willing to complete -- even when not paid for their effort. A third study shows that individuals are more willing to accept a risky gamble in pursuit of whole unit fulfillment. Finally, we use verbal reference points to show that whole unit framing increases charitable contributions.

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# **SJDM SUNDAY MORNING POSTER SESSION #1 & BOOK AUCTION**

**8:30am – 10:30am w/Continental Breakfast - Sheraton Hall**

- 1) A bias in heuristics: Rational and intuitive thinking styles  
*Blettner, Daniela (Simon Fraser University); Rothengatter, Marloes (Tilburg University)*
- 2) Anchors Bias Judgment and Increase Confidence  
*Smith, Andrew R. (Appalachian State University); Marshall, Lindsay D. (Appalachian State University)*
- 3) Hindsight Bias: A correct judgment bias or simply a memory bias  
*Pinegar, Shannon (Ohio University); Chimeli, Janna (Ohio University); Bellezza, Frank (Ohio University)*
- 4) Cognitive Biases in Borrowing Decisions: Implications for the Student Debt Crisis  
*Chabot, Aimee M. (University of California, San Diego); Parris, Julian L. (University of California, San Diego); Bryan, Christopher J. (University of California, San Diego)*
- 5) Status-Quo Bias Revisited: Label versus Knowledge  
*He, Xin (University of Central Florida); Gong, Baiyun (Nova Southeastern University)*
- 6) Complexity Bias in Stock Choice and Retirement Plan Selection  
*Terpstra, Natasha (Michigan Technological University); Cokely, Edward (Michigan Technological University)*
- 7) Self-Perception Bias as a Barrier to Behavior Change  
*Amato, Michael S. (University of Wisconsin - Madison); Moore, Colleen F. (Montana State University); Shaw, Bret R. (University of Wisconsin - Madison)*
- 8) Implicit categorization causes biases in the perception of sequences  
*Gao, Jie (Center for Decision Science, Columbia University); Corter, James (Teachers College, Columbia University)*
- 9) When two heads are worse than one: Biases towards single authorship in the evaluation of creative works  
*Smith, Rosanna K. (Yale University); Newman, George E. (Yale University)*

- 10) Does trait mindfulness attenuate cognitive biases related to the representativeness heuristic?  
*Young, Diana L. (Georgia College); Heppner, Whitney L. (Georgia College)*
- 11) Assessing the effectiveness of an analogical debiasing technique  
*Bago, Bence (University of Edinburgh); Szollosi, Aba (ELTE, Hungary); Foldes, Andrei (ELTE, Hungary); Aczel, Balazs (ELTE, Hungary)*
- 12) Withdrawn
- 13) How to Decrease the Amortization and Exponential Growth Bias: Experience vs. Rules  
*Foltice, Bryan (Finance Center Muenster); Langer, Thomas (Finance Center Muenster)*
- 14) Individual differences and self-framing in the sunk cost bias  
*Yan, Haoyang (University of Iowa); Gaeth, Gary J (University of Iowa); Levin, Irwin P (University of Iowa)*
- 15) Remembering the best and worst of times: Memories for extreme outcomes bias risky decisions  
*Ludvig, Elliot A. (Princeton University); Madan, Christopher R. (University of Alberta); Spetch, Marcia L. (University of Alberta)*
- 16) The effectiveness of cognitive reappraisal in reducing a decision-making bias, measured using a stock market simulation  
*Grayson, Paul J (The Open University); Fenton-O'Creevy, Mark (The Open University); Hardy, Ben (The Open University)*
- 17) Methodological questions in measuring individual differences in decision biases  
*Aczel, Balazs (ELTE, Hungary); Bago, Bence (ELTE, Hungary); Foldes, Andrei (ELTE, Hungary); Szollosi, Aba (ELTE, Hungary)*
- 18) The role of narcissism and should counterfactual thinking in the hindsight bias  
*Kausel, Edgar (University of Chile); Reb, Jochen (Singapore Management University); Culbertson, Satoris (Kansas State University); Jackson, Alexander (Kansas State University); Leiva, Pedro (University of Chile)*
- 19) Wisdom of the crowd can improve confidence interval estimates, but a systematic bias could lead to underperformance  
*Yeung, Saiwing (Beijing Institute of Technology)*
- 20) Don't Judge a Decision by its Outcome: Influence of Event Construal on the Outcome Bias  
*Savani, Krishna (National University of Singapore); King, Dan (National University of Singapore)*
- 21) The Pearson Correlation Heuristic: Interpretations of the Pearson Coefficient of Correlation are Optimistically Biased  
*Gamliel, Eyal (Ruppin Academic Center); Gur, Roi (Ruppin Academic Center)*
- 22) Is a picture worth a thousand words? The interaction of visual display and attribute representation in attenuating framing bias  
*Gamliel, Eyal (Ruppin Academic Center); Kreiner, Hamutal (Ruppin Academic Center)*
- 23) Effects of training format and numeracy on Bayesian reasoning  
*Weber, Bethany (Iowa State University); Yeung, Kam Leung (Iowa State University); Pappas, Nikolaos (University of Wisconsin-Madison); Carpenter, Shana (Iowa State University)*
- 24) Conditional Syllogism Training Improves Judgments on Wason's Selection Task  
*Hunt, Gayle (New Mexico State University); Trafimow, David (New Mexico State University)*
- 25) Adjusting, but From Where? Judgment in the Presence of Multiple Anchors  
*Bixter, Michael T. (Stony Brook University); Luhmann, Christian C. (Stony Brook University)*
- 26) Extending the Cognitive Reflection Test  
*Toplak, Maggie E. (York University); West, Richard F. (James Madison University); Stanovich, Keith E. (University of Toronto)*
- 27) How working memory load impacts decision strategies  
*Fechner, Hanna B. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Schooler, Lael J. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Pachur, Thorsten (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 28) Denominator neglect in cigarette graphic warning labels  
*Meilleur, Louise (Ohio State); Moreno-Vasquez, Tomas (Ohio State); Peters, Ellen (Ohio State)*
- 29) Unfolding Anchoring: Individual Difference Approach  
*Teovanovic, Predrag (Institute for Psychology, University of Belgrade)*
- 30) The Effect of Sample Size on Judgments of Average Physical Size  
*Price, Paul C. (California State University, Fresno); Kimura, Nicole M.. (California State University, Fresno); Smith, Andrew R. (Appalachian State University); Marshall, Lindsay D. (Appalachian State University)*



- 31) Gas Neglect  
*Schley, Dan R. (The Ohio State University)*
- 32) The When and Why of Reverse Endowment Effects: A Query Theory Investigation  
*Jasper, John (University of Toledo); Corser, Ryan (University of Toledo); Westfall, Jonathan E. (Centenary College of Louisiana)*
- 33) Same old problems? Causal structure as an intervention to overcome Base Rate Neglect  
*McNair, Simon (Leeds University Business School); Feeney, Aidan (Queen's University Belfast)*
- 34) The cost of liking odd numbers  
*Hafenbraedl, Sebastian (University of Lausanne); Woike, Jan K. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 35) Aging and the Framing Effect: A Meta-analysis  
*Best, Ryan (Florida State University); Charness, Neil (Florida State University)*
- 36) The Psychology of Leaving Things Behind, from Parties to Partners  
*Sezer, Ovul (Harvard University/ Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael I. (Harvard Business School); Gino, Francesca (Harvard Business School)*
- 37) A Closer Look at the Effects of Actions Versus Inactions on Post-Decisional Regret: Do Perceptions of Self Versus Others Play a Role?  
*Johnson, Desiree N. (University of Nebraska-Omaha); Scherer, Lisa L. (University of Nebraska-Omaha)*
- 38) Can 10 minutes-10 months-10 years lead to better decisions?  
*Shin, Hee Yeon (Harvard Business School); Gino, Francesca (Harvard Business School)*
- 39) Time preferences and environmental decisions  
*Stevens, Jeffrey R. (University of Nebraska-Lincoln); Arthurs, Leilani (University of Nebraska-Lincoln)*
- 40) The effect of time pressure on group polarization and the first advocacy effect in group decision making  
*Tsuzuki, Takashi (Department of Psychology, Rikkyo University); Manabu, Kikuchi (Department of Psychology, Rikkyo University); Itsuki, Chiba (Graduate School of Psychology, Rikkyo University)*
- 41) The effects of time pressure on faking  
*Zhang, Don (Bowling Green State University); Nye, Christopher (Michigan State University)*
- 42) Money, Choices, & Time: Does understanding numbers help?  
*Bhattacharya, Chandrima (University of Toledo); Jasper, John D. (University of Toledo)*
- 43) Combining Response Time and Choice Data in a Neuroeconomic Model of the Decision Process Improves Out-of-Sample Predictions  
*Clithero, John A. (Caltech); Rangel, Antonio (Caltech)*
- 44) Giving Money vs. Giving Time: The Effect of Compensation on Judgments of Transgressions  
*Wan, Jing (University of Toronto); Aggarwal, Pankaj (University of Toronto)*
- 45) Probabilistic reasoning under time pressure: Developmental evidence for good intuition  
*Furlan, Sarah (University of Padova); Agnoli, Franca (University of Padova); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell University)*
- 46) Fighting for Self-Control: The Influence of Impulsivity on Unhealthy Habits  
*Jackson, Marc D. (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana M. (Auburn University)*
- 47) Is it all about the self? The effect of self-control depletion on ultimatum game proposers  
*Halali, Eliran (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev); Bereby-Meyer, Yoella (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev); Ockenfels, Axel (University of Cologne)*
- 48) The Emergency Reserve: The Effects of Slack on Self-Control Behavior  
*Sharif, Marissa A. (UCLA Anderson School of Management); Shu, Suzanne B. (UCLA Anderson School of Management)*
- 49) Seeing the future in what might have been: Counterfactual thought in decision process tracing  
*Frame, Mary E. (Miami University); Zhang, Ruohui (Miami University); Summerville, Amy (Miami University); Bristow, R. Evan (Miami University); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University); Trask-Tolbert, Amanda R. (Miami University)*
- 50) Epistemic vs. Aleatory Representations of Uncertainty: Content Analysis Indicators of Accuracy in Geopolitical Forecasting  
*Scott, Sydney E. (University of Pennsylvania); Metz, S. Emlen (University of Pennsylvania); Rohrbaugh, Nick (University of Pennsylvania); Mellers, Barbara A. (University of Pennsylvania); Tetlock, Philip E. (University of Pennsylvania); Schwartz, H. Andrew (University of Pennsylvania)*



- 51) Convergence across three indicators of temporal discounting and associations with cognitive ability  
*Basile, Alexandra (York University); Saoud, Wafa (York University); Toplak, Maggie (York University)*
- 52) Temporal Perspective and Decision Coping Patterns as Determinants of Conflict Management Styles  
*Upadhyay, Divya (Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, India); Mukherjee, Kanchan (Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, India)*
- 53) Decision Field Theory-Dynamic: A Model of Planning On the Fly  
*Hotaling, Jared (Indiana University)*
- 54) Thinking Beyond the Here and Now: Mental Simulation Across Psychological Distance  
*Wheeler, Natalie M. (The University of Chicago); Caruso, Eugene M. (The University of Chicago); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado)*
- 55) Experienced Regret and Impulsivity: To Delay or not Delay?  
*Darbor, Kathleen E. (Texas A& M University); Lench, Heather C. (Texas A& M University)*
- 56) Training People to be Myopic or Far-Sighted  
*Zhang, Hang (New York University); Kim, Hyoseok (New York University); Daw, Nathaniel D. (New York University); Maloney, Laurence T. (New York University)*
- 57) Self-Regulation in Decisions for the Self versus Other  
*Komoski, Stephanie E. (Wake Forest University); Stone, Eric R. (Wake Forest University); Masicampo, E. J. (Wake Forest University)*
- 58) I'd Move Mountains for You: Construal Level Theory and Costly Sacrifices in Romantic Relationships  
*Asyabi-Eshghi, Behzad (University of Toronto); Impett, Emily A. (University of Toronto)*
- 59) Modeling Age Differences in the Rapid Integration of Gains and Losses  
*Horn, Sebastian S. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Mata, Rui (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Pachur, Thorsten (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 60) Deferring Important Decisions  
*Krijnen, Job M. T. (Tilburg University); Breugelmans, Seger M. (Tilburg University); Zeelenberg, Marcel (Tilburg University)*
- 61) Information distortion and the role of psychological distance  
*Kim, Ka Eun (Yonsei University); Rim, Hye Bin (Yonsei University)*
- 62) Withdrawn
- 63) Consumer Choice in Price-Free Situations  
*Ramaswami, Seshan (Singapore Management University)*
- 64) Experts' perspective on consumers' perception and decision making in retail finance  
*Jonaityte, Inga (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)*
- 65) QuickChoice: Using Defaults to Help Consumers Choose High-Value Health Insurance  
*Gao, Jie (Columbia University); Appelt, Kirstin C. (Pacific Business Group on Health); von Glahn, Ted (Pacific Business Group on Health); Johnson, Eric J. (Columbia University)*
- 66) Designing Risk Communications that Help Consumers to Make Better decisions  
*Liberali, Jordana M. (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Dellaert, Benedict G. C. (Erasmus University Rotterdam)*
- 67) Withdrawn
- 68) The influence of online interaction in virtual community on consumer Decisions  
*Guan, Yuhong (Tsinghua University); Liu, Maggie Wenjing (Tsinghua University)*
- 69) You Are Where You Shop: Discrepancies between Explicit and Implicit Self-Esteem and Consumer Judgment  
*Jin, Lu (Rotman, University of Toronto); Mitchell, Andrew (Rotman, University of Toronto)*
- 70) Not All Control is Created Equal: The Effects of Behavioral and Decisional Control on Consumer Judgments  
*Hagen, Anna Linda (Ross School of Business, University of Michigan)*

- 71) Look for the signature: The influence of personal signatures on product evaluations and purchase behavior  
*Kettle, Keri (University of Miami); Mantonakis, Antonia (Brock University)*
- 72) The Nature and Effects of High Service Attentiveness  
*Liu, Maggie Wenjing (Tsinghua University); Zhang, Lijun (Peking University); Keh, Hean Tat (Monash University)*
- 73) Does ownership duration really matter? Experimental study  
*Rosenboim, Mosi (Ben Gurion University of the Negev); Shavit, Tal (The College of Management Academic Studies)*
- 74) Owning the Experience: How Possessions Shape our Memory and Decisions  
*Hur, Julia D. (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University); Nordgren, Loran F. (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)*
- 75) What's in it for me? The role of exchange equity in tax evasion  
*Plantinga, Arnoud (Tilburg University); van Wolferen, Job (Tilburg University)*
- 76) Neural correlates of emotional and rational considerations in moral tradeoffs  
*Montaser-Kouhsari, Leila (Caltech); Hutcherson, Cendri (Caltech); Rangel, Antonio (Caltech)*
- 77) Withdrawn
- 78) Morality as an argument: people think of moral beliefs as neither objective truths nor subjective preferences  
*Fernandez-Duque, Diego (Villanova University); McCusker, Kelly (Villanova University); Jackiewicz, Michael (Villanova University); Evans, Jessica (Villanova University)*
- 79) Third Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence? - A Comparison Between Groups and Individuals  
*Tan, Fangfang (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance); Xiao, Erte (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 80) Essentialism of religious identity  
*Ginges, Jeremy (New School for Social Research); Salari Rad, Mostafa (New School for Social Research)*
- 81) Giving Even When it Hurts: Highly Interdependent People are Willing to Sacrifice for a Romantic Partner Even in the Face of High Costs  
*Day, Lisa C. (University of Toronto); Le, Bonnie M. (University of Toronto); Impett, Emily A. (University of Toronto)*
- 82) What can be learned about social preferences by investigating cognitive processes?  
*Fiedler, Susann (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Glockner, Andreas (University of Gottingen); Nicklisch, Andreas (University of Hamburg); Dickert, Stephan (University of Wien)*
- 83) Influence of Belief in God on Decision Making  
*Wieland, Alice (U Nevada-Reno)*
- 84) The Language of Trust  
*Radzevick, Joseph R. (Gettysburg College)*
- 85) The Discloser's Iron Hand - How Disclosures Make Us Harsher  
*Brandimarte, Laura (Carnegie Mellon University); Acquisti, Alessandro (Carnegie Mellon University); Gino, Francesca (Harvard Business School)*
- 86) Willingness to Engage in Helping Behaviors when Considering Costs and Benefits  
*Zhang, Ruohui (Miami University); Frame, Mary E. (Miami University); Chapa, Kayla (Miami University); Wilkin, Bryn (Miami University); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University)*
- 87) The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Quantifying Presumption of Innocence in Relation to Criminal Stereotypes and Types of Crime  
*John, Richard (Univ. of Southern California); Scurich, Nicholas (Univ. of California, Irvine); Lee, Ryan (Univ. of Southern California)*
- 88) Where did that come from? Identifying the source of a sample  
*Lindskog, Marcus (Uppsala University); Winman, Anders (Uppsala University); Juslin, Peter (Uppsala University)*
- 89) Risk Preferences for Outcomes Involving Mood  
*Fuller, Elizabeth M. (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra (University of South Florida)*
- 90) Risk and responsibility  
*Summers, Barbara (University of Leeds); Duxbury, Darren (University of Leeds)*
- 91) Modeling riskless choice in dual process decision-making  
*Guo, Lisa (IMBS at UCI); Trueblood, Jennifer S. (Cognitive Sciences at UCI)*

- 92) Influencing Risk Behavior: The Effect of Framing and Goal under Positive Mood  
*Han, Sidney Su (University of Guelph)*
- 93) Self-reported risk taking across the lifespan: Meta-analyses and Survey Data  
*Josef, Anika K. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Mata, Rui (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Hertwig, Ralph (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 94) How to assess risky choice in older adults?  
*Frey, Renato (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Mata, Rui (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Hertwig, Ralph (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 95) Thinking about risky choice: Cognitive motivation, ability, and resources  
*Stroh, Nathan W. (Appalachian State University); McElroy, Gary T. (Appalachian State University); Dickinson, David L. (Appalachian State University)*
- 96) Subjective Value, Risk Preference, and Repeated Gambles  
*Ramirez Jr., Patrick (University of Texas at Arlington); Levine, Daniel (University of Texas at Arlington)*
- 97) It All Comes Down to Risk: Ruling Out Additional Explanations for the Uncertainty Effect  
*Moon, Alice (UC Berkeley); Nelson, Leif D. (UC Berkeley)*
- 98) Choice Behavior under Risk with High Stakes  
*Chen, Zhiqin (University of Southern California); John, Richard S. (University of Southern California)*
- 99) Probability neglect in risky choice: the role of numeracy and intrinsic happiness  
*Taylor, Andrea (University of Leeds); Ranyard, Rob (University of Bolton)*
- 100) Feeling Lucky: Predicting Risk-Taking Behavior  
*Ranieri, Andrea Y. (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra L. (University of South Florida)*
- 101) Emotions and preferences: risky choices and retrospective frequency judgments  
*Heilman, Renata M. (City University London UK; Babes-Bolyai University Romania); Kusev, Petko (Kingston University London, UK; City University London, UK); van Schaik, Paul (Teesside University, Middlesbrough, UK)*
- 102) The effect of positive mood on risky choice and advice  
*Yang, Hwajin (Singapore Management University); Yang, Sujin (The Catholic University of Korea, School of Medicine)*
- 103) A Simple Approach to Predicting Risk of ACL Injury  
*Petushek, Erich J. (Michigan Technological University); Cokely, Edward T. (Michigan Technological University); Ward, Paul (University of Greenwich); Myer, Gregory D. (Cincinnati Children's Hospital)*
- 104) Age-related Changes in Adaptive Risky Decision Making and Decision Competence: Examining Ages 8-17  
*Bossard, Elaine A. (University of Iowa); Levin, Irwin P. (University of Iowa); Weller, Joshua A. (Idaho State University)*
- 105) Reactions to Recent Experience in Risky Situations  
*Stershic, Sandra (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra (University of South Florida)*
- 106) Variations on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task  
*McCoy, Anthony W. (Kansas State University); Young, Michael E. (Kansas State University)*
- 107) Gain versus pain: The power of probability weighting in modeling risky choice  
*Pachur, Thorsten (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); Kellen, David (Albert Ludwigs University Freiburg)*
- 108) Numeracy Affects Probability Weighting via Affective Reactions to Risks  
*Petrova, Dafina (University of Granada, Spain); van der Pligt, Joop (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands); Garcia-Retamero, Rocio (University of Granada, Spain)*
- 109) Be afraid, be very afraid: Effects of fearful and fatalistic gists on young adult risk behavior predicted by fuzzy-trace theory  
*Avrutine, Julie (Columbia University); Reyna, Valerie (Cornell University); Wilhelms, Evan (Cornell University); Brust-Renck, Priscila (Cornell University)*
- 110) Subjective Numeracy and Mathematics Self Doubt as Predictors of Numeracy-Related Constructs and Risk Information Processing  
*Friedrich, James (Willamette University); Wenger, Jonathan (Willamette University); Demezas, Kirstin (Willamette University)*

- 111)** A cross-national study of uncertainty and perceptions of Global Climate Change  
*Budescu, David V. (Fordham University); Por, Han-Hui (Fordham University); Broomell, Stephen (Carnegie Mellon University); Michael Smithson (Australian National University)*
- 112)** Public Perception of Scientific Uncertainty  
*Broomell, Stephen (Carnegie Mellon University); Kane, Patrick (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 113)** The Impact of Different Sources of Uncertainty in Climate Change Communication  
*Chai, Hui Yih (University of New South Wales); Newell, Ben R. (University of New South Wales)*
- 114)** The Relationships Among Intolerance of Uncertainty, Decision-Making and Working Memory  
*Spitaletta, Jason (Department of Psychology, The Catholic University of America); Seaman, Kendra (Department of Psychology, The Catholic University of America); Sebrechts, Marc (Department of Psychology, The Catholic University of America)*
- 115)** The Assumption of Class-Conditional Independence in Categorization Under Uncertainty  
*Jarecki, Jana (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); Meder, Bjorn (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); Nelson, Jonathan D. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin)*
- 116)** Understanding decision making in avalanche terrain - A conceptual framework applying prospect theory  
*Zweifel, Benjamin (ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Haegeli, Pascal (Simon Fraser University, Canada); Boutellier, Roman (ETH Zurich, Switzerland)*
- 117)** Adversary Modeling in Security Games  
*Cui, Jinshu (Department of Psychology, University of Southern California); John, Richard S. (Department of Psychology, University of Southern California)*
- 118)** Third Party Compensation in Behavioral Games: Different Drivers in Different Contexts  
*Thulin, Erik (University of Pennsylvania); Bicchieri, Cristina (University of Pennsylvania)*
- 119)** The effect of unpacking on probabilistic information interpretation  
*Belogolova, Helen (UCLA); Fox, Craig (UCLA)*
- 120)** Possibilities and Probabilities  
*Leonhardt, James (New Mexico State University); Keller, Robin (UC Irvine)*
- 121)** Improving Estimation of Joint Probabilities with Ratio Judgments  
*Por, Han-Hui (Fordham University); Budescu, David V. (Fordham University)*
- 122)** Withdrawn
- 123)** Withdrawn
- 124)** Perceptual grouping of possible outcomes as obstacle to simple probability assessments  
*Hurst, Ada (University of Waterloo)*
- 125)** Evidence of Systematic Rounding Errors in Human Working Memory When Estimating Conjunction Probabilities  
*Tee, James (New York University); Zhang, Hang (New York University); Maloney, Laurence T. (New York University)*
- 126)** Booms, Crashes and Early Investment Experiences in a Laboratory Experiment  
*Papadovasilaki, Dimitra (University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics); Guerrero, Federico (University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics); Safford, Amanda (University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics); Sundali, James (University of Nevada, Reno, Managerial Sciences Department); Stone, Gregory R. (University of Nevada, Reno, Finance Department)*
- 127)** Combo bets are more attractive than single bets  
*Nilsson, Hakan (Department of Psychology, Uppsala University); Andersson, Patric (Stockholm School of Economics)*
- 128)** Effects of Asymmetry on Investment in Experimental Contexts  
*Hart, Einav (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel); Kareev, Yaakov (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel); Avrahami, Judith (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel)*
- 129)** (When) Does Hierarchical Bayesian Modelling Pay off?  
*Scheibehenne, Benjamin (University of Basel); Pachur, Thorsten (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 130)** Health, Beliefs and Cognition: An Exploration of the Compensatory Health Beliefs Scale  
*Lavins, Bethany D. (Ohio University); Gonzalez-Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio University)*

- 131)** Effects of Affective Dimensions of Music on Decision Making  
*Kim, Jongwan (University of South Carolina); Wedell, Douglas H. (University of South Carolina)*
- 132)** The Bias Blind Spot in Jurors' Ability to Diagnose Bias during Voir Dire  
*Yokum, David (University of Arizona); Robertson, Christopher (University of Arizona)*
- 133)** The Present Bias Revisited: Loss of Psychological Control as an Underlying Mechanism  
*Lee, Kelly K. (Washington University in St. Louis); Malkoc, Selin A. (Washington University in St. Louis); Rucker, Derek D. (Northwestern University)*
- 134)** Higher Decision Confidence Predicts More Framing Bias: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Approach  
*Corbin, Jonathan C. (Cornell); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell); Wilhelms, Evan A. (Cornell); Weldon, Rebecca (Cornell)*
- 135)** Hindsight bias about 2012 US election outcomes: Individual differences in knowing it all along  
*Bruine de Bruin, Wandí (University of Leeds and Carnegie Mellon University); McNair, Simon (University of Leeds); Peters, Ellen (Ohio State University); Fischhoff, Baruch (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 136)** Adolescent Empathy Gaps  
*Markey, Amanda R. (Carnegie Mellon University); Downs, Julie S. (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 137)** Self-Regulatory Emotions & Cheating: How Anger, Pride & Guilt Affect Unethical Behavior  
*Motro, Daphna (University of Arizona); Ordonez, Lisa (University of Arizona)*
- 138)** Probabilistic inferences under emotional stress: How arousal affects decision processes  
*Wichary, Szymon (University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw, Poland); Mata, Rui (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany); Rieskamp, Jorg (University of Basel, Switzerland)*
- 139)** Prosocial Lies: When Deception Breeds Trust  
*Levine, Emma E. (Wharton, The University of Pennsylvania); Schweitzer, Maurice E. (Wharton, The University of Pennsylvania)*
- 140)** Quitting: The Downside of Great Expectations in Professional Tennis  
*Tuckfield, Bradford (The Wharton School); Dietvorst, Berkeley (The Wharton School); Milkman, Katherine L. (The Wharton School); Schweitzer, Maurice E. (The Wharton School)*
- 141)** Bounded emotion, the psychophysics of affect and scope: Collapse of affect in donation and non-donation judgment tasks  
*Vastfjall, Daniel (Decision Research); Hagma, William (Linköping University); Dickert, Stephan (Linköping University); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)*
- 142)** The Worst Sort: Judging & Punishing Sex Offenders  
*Lively, Chaz (University of Pennsylvania); Goodwin, Geoffrey (University of Pennsylvania)*
- 143)** Agency alters social preferences and decisions  
*Choshen-Hillel, Shoham (The University of Chicago); Yaniv, Ilan (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)*
- 144)** Moralizing Goals Enhances Goal Commitment and Pursuit  
*Hosey, Christine (University of Chicago); Risen, Jane (University of Chicago)*
- 145)** Fear of the unknown: An examination of the determinants of ambiguity aversion  
*Guney, Sule (University of New South Wales); Newell, Ben R. (University of New South Wales)*
- 146)** Judging the controllability of destiny: Human agency appraisals increase helping for assistance efforts but decrease helping for victims  
*Carpenter, Stephanie M. (University of Michigan); Vickers, Brian D. (University of Michigan); Yates, J. Frank (University of Michigan)*
- 147)** Cost for the donor and benefit for the receiver: An explanation of psychophysical numbing  
*Rubaltelli, Enrico (University of Padova); Hysenbelli, Dorina (University of Padova); Dickert, Stephan (Vienna University of Economics and Business); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)*
- 148)** Understanding the developmental sources of scope insensitivity in helping behavior  
*Kogut, Tehila (Ben Gurion University); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research & University of Oregon); Vastfjall, Daniel (Decision Research)*
- 149)** Strategic cheating in monetary donations to social organizations  
*Ayal, Shahar (Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya); Hochman, Guy (Duke University); Gneezy, Uri (UC San Diego); Ariely, Dan (Duke University)*
- 150)** I'll be still in pain: Forecasting emotional reactions to social vs. non-social events after social exclusion  
*Kim, Aeri (Yonsei University); Rim, Hye Bin (Yonsei University); Sim, Olivia Suhyung (Yonsei University)*

# SJDM SUNDAY EVENING POSTER SESSION #2 & BOOK AUCTION

5:30pm – 7:30pm w/ Cash Bar - Sheraton Hall

- 1) A Crisis of Choice: Regulatory Focus and Mode Predict Decision Difficulty in Maximization  
*Hughes, Jeffrey (University of Waterloo); Scholer, Abigail A. (University of Waterloo)*
- 2) How Voice Affects Choice: Auditory Heuristics and Employment Decisions  
*Truncellito, Richard D. (Carnegie Mellon University); Kassam, Karim S. (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 3) Set-fit effects in choice  
*Evers, Ellen R. K. (Tilburg University); Inbar, Yoel (Tilburg University); Zeelenberg, Marcel (Tilburg University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon)*
- 4) The description-experience choice gap is attenuated in older adults  
*Camilleri, Adrian R. (Duke University); McCarrey, Anna C. (National Institute on Aging)*
- 5) Gain and Loss in Intertemporal choice: Impulsivity, Procrastination, and Response Dynamic Measurements  
*Cheng, Jiuqing (Ohio University); Gonzalez-Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio University)*
- 6) Why being unattainable makes a choice alternative desirable: Thought suppression as a motive for choice  
*Usta, Murat (Grenoble School of Business)*
- 7) Known Unknowns in Judgment and Choice  
*Walters, Daniel (Anderson School of Management, UCLA); Fernbach, Philip (Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado, Boulder); Sloman, Steven (Brown University)*
- 8) Cognitive Processes behind Food Choices  
*Chimeli, Janna (Ohio University); Gonzalez-Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio University)*
- 9) I'll take it because: No Paradox of Choice among satisficers and maximizers  
*Yamagishi, Kimihiko (Tokyo Institute of Technology); Ikawa, Norio (Macmem Inc.)*
- 10) Heuristics for Trust-Based Personnel Choices  
*Wang, X. T. (University of South Dakota); Hu, Zhan (Fudan University)*
- 11) User Acceptance of Decision Aids for Complex Choices: Regret Anticipation Moderates the Impact of Cognitive Complexity  
*Fyraki, Agapi Thaleia (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Dellaert, Benedict G. C. (Erasmus University Rotterdam)*
- 12) Heuristic and Discount Models of Intertemporal Choice: A Quantitative Test  
*Regenwetter, Michel (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Stevens, Jeffrey (University of Nebraska at Lincoln); Guo, Ying (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Popova, Anna (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Zwilling, Chris (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)*
- 13) How do discount functions reflect attribute-based strategies in intertemporal choice?  
*Suter, Renata (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Pachur, Thorsten (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Hertwig, Ralph (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 14) Wanting to Stay Versus Not Wanting to Go: Romantic Relationship Stay/Leave Decisions Conceptualized as Multiattribute Choices  
*Joel, Samantha (University of Toronto); Page-Gould, Elizabeth (University of Toronto); MacDonald, Geoff (University of Toronto)*
- 15) Can economic models be built on bounded rationality?  
*Caldwell, Leigh (The Irrational Agency)*
- 16) Withdrawn
- 17) Withdrawn
- 18) Color frequency affects attribute frames  
*McCormick, Michael (University of North Carolina at Greensboro); Seta, John J. (University of North Carolina at Greensboro)*
- 19) Fatal Attractiveness: How Mating Cues Affect Managerial Decision Making  
*de Bellis, Emanuel (University of St. Gallen); Haubl, Gerald (University of Alberta); Hildebrand, Christian (University of St. Gallen); Hertwig, Ralph (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Herrmann, Andreas (University of St. Gallen)*

- 20) Who gets the organ? How policy framing affects public's preference  
*Li, Meng (University of Colorado Denver); Dewitt, Jeff (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University)*
- 21) A New Look at the Hot Hand Fallacy: How Rate of Change Affects Gambling Behavior  
*Prunier, Stephen G. (University of Toledo); Jasper, John D. (University of Toledo)*
- 22) Withdrawn
- 23) Predicted Emotional Reaction and Disaster Preparedness: The Change After the Prediction  
*Noda, Masayo (Kinjo Gakuin University)*
- 24) Testing Two Pathways to Inaction - The roles of Indecisiveness, Anxiety, Perceived Control, and Worry  
*McNeill, Ilona (University of Western Australia); Dunlop, Patrick (University of Western Australia); Skinner, Timothy (Charles Darwin University); Morrison, David (Murdoch University)*
- 25) Personality influences on the manipulation of emotion in the Iowa Gambling Task  
*Humeny, Courtney (Carleton University); West, Robert (Carleton University)*
- 26) Withdrawn
- 27) Laboratory experiments on anxiety and procrastination  
*Xu, Ping (Ohio University); Gonzalez, C. Vallejo (Ohio University)*
- 28) It Smells Good But Feels Bad: The Cross Cueing Effects of Olfactory Induced Emotion on Self-Regulation  
*Maranduik, Alex J. (University of Guelph)*
- 29) Envy is a Focusing Illusion  
*O'Brien, Ed (University of Michigan); Ellsworth, Phoebe C. (University of Michigan); Schwarz, Norbert (University of Michigan)*
- 30) Sensation Seeking and Response-Scale Effects on Rating Versus Categorizing Rewards: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Account  
*Weldon, Rebecca (Cornell University); Reyna, Valerie (Cornell University); Wilhelms, Evan (Cornell University); Corbin, Jonathan (Cornell University); Chick, Christina (Cornell University); Brust Renck, Priscila (Cornell University)*
- 31) Differentiating Hot-State and Construal-Level Accounts of Curiosity: Why We search for Negative Information Against Our Better Judgment  
*Barkan, Rachel (Ben-Gurion University, Israel); Shani, Yaniv (Tel-Aviv University, Israel); Danziger, Shai (Tel-Aviv University, Israel)*
- 32) Why Are You Mad? The Effect of Different Anger Sources on Cooperation  
*Motro, Daphna (University of Arizona); Kugler, Tamar (University of Arizona); Connolly, Terry (University of Arizona)*
- 33) Valuing the lives you can save in tragic situations  
*Mayorga, Marcus M. (Decision Research, University of Oregon); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research, University of Oregon)*
- 34) Different mechanisms underlie the Identified Victim Effect, Proportion Dominance Effect and In-group Effect in helping situations.  
*Erlandsson, Arvid (Lund University)*
- 35) Mood and Economic Expectations After the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election  
*Williamson, Leanne M. (The Ohio State University); Peters, Ellen (The Ohio State University); Bruine de Bruin, Wandi (Centre for Decision Research, Leeds University Business School; Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 36) Nudging Hybrid Vehicle Purchase by Framing  
*Yeung, Kam Leung (Iowa State University); Weber, Bethany (Iowa State University)*
- 37) How acceptable are nudges to the public?  
*Castelo, Noah (University of British Columbia); Felsen, Gidon (University of Colorado School of Medicine); Reiner, Peter B. (National Core for Neuroethics)*
- 38) The Role of Conflicting Normative Information on Perceptions of Binary Sequences  
*Beckstead, Jason W. (University of South Florida)*
- 39) Evidence of Conflict Monitoring and Numerical Ability  
*Corser, Ryan (University of Toledo); Voss, Raymond (University of Toledo); Jasper, John D. (University of Toledo); Bodie, Timothy (University of Toledo)*

- 40) Withdrawn
- 41) Withdrawn
- 42) Misperceptions of Household Energy Consumption  
*Schley, Dan R. (The Ohio State University); DeKay, Michael L. (The Ohio State University)*
- 43) Who Did What? The Impact of Giving Credit on Agents' Motivation  
*Chaudhry, Shereen J. (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 44) Social Sampling: Decisions from Experience in Ultimatum Bargaining  
*Fleischhut, Nadine (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); Artinger, Florian (University of Warwick); Olschewski, Sebastian (University of Tuebingen); Volz, Kirsten (University of Tuebingen); Hertwig, Ralph (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin)*
- 45) When being smarter raises your credit score: How different individual differences determine financial decision-making skill  
*Enkavi, Zeynep (Columbia University); Gao, Jie (Columbia University); Li, Ye (UC Riverside); Zaval, Lisa (Columbia University); Johnson, Eric J. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)*
- 46) Measuring the Collateral Costs of Fundraising  
*Yeomans, Mike (Chicago Booth); Al-Ubaydli, Omar (George Mason)*
- 47) Cognitive segmentation tool for targeted pricing strategy: applying JDM research in the real world  
*Halonen, Elina (University of Turku, Finland); Caldwell, Leigh (The Irrational Agency, London)*
- 48) Lexicographic Decision Making in Ultimatum Bargaining  
*Fleischhut, Nadine (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); Artinger, Florian (University of Warwick); Olschewski, Sebastian (University of Tuebingen); Hertwig, Ralph (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin)*
- 49) More waste, less heed: Understanding domestic food waste from a judgment and decision making perspective  
*Bown, Nicola (Centre for Decision Research, University of Leeds)*
- 50) Goal adjustment in teams: problem-oriented search versus self-enhancement  
*Blettner, Daniela (Simon Fraser University); Zeigler-Hill, Virgil (Oakland University); Wang, Jim (University of Southern Mississippi)*
- 51) Exploring learning goal orientation  
*Yaoyuneyong, Gallayanee (University of Southern Mississippi); Blettner, Daniela (Simon Fraser University)*
- 52) The Influence of Active Goals on Evaluations of Hybrid Products  
*Kim, Moon-Yong (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)*
- 53) Working hard at not seeing the obvious: Competition, Goals & Bounded Awareness  
*Fletcher, Pinar (Harvard Business School)*
- 54) Motivational differences in aiming for narrow or wide goals  
*Xu, Amy Z. (University of Waterloo); Bohns, Vanessa K. (University of Waterloo); Scholer, Abigail A. (University of Waterloo)*
- 55) Buffering Against Threats in Performance Domains: Activating Goals vs. Self-Affirming  
*Wieland, Alice (University of Nevada, Reno); Amaral, Nelson B. (University of Minnesota)*
- 56) Reference-dependent Preference Reversals: A Dynamic Modeling Account  
*Trueblood, Jennifer S. (University of California, Irvine)*
- 57) You can't be better than me: The role of the reference point in modulating people's pursuit of wealth  
*Pittarello, Andrea (University of Padova); Rubaltelli, Enrico (University of Padova); Rumiati, Rino (University of Padova)*
- 58) Cultural Differences in Motives for Advice-seeking  
*Ning, Zhang (Queen's University); Li-Jun, Ji (Queen's University); Ye, Li (Huazhong Chian Normal University); Gillian, Harper (Queen's University)*
- 59) The effects of culture and content on decision mode selection  
*Gong, Han (Department of Psychology, Northwestern University); Medin, Douglas L. (Department of Psychology, Northwestern University)*
- 60) Maximizing Tendencies: Cross-Cultural Differences in Decision Regret and Life Satisfaction  
*Zhu, Xiaoyuan (Susan) (University of Connecticut); Daniels, Michael (Singapore Management University); Dalal, Dev (University of Connecticut)*



- 61) Physical Attractiveness Preference among Bicultural Individuals  
*Hsu, Yu-Wei (Northwestern University); Finkel, Eli J. (Northwestern University)*
- 62) Holistic thought and optimism: A three-way cultural comparison  
*Chen, Stephanie (The University of Michigan); Nisbett, Richard (The University of Michigan)*
- 63) Not All Fakes Are Created Equal: Authenticity and Cultural Differences in Considering Counterfeits  
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- 64) Behavioral Microfoundations of R & D Managers in New Product Development in Indian Firms  
*Lakshmanan, Prasad (Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore); Garud, Niharika (Indian Institute of Management Bangalore)*
- 65) Mindfulness in New Product Development Processes: Evidence from Indian Firms  
*Garud, Niharika (Indian Institute of Management Bangalore)*
- 66) Predicting Decision Delay amongst Residents of Wildfire Prone Areas  
*McNeill, Ilona M. (University of Western Australia); Dunlop, Patrick D. (University of Western Australia); Skinner, Timothy C. (Charles Darwin University); Morrison, David L. (Murdoch University)*
- 67) Predicting Individual Earnings and Forecasting Accuracy in Prediction Markets  
*Atanasov, Pavel (University of Pennsylvania); Rescober, Philip (University of Pennsylvania); Mellers, Barbara (University of Pennsylvania); Tetlock, Philip (University of Pennsylvania); Ungar, Lyle (University of Pennsylvania)*
- 68) Prediction specificity harms prediction quality  
*Kelly, Theresa F. (University of Pennsylvania); Simmons, Joseph P. (University of Pennsylvania)*
- 69) Eye Blink Rate Predicts Decision Strategy in Adolescents  
*Barkley-Levenson, Emily (University of Southern California); Fox, Craig (University of California Los Angeles); Huang, Olivia (University of California Los Angeles); Jones, Caroline (Boston University); Galvan, Adriana (University of California Los Angeles)*
- 70) Withdrawn
- 71) "The longer you can look back, the farther you can look forward": Past duration predicts individual and collective environmental decision-making  
*Bang, Hye Min (Duke University); Hershfield, Hal E. (New York University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)*
- 72) Rational thinking and cognitive abilities in antisocial youth: The importance of considering sample characteristics when predicting outcome variables  
*Sorge, Geoff B. (Department of Psychology, York University); Skilling, Tracey (Centre for Addiction and Mental Health); Toplak, Maggie E. (Department of Psychology, York University)*
- 73) Judgment in forecasting: Moving from artificial experiments to the organizational environment  
*De Baets, Shari (Vlerick Business School); Vanderheyden, Karlien (Vlerick Business School); Buelens, Marc (Vlerick Business School)*
- 74) Boosting the Communicated Accuracy of Imprecise Intelligence Forecasts  
*Mandel, David R. (DRDC / York University)*
- 75) A process tracing study of screening's impact on decision accuracy  
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- 76) How Accurate are Lay-Perceptions of Effect Size Indicators?  
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- 77) Probabilistic Coherence Weighting for Increasing Accuracy of Judgment  
*Olson, Kenneth C. (George Mason University); Karvetski, Christopher W. (George Mason University); Mandel, David R. (DRDC / York University); Twardy, Charles R.*
- 78) Effects of data display types on project management decision-making  
*Lee, Patricia (Fordham University)*
- 79) Maximizing and Decisions From Experience  
*Weinhardt, Justin (University of Calgary); Gonzalez, Cleotilde (Carnegie Mellon University); Harman, Jason (Carnegie Mellon University)*

- 80)** The upside of information distortion: It's quicker, easier, and more satisfying  
*Erford, Breann M. (The Ohio State University); DeKay, Michael L. (The Ohio State University)*
- 81)** Selective attention framing effects in narrative vs. non-narrative contexts  
*Steinhardt, Joseph (Cornell University); Shapiro, Michael A. (Cornell University)*
- 82)** The effect of framing on admission decisions in psychiatrists  
*Jefferies, Kiri (Herts Parts NHS Foundation Trust, Uni of Herts); Sharma, Shivani (University of Hertfordshire); Gale, Tim M. (Herts Parts NHS Foundation Trust, Uni of Herts); Hawley, Chris J. (Herts Parts NHS Foundation Trust, Uni of Herts); Georgiou, George J. (University of Hertfordshire)*
- 83)** Positive (and negative) effects of experience-based sampling and causal framing on intuitive statistical judgments  
*Hawkins, Guy E. (University of New South Wales); Hayes, Brett K. (University of New South Wales); Newell, Ben R. (University of New South Wales)*
- 84)** Global Warming vs Climate Change: Ideology Trumps Framing  
*Benjamin, Daniel (Fordham University); Por, Han-Hui (Fordham University); Budescu, David (Fordham University)*
- 85)** Gender differences in analytic cognitive style  
*Pennycook, Gordon (University of Waterloo); Barr, Nathaniel (University of Waterloo); Koehler, Derek A. (University of Waterloo); Fugelsang, Jonathan J. (University of Waterloo)*
- 86)** Gender, Number of Competitors, and Competition Entry Decisions  
*Hanek, Kathrin J. (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor); Garcia, Stephen M. (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor); Wu, Kaidi (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor); Tor, Avishalom (University of Notre Dame, The Law School)*
- 87)** The two sides of the coin: Thinking about money makes men more competitive about resources but less competitive about performance  
*Molouki, Sarah (University of Chicago); Shapira, Oren (University of Chicago); Mead, Nicole L. (Erasmus University); Caruso, Eugene M. (University of Chicago)*
- 88)** Withdrawn
- 89)** Influencing health decision making: A study of color and message framing  
*Voss, Raymond P. (University of Toledo); Corser, Ryan (University of Toledo); McCormick, Michael (University of North Carolina Greensboro); Jasper, John D. (University of Toledo)*
- 90)** Numeracy skills in health: Providers and newly insured adults face new challenges  
*Tompkins, Mary Kate (The Ohio State University); Meilleur, Louise (The Ohio State University); Peters, Ellen (The Ohio State University)*
- 91)** Influence of social support in health-relevant decision making in women with a family history of breast cancer  
*Garcia-Retamero, Rocio (University of Granada); Henneman, Lidewij (VU University Medical Center); van Asperen, Christi J. (Leiden University Medical Center); Oosterwijk, Jan C. (University Medical Center, Groningen University); Menko, Fred H. (VU University Medical Center, Amsterdam); Timmermans, Danielle R. M. (VU University Medical Center, Amsterdam)*
- 92)** Threats to security: Ironical consequences of secure data collection in healthcare  
*Moher, Ester (University of Ottawa); El Emam, Khaled (University of Ottawa)*
- 93)** Getting Ahead of Illness: Using Metaphors to Influence Medical Decision-Making  
*Scherer, Aaron M. (University of Iowa); Scherer, Laura D. (University of Missouri-Columbia); Fagerlin, Angela (University of Michigan)*
- 94)** Theory-informed design of values clarification methods: A cognitive psychological perspective on patient treatment decision making  
*Pieterse, Arwen H. (Leiden University Medical Center); De Vries, Marieke (Tilburg University); Kunneman, Marleen (Leiden University Medical Center)*
- 95)** Do physicians want to share decision making with their patients?  
*Garcia-Retamero, Rocio (U. Granada; Max Planck Institute); Wicki, Barbara (AO Clinical Investigation and Documentation); Cokely, Edward T. (Michigan Technological University); Hanson, Beate (AO Clinical Investigation and Documentation)*
- 96)** The Polarizing Effect of Calories: How Calorie Estimation Influences Food Perceptions  
*Popovich, Deidre L. (Emory University)*
- 97)** Assessing Decision Making Competence in High-Functioning Young Adults on the Autism Spectrum  
*Levin, Irwin (University of Iowa); Gaeth, Gary (University of Iowa); Yegorova, Vitaliya (University of Iowa); Yan, Haoyang (University of Iowa)*

- 98)** Applying decision theory to child injury prevention: Testing the coexistence hypothesis in situations involving pediatric injuries  
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- 99)** Exploring the Contributions of Liking and Wanting to the Intention-Behavior Link  
*Wudarzewski, Amanda (University of Waterloo); Koehler, Derek (University of Waterloo); Scholer, Abigail (University of Waterloo)*
- 100)** The Effect of Distraction on Memory-based Decision Making  
*Huffling, Steven K. (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana M. (Auburn University)*
- 101)** The effects of hemispatial attention on decision making  
*McElroy, Todd (Appalachian State University); Stroh, Nathan (Appalachian State University); Doherty, Shannon (Appalachian State University)*
- 102)** Withdrawn
- 103)** Impacts of maximizing tendencies on the size of information distortion  
*Rim, Hye Bin (Yonsei University)*
- 104)** Satisfaction in social microlending: The role of decision support systems and decision makers' mind sets.  
*Hafenbraedl, Sebastian (University of Lausanne); Pfeiffer, Jella (University of Mainz); Hoffrage, Ulrich (University of Lausanne)*
- 105)** Seeking an Ontology of Open-Mindedness  
*Metz, S. Emlen (University of Pennsylvania)*
- 106)** When copying hinders learning: Pitfalls of success-based group decision-making  
*Woike, Jan K. (ARC, Max Planck Institute f. Human Development, Berlin ); Bonardi, Jean-Philippe (HEC, Universite de Lausanne); Garcia-Retamero, Rocio (Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Granada)*
- 107)** The relationship between components of maximization and information search behavior  
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- 108)** Evidence for influence of frame on cue ordering  
*Chrabaszcz, Jeffrey S. (UMD, College Park); Yu, Erica (UMD, College Park); Sprenger, Amber M. (The MITRE Corporation); Dougherty, Michael R. (UMD, College Park)*
- 109)** Estimating the Effectiveness of Computer-Mediated Help-Seeking  
*Roghanizad, M. Mahdi (University of Waterloo); Bohns, Vanessa K. (University of Waterloo)*
- 110)** Point Substitutions in a Cascaded Inference Model  
*Beam, Colin (University of Washington); Miyamoto, John (University of Washington)*
- 111)** An eye tracking and verbal protocol analysis of decision strategies in the context effects of multi-attribute decision making  
*Itsuki, Chiba (Graduate School of Psychology, Rikkyo University); Takashi, Tsuzuki (Department of Psychology, Rikkyo University); Masashi, Soma (Graduate School of Psychology, Rikkyo University)*
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*Duan, Jinyun (Soochow University); Chang, Xiaoxi (University of Ottawa); Lu, Wenjuan (Soochow University); Bonaccio, Silvia (University of Ottawa)*
- 113)** Development and Validation of a New Measure of Intuition: The Types of Intuition Scale (TIntS)  
*Pretz, Jean E. (Elizabethtown College); Brookings, Jeffrey B. (Wittenberg University); Carlson, Lauren A. (Illinois State University); Humbert, Tamara Keiter (Elizabethtown College); Roy, Michael M. (Elizabethtown College); Jones, Meghan E. (Elizabethtown College)*
- 114)** Expectations-based trade  
*Levis, Amanda (Yale Marketing); Frederick, Shane (Yale Marketing)*
- 115)** Comparative Decision Making: From Playgrounds to CEOs  
*Yazbec, Angele (Grand Valley State University); Rydecki, Krista (Grand Valley State University); Fific, Mario (Grand Valley State University)*
- 116)** Processing payoffs in a perceptual decision task  
*Diederich, Adele (Jacobs University)*
- 117)** Measuring Decisional Regret Amongst French-Speaking Populations: Translation And Validation Of A Regret Scale  
*Girard, Annie J. (University of Ottawa); Bonaccio, Silvia (University of Ottawa)*

- 118)** The Case for a Broader Definition of Decision Making  
*Taylor, Graeme (UNSW. Australia)*
- 119)** The Priceless Entrepreneur  
*Shyti, Anisa (HEC Paris); Paraschiv, Corina (HEC Paris)*
- 120)** Withdrawn
- 121)** Is  $W(1) = 1$ ? A purely mathematical addition  
*Harin, Alexander (Modern University for the Humanities)*
- 122)** Agency, Risk and Responsibility judgments  
*Nordbye, Gro H. H. (University of Oslo); Teigen, Karl H. (University of Oslo)*
- 123)** Recency and Reference Point Formation: The effect on risky choice behavior  
*Yeomans, Mike (Chicago Booth); Wu, George (Chicago Booth)*
- 124)** Age Differences in Risk Perception and Risk Intentions across Risk Domains  
*Bonem, Emily (University of Michigan); Ellsworth, Phoebe (University of Michigan); Gonzalez, Richard (University of Michigan)*
- 125)** Using Reference Classes Leads to Lower Risk Sensitivity  
*Sinayev, Aleksandr (The Ohio State University); Peters, Ellen (The Ohio State University)*
- 126)** Individual Differences in Attitudes towards Nudges  
*Jung, Janice (UPenn); Mellers, Barbara (UPenn); Baron, Jonathan (UPenn)*
- 127)** Individual Differences in Greed: The Development of a Valid and Reliable Scale  
*Seuntjens, Terri G. (Tilburg University); Zeelenberg, Marcel (Tilburg University); Breugelmans, Seger M. (Tilburg University); Van de Ven, N. (Tilburg University)*
- 128)** Does a teaser always tease?  
*Tu, Yanping (University of Chicago); Hsee, Christopher (University of Chicago)*
- 129)** Loss Aversion and Exploration in a Search Task  
*Chin, Alycia (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 130)** How the psychological tangibility of money reduces loss aversion  
*Shah, Avni (Duke University); Bettman, Jim (Duke University); Payne, John (Duke University)*
- 131)** Size doesn't matter: The importance of small losses  
*Zeisberger, Stefan (University of Zurich)*
- 132)** Understanding the Psychology of Scarcity: When Limited Resources Prompt Abstract Thinking  
*Roux, Caroline (Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management); Goldsmith, Kelly (Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management)*
- 133)** From Individual Binary Choice to Strategic Interactions: When and How are Optimal Decisions Fueled by Competition?  
*Schulze, Christin (School of Psychology, University of New South Wales); van Ravenzwaaij, Don (School of Psychology, University of Newcastle); Newell, Ben R. (School of Psychology, University of New South Wales)*
- 134)** Understanding local warming: How warm days lead to increased belief in global warming  
*Zaval, Lisa (Columbia University); Keenan, Elizabeth A. (University of California); Johnson, Eric J. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)*
- 135)** Withdrawn
- 136)** The impact of post-decisional information on confidence judgments  
*Yu, Shuli (Michigan State University); Pleskac, Timothy (Michigan State University)*
- 137)** A Mathematical Theory of Qualitative Decision-Making  
*Broniatowski, David (Johns Hopkins University); Reyna, Valerie (Cornell University)*

- 138)** Value beyond context and elicitation: Values constructed on the spot influence more than decisions on the spot  
*Vickers, Brian D. (University of Michigan); Carpenter, Stephanie M. (University of Michigan); Yates, J. Frank (University of Michigan)*
- 139)** The Effects of Choosing on Subsequent Confidence: Tests of a Quantum Model of Decisions and Judgments  
*Kvam, Peter D. (Michigan State University); Pleskac, Timothy J. (Michigan State University); Busemeyer, Jerome R. (Indiana University)*
- 140)** Exploration strategies in human decision making  
*Wilson, Robert C. (Princeton University); Geana, Andra (Princeton University); White, John M. (Princeton University); Ludvig, Elliot A. (Princeton University); Cohen, Jonathan D. (Princeton University)*
- 141)** Intransitive cycles and rational choice  
*Muller-Trede, Johannes (Rady School of Management, UCSD); Sher, Shlomi (Department of Psychology, Pomona College); McKenzie, Craig R.M. (Department of Psychology and Rady School of Management, UCSD)*
- 142)** Using Context to Predict Value  
*Hundtofte, Sean (Yale); Meyer, Andrew (Yale); Frederick, Shane (Yale)*
- 143)** A Penny Saved is a Partner Earned: The Romantic Appeal of Savers  
*Olson, Jenny G. (University of Michigan); Rick, Scott I. (University of Michigan)*
- 144)** The Effect of Using a Foreign Language on Delaying Gratification  
*Hayakawa, Sayuri L. (University of Chicago); Keysar, Boaz (University of Chicago); An, Sun-Gyu (University of Chicago)*
- 145)** How Soon is Immediate?  
*Yoon, Haewon (Rutgers University Department of Psychology); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University Department of Psychology)*
- 146)** Flexible group decisions: Abandoning the majority rule when necessary  
*Juni, Mordechai Z. (University of California, Santa Barbara); Eckstein, Miguel P. (University of California, Santa Barbara)*
- 147)** Exploring antecedents and consequences of decision mode selection  
*Gong, Han (Department of Psychology, Northwestern University); Medin, Douglas L. (Department of Psychology, Northwestern University)*
- 148)** Three things that make insurance fraud seem acceptable: Deductibles, insurance companies' profit, and paying premiums  
*van Wolferen, Job (TIBER / Tilburg University); Inbar, Yoel (TIBER / Tilburg University); Zeelenberg, Marcel (TIBER / Tilburg University)*
- 149)** On the Difficulty of Simultaneously Eliciting the Attraction, Compromise, and Similarity Effects  
*Berkowitsch, Nicolas, A. J. (University of Basel); Scheibehenne, Benjamin (University of Basel); Mata, Rui (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 150)** A Meta-Analytic Review of Self-Licensing  
*Blanken, Irene (Tilburg University); van de Ven, Niels (Tilburg University); Zeelenberg, Marcel (Tilburg University)*
- 151)** The Sex-Partner Discrepancy Revisited: Strategy Differences and Mode Effects  
*Schweickart, Oliver (University of Alberta); Brown, Norman R. (University of Alberta); Moore, Sean E. (University of Alberta-Augustana); Sinclair, Robert C. (Laurentian University)*
- 152)** Selling Out  
*Bhattacharjee, Amit (Dartmouth College); Berman, Jonathan Z. (University of Pennsylvania); Dana, Jason (University of Pennsylvania); Mellers, Barbara (University of Pennsylvania)*

# **Society for Judgment and Decision Making**

## **The 2013 34<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference**



**Sheraton Centre Toronto Hotel**  
**123 Queen Street West**  
**Toronto, ON M5H 2M9**  
**November 15 -18, 2013**

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2013 Program Committee: Robyn LeBoeuf (chair), Bernd Figner, Jack Soll, Katy Milkman

Thanks to Mare Appleby (conference coordinator), Jon Baron (webmaster), Craig Fox (President), Amy Summerville (student poster awards), Anuj Shah (communication), Katherine Burson (social event), Ana Franco-Watkins (book auction), Tim Pleskac (Einhorn Award Committee chair), Daniel Read (Beattie Award Committee chair) and the ad hoc reviewers: Adam Alter, Dan Bartels, Lyle Brenner, Clayton Critcher, Jason Dana, Jeff Galak, Ayelet Gneezy, Kelly Goldsmith, Dena Gromet, Crystal Hall, Yoel Inbar, Ellie Kyung, Wendy Liu, Julia Minson, Don Moore, Carey Morewedge, Leif Nelson, Nathan Novemsky, Chris Olivola, Danny Oppenheimer, Jason Riis, Jane Risen, Aner Sela, Suzanne Shu, Joe Simmons, Uri Simonsohn, Deb Small, Mary Steffel, Abby Sussman, Oleg Urminsky, Elanor Williams.



**2013 SJDM Conference Master Schedule  
Sheraton Centre Toronto Hotel  
November 15 -18, 2013**

**FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15**

Psychonomic Society JDM Sessions (See the Psychonomic Society [www.psychonomic.org](http://www.psychonomic.org) website for details)

5:00-7:00 pm **Welcome Reception / Early Registration** w/ Cash Bar - Civic Foyer

8:00-10:00 pm **Duncan Luce Tribute** - Civic Ballroom

**SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 16**

7:30-8:30 am **Registration & Continental Breakfast** - Civic Foyer

8:30 -10:00 am **Paper Session #1** - Willow East, Essex, Simcoe/Dufferin,

10:00 -10:30 am Morning Coffee Break - Civic Foyer

10:30-12:00 pm **Paper Session #2** - Willow East, Essex, Simcoe/Dufferin

12:00-1:30 pm Lunch Break (on your own)

1:30-3:00 pm **Paper Session #3** - Willow East, Essex, Simcoe/Dufferin

3:15-4:45 pm **Paper Session #4** - Willow East, Essex, Simcoe/Dufferin

4:45-5:15 pm Afternoon Coffee Break - Civic Foyer

5:15-6:45 pm **Paper Session #5** - Willow East, Essex, Simcoe/Dufferin

6:45-8:45 pm **Graduate Student Social Event** - Willow Centre

7:00-9:00 pm **Executive Board Dinner** - Donatello Restaurant, 37 Elm Street, [www.donatellorestaurant.ca](http://www.donatellorestaurant.ca)

**SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 17**

8:30-10:30 am **Poster Session #1 & Book Auction** - w/ Continental Breakfast - Sheraton Hall

10:30-12:00 pm **Paper Session #6** - Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin

12:00-1:30 pm **Women in SJDM Networking Event** - Essex Room

12:00-1:30 pm Lunch Break (on your own)

1:30-2:30 pm **Keynote Address** by **Susan Carey** - Grand West

2:45-4:15 pm **Paper Session #7** - Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin

4:15-4:45 pm Afternoon Coffee - Civic Foyer

4:45-5:30 pm **Presidential Address** by **Craig Fox** - Grand West

5:30-7:30 pm **Poster Session #2 & Book Auction** w/ Cash Bar - Sheraton Hall

9:00 pm-1:00 am **SJDM Evening Social Event** (for more information see pg. 6)

**MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18**

8:00-8:45 am **Business Meeting & Awards Breakfast** - Conference B & C

9:00-9:30 am **Einhorn Award** - Essex Room

9:45-11:15 am **Paper Session #8** - Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin

11:15-11:45 am Morning Coffee Break - Civic Foyer

11:45-1:15 pm **Paper Session #9** - Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin



You are invited to join us for a  
  
**Special Session Commemorating the Life and Work of Duncan Luce at SJDM**  
  
on Friday Nov 15, 2013  
  
8:00 – 10:00 pm  
  
Civic Ballroom, Sheraton Hotel



## **SJDM Tribute to R. Duncan Luce**

**Friday, Nov. 15, 8 -10 pm  
Civic Ballroom, Sheraton Hotel  
Toronto, Canada**

### **Introductory Recollections**

***Elke U. Weber***

R. Duncan Luce: Scientist and (Gentle)man

***Michel Regenwetter***

What it meant to be Duncan's student and house sitter

***L. Robin Keller***

Recalling Duncan Luce at UC Irvine

### **Theories of Strategic Choice**

***George Wu***

Games and Decisions Revisited

### **Theories of Individual Choice**

***Michael H. Birnbaum***

Theories of decisions under risk and uncertainty

***James Townsend***

From the Luce IIA (independence from irrelevant alternatives) to Process Models for Configural Decision Making

***Barbara Mellers***

Remembering Duncan Luce

### **Foundations of Measurement and Psychophysics**

***David H. Krantz***

Think, Write, Love, and Publish, or What I Learned from Duncan Luce

***Ragnar Steingrimsen***

Connecting Perception and Choice via Axiomatic Modeling

### **Closing Recollections**

***Carolyn Scheer Luce***

Duncan's Zest for Life and Work

SATURDAY NOV 16, 2013			
Rooms - Willow East, Essex, Simcoe/Dufferin			
	TRACK I Willow East	TRACK II Essex	TRACK III Simcoe/Dufferin
Session #1	Motivations and Conflicts of Interest	Risk 1	Health and the Environment
8:30am	Woolley - Money Matters Less	Dellaert - Decisions under Risk	VanEpps - Promote Healthy Eating
8:50am	Davidai - Extrinsic Incentives Bias	Schley - Assessing "economic value"	Zaval - Green and Graying
9:10am	Sah - I am Immune	Weber - Behavioral Effects	Schwartz - Consumer Energy Behavior
9:30am	Packard - No Idle Boast	Luckman - Risky/inter-temporal choice	Benjamin - Decisions/climate change
Session #2	Choice Architecture 1	Reflection, Intuition, and Insight	Biases in Judgment and Choice
10:30am	Shu - Architecture Acceptable	Meyer - Bat and Ball Problem	Bar-Hillel - "Heads or Tails?"
10:50am	Tannenbaum - Partitioning option	Baron - Open-minded thinking	Brough - Probability Judgments
11:10am	Colby - Healthy Defaults	Urminsky - Outcome neglect	Tam - Standard anchoring task
11:30am	Goswami - Search Of Optimally	Tennant - Method of deciding matters	Schrift - The Effort-Outcome Link
Session #3	Morality and Ethics 1	The Past vs. The Future	Choice 1
1:30pm	Ames - Intentional Harms	Caruso - Temporal Doppler Effect	Rader - Misjudging the impact
1:50pm	Piazza - Harmfulness and morality	Williams - Starting Your Diet	Campbell - Gaga for Lady Gaga?
2:10pm	Dillon - To kill or not to kill	Norton - Belief in a favorable future	Spiller - Matters of Taste
2:30pm	Vosgerau - Judging morality of others	Critcher - Performance Heuristic	Evangelidis - Choice Utility
Session #4	Choice Architecture 2	Risk 2	Symposium: The Relationship Between Altruism and Personal Benefits
3:15pm	Mazar - Applying Behavioral Economics	Kupor - Risky Decisions	Newman - Tainted Altruism
3:35pm	Mochon - Healthier by Precommitment	Webb - Choice Bracketing	Barasch - Selfish or selfless?
3:55pm	Hadar - Subjective Knowledge	Garcia-Retamero - Communicating Health Risks	Imas - On Prosocial Incentives
4:15pm	Kyung - "Privacy Paradox"	Yip - Following Your Gut	Olivola - Welfare-Distorting Role
Session #5	Morality and Ethics 2	Self-Control	Financial Decision Making
5:15pm	Gromet - Deviance of triangles	McGuire - Delay-of-gratification	Cryder - Spending Credit
5:35pm	DeWitt - Grouping Promotes Equality	Milkman - Hunger Games Hostage	Kettle - Debt Repayment Strategy
5:55pm	Bryan - Cheating makes you 'a cheater'	Dai - The Fresh Start Effect	Berman - Forecasting Personal Finances
6:15pm	Burns - "It all happened so slow!"	Zhou - The Burden of Responsibility	Greenberg - Spending Underestimation

**SUNDAY NOV 17, 2013**

**Rooms – Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin**

	<b>TRACK I Civic North</b>	<b>TRACK II Civic South</b>	<b>TRACK III Simcoe/Dufferin</b>
<b>Session #6</b>	<b>Altruism and Charitable Giving</b>	<b>Predictions and Forecasts</b>	<b>Choice and Probability Modeling</b>
<b>10:30am</b>	<b>Banker</b> - Altruistic Patience	<b>Simmons</b> - Elephants Weigh More	<b>Broomell</b> - Parameter Recovery
<b>10:50am</b>	<b>Yang</b> - Altruistic Performance	<b>Swift</b> - Fast & Frugal Forecasting	<b>Fisher</b> - Are People Naive Probability
<b>11:10am</b>	<b>Dickert</b> - Explaining the processes	<b>Dietvorst</b> - Seeing Algorithms Err	<b>Bhatia</b> - Reference-Dependent Choice
<b>11:30am</b>	<b>Sussman</b> - Exceptional Framing	<b>Larrick</b> - The fragile wisdom of dyads	<b>Diecidue</b> - Delay resolution of uncertainty
<b>Session #7</b>	<b>Intertemporal Choice</b>	<b>Research and Academia</b>	<b>Judgment</b>
<b>2:45pm</b>	<b>Walters</b> - Loss Aversion	<b>Simonsohn</b> - Failure to Replicate?	<b>Koehler</b> - Psychology of self-prediction
<b>3:05pm</b>	<b>Scholten</b> - Virtues and Vices	<b>Davis-Stouber</b> - Experimental findings	<b>Lucas</b> - Motivated mental imagery
<b>3:25pm</b>	<b>Read</b> - Hidden Zero Effect	<b>Larkin</b> - Across Workplace Hierarchies	<b>de Langhe</b> - Heteroscedastic randomness
<b>3:45pm</b>	<b>Fisher</b> - The Role of Attention	<b>Oppenheimer</b> - Peer Assessment	<b>Bjalkebring</b> - Multiple numeric

**MONDAY NOV 18, 2013**

**Rooms – Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin**

	<b>TRACK I Civic North</b>	<b>TRACK II Civic South</b>	<b>TRACK III Simcoe/Dufferin</b>
<b>Session # 8</b>	<b>Morality and Ethics 3</b>	<b>Consumer Decision Making</b>	<b>Choice 2</b>
<b>9:45am</b>	<b>Zhang</b> - Does Could Lead to Good?	<b>Shah</b> - Psychological tangibility of costs	<b>Reeck</b> - Reining in regret
<b>10:05am</b>	<b>Moore</b> - Competence by any Means	<b>Ulkumen</b> - Impact of Comparison Frames	<b>Parker</b> - Staying the Course
<b>10:25am</b>	<b>Haran</b> - Know who you're up against	<b>Popovich</b> - Acquire Wish List Items	<b>Thomas</b> - Knowing without Remembering
<b>10:45am</b>	<b>Hilbig</b> - Minor lies preserving	<b>Kumar</b> - Questioning the "I"	<b>Baskin</b> - What was I Thinking?
<b>Session #9</b>	<b>Gambling and Insurance</b>	<b>Emotions, Optimism, and Well-Being</b>	<b>Framing and Response Elicitation</b>
<b>11:45pm</b>	<b>Zeelenberg</b> - Hidden cost of insurance	<b>Yang</b> - Hedonic Durability	<b>Goldstein</b> - Understanding Distributions
<b>12:05pm</b>	<b>McKenzie</b> - Longshots Only for Losers?	<b>Pierce</b> - Intense Well-Being Consequences	<b>Levav</b> - Imago Animi Sermo Est
<b>12:25pm</b>	<b>Morewedge</b> - Superstitious Reluctance	<b>Moran</b> - Issue specific emotionality	<b>Schiro</b> - Dichotomizing data changes
<b>12:45pm</b>	<b>Tang</b> - Differences in betting behavior	<b>Tenney</b> - Optimistic About Optimism	<b>Barasz</b> - Greater than the Sum

# 2013 SJDM Conference Special Events

## FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15

5:00-7:00 pm **SJDM Welcome Reception / Early Registration** - Civic Foyer

Please join us at the Welcome Reception which will feature appetizers and a cash bar. This event will also provide an opportunity for early conference registration so that you can avoid the lines Saturday morning.

8:00-10:00 pm **Duncan Luce Tribute** - Special Session Commemorating the Life and Work of Duncan Luce at SJDM - Civic Ballroom (see page 2)

## SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 16

7:00-9:00 pm **Executive Board Dinner** - TBA

Members of the Executive Board, JDM officers, and program chairs for this year and next year are invited to a working dinner.

6:45-8:45 pm **Graduate Student Social Event** - Willow Centre

This informal event will provide student members of SJDM an opportunity to imbibe and network with the future stars of the field. But wait, there's more: SJDM is buying the first round of drinks! For more information contact Elina Halonen at [elina@theirrationalagency.com](mailto:elina@theirrationalagency.com).

## SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 17

8:30-10:30 am AND 5:00-7:00 pm **SJDM Book Auction** - Sheraton Hall

If you love academic books, come to the SJDM book auction table during the poster sessions. Bid on the books for a fraction of the retail cost through a sealed auction. Bidding ends at 7:00 pm during the evening poster session. Any books without bids will be offered for \$1, first come first served! For graduate students, don't miss this great opportunity to get books at discounted prices. Proceeds from the book auction support student-related travel. For more information, contact Ana Franco-Watkins at [afrancowatkins@auburn.edu](mailto:afrancowatkins@auburn.edu).

12:00-1:30 pm **Women in SJDM Networking Event** - Essex Room

All (women and men) are welcome to attend the eighth annual Women in SJDM Luncheon, focused on promoting the advancement of women in JDM. The event will feature lunch, networking opportunities, and a keynote speech from Professor Laura Kray of the University of California at Berkeley's Haas School of Business. The event is organized this year by Katy Milkman, Leslie John, and Ellie Kyung. To inquire about the event, please email Katy Milkman at [milkman@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:milkman@wharton.upenn.edu). We will open registration up online through the SJDM mailing list and accept a maximum of 140 people, and we will keep a waiting list if necessary. In addition, when registering for the meeting: [<http://www.sjdm.org/join.html>], you will notice an option to donate to the Women in SJDM event. We encourage you (especially faculty!) to consider a donation to the event fund. With all of our support, we can ensure that this event will continue to be an annual tradition.

### THANK YOU TO THE SPONSORS OF THE 2013 WOMEN IN SJDM LUNCHEON

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Cindy Cryder | Michael DeKay | Robin Keller | Ellie Kyung | George Wu

#### **This event is made possible entirely through sponsorship.**

To help keep this event an annual tradition, please consider donating to the Women in SJDM Annual Lunch Fund.

(To make a contribution, go to: <http://www.sjdm.org/join.html>, scroll down to the statement:

"Donate to the Women in SJDM Annual Lunch Fund", and click "Donate".)

1:30-2:30 pm **Keynote Address by Susan Carey** - Grand West

### **The Origin of Concepts**

*Susan Carey (Harvard University)*

Alone among animals, humans can ponder the causes and cures of pancreatic cancer or global warming. How are we to account for the human capacity to create concepts such as electron, cancer, infinity, galaxy, and democracy?

A theory of conceptual development must have three components. First, it must characterize the innate representational repertoire—that is, the representations that subsequent learning processes utilize. Second, it must describe how the initial stock of representations differs from the adult conceptual system. Third, it must characterize the learning mechanisms that achieve the transformation of the initial into the final state. I defend three theses. With respect to the initial state, contrary to historically important thinkers such as the British empiricists, Quine, and Piaget, as well as many contemporary scientists, the innate stock of primitives is not limited to sensory, perceptual or sensory-motor representations; rather, there are also innate conceptual representations. With respect to developmental change, contrary to “continuity theorists” such as Fodor, Pinker, Macnamara and others, conceptual development involves qualitative change, resulting in systems of representation that are more powerful than and sometimes incommensurable with those from which they are built. With respect to a learning mechanism that achieves conceptual discontinuity, I offer Quinian bootstrapping.

I take on two of Fodor's challenges to cognitive science: 1) I show how (and in what ways) learning can lead to increases in expressive power and 2) I challenge Fodor's claim that all learning is hypothesis testing, and that the only way new concepts can be constructed is by assembling them from developmental primitives, using the combinatorial machinery of the syntax of the language of thought.

#### **Biographical Note**

Susan Carey has been Professor of Psychology at Harvard since 2001, having previously taught at MIT (24 years) in the Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, and at NYU (5 years) in the Psychology Department. Her work concerns the origin of knowledge on three time scales-- evolutionary, historical, and, mainly, ontogenetic.

4:45-5:30 pm **Presidential Address by Craig Fox** - Grand West

### **The Wisdom of Donald Rumsfeld: Metacognitive Knowledge in Decision Under Uncertainty**

*Craig R. Fox (UCLA Anderson School and Department of Psychology)*

“There are known knowns... known unknowns... [and] unknown unknowns.” In my talk I will argue that decisions under uncertainty are critically influenced by what we think we know and don't know, as well as our impressions of the extent to which outcomes are knowable—and these metacognitive judgments are often biased in systematic and predictable ways. First, I will examine “known knowns” and show that appraisals of one's level of knowledge are inherently comparative and labile, and they influence a number of choice behaviors. Second, I will examine “known unknowns” and show that illusions of understanding (i.e., lack of sensitivity to what we know we don't know) contribute to judgmental overconfidence and political extremism. Third, I will examine unknown unknowns, such as “black swan” effects, and explore a hidden insight from research on decisions from experience. Finally, I will examine perceptions of what is inherently knowable in advance and show that such assessments predict judgment extremity and investment behaviors. These findings collectively reveal underappreciated wisdom in the former Secretary of Defense's most memorable public statement.

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
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**The great annual tradition returns!**

## **SJDM SOCIAL EVENT 9:00pm-1:00am**

Be sure to make your way over to **Courthouse** <http://www.liveatcourthouse.com/> to catch up with all your SJDM friends. Courthouse has plenty of comfortable seating areas for quiet conversations, a dance floor for loosening up, light and not so light snacks (poutine!), and of course a bar. Drink tickets will be distributed to the first JDMers to arrive. See you there! **Courthouse** is located at **57 Adelaide Street East**, just a 10 minute walk from the hotel. Google Maps suggests walking east (right) on **Queen St. W.**, turning right on **Yonge St.**, and then turning left onto **Adelaide St. E.**



### **MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18**


8:00-8:45 am **Business Meeting and Awards Breakfast** - Conference B & C

All members of SJDM are invited to attend the business meeting (and it's where the food is). Every vote counts. Student poster awards will be announced.

9:00-9:30 am **Einhorn Award** - Essex Room

If you want to know who won this prestigious award, you'll have to come to this session of the conference! The winner will make a presentation of the research paper for which s/he won the award.

**NOTE: there will be no Monday Luncheon at this year's conference.**



**Let the bidding begin for the**

**Annual SJDM Book Auction**

**held during the Sunday Poster Sessions**

**Bidding ends at 7pm.**

***Proceeds support student travel!***

If you love academic books, come to the SJDM book auction table during the Sunday poster sessions. Bid on the books for a fraction of the retail cost through a sealed auction. Bidding ends at 7:00 pm during the evening poster session. Any books without bids will be offered for \$1, first come first served! For graduate students, don't miss this great opportunity to get books at discounted prices. Proceeds from the book auction support student-related travel. For more information, contact Ana Franco-Watkins at [afrancowatkins@auburn.edu](mailto:afrancowatkins@auburn.edu).

## **Session #1 Track I: Motivations and Conflicts of Interest – Willow East**

### **Money Matters Less Than You Think: External Incentives Weigh More in Planning than Doing**

*Woolley, Kaitlin (University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Fishbach, Ayelet (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)*

We demonstrate people judge external incentives as more important when deciding to pursue an activity (e.g., applying for a job or college) than during pursuit (e.g., pursuing a job or a college degree, Studies 1 & 2). Because external incentives receive greater weight in planning than in pursuit, people erroneously choose to pursue an activity for reasons that turn out to be less important during pursuit, resulting in poorer performance (increased slacking and decreased persistence) on tasks high on external, but low on internal incentives compared with tasks low on internal, but high on external incentives (Studies 3 & 4). Contact: [kwoolley@chicagobooth](mailto:kwoolley@chicagobooth).

### **The Extrinsic Incentives Bias at Work: Why Tenure Is Bad For Others, But Not For Me**

*Davidai, Shai (Cornell University); Gilovich, Thomas D. (Cornell University)*

People believe extrinsic incentives affect others more than they affect themselves. However, the consequences of this bias have received little empirical attention. In three studies, we show that lay theories of motivation shape attitudes about public policies that involve extrinsic incentives. We find that policy-related attitudes are better predicted by their anticipated effect on others' motivation than by their anticipated effect on one's own motivation. For example, attitudes regarding the academic tenure system (Study 2) and unemployment benefits programs (Study 3) are better predicted by their perceived demotivating effect on others' productivity than by their predicted effect on the self. Contact: [sd525@cornell.edu](mailto:sd525@cornell.edu)

### **I am Immune: A Sense of Invulnerability Predicts Increased Acceptance of, and Influence from, Conflicts of Interest**

*Sah, Sunita (Georgetown University); Richard Larrick (Duke University)*

Many scandals in government, medicine, law and industry, concern conflicts of interest in which professionals accept gifts or other incentives that appear to be barely disguised bribes. We examined managers' sense of invulnerability to the biasing effects of conflicts of interest. Managers who scored higher on professionalism, (i.e., the ability to remain objective and impartial in their decision-making), were more likely to accept, and be influenced by, small gifts, while denying, or remaining oblivious to, any bias in their decision-making. Contact: [sunitasahcmu@gmail.com](mailto:sunitasahcmu@gmail.com)

### **No Idle Boast: Consumer Responses to Self-Enhancing Sources of Product Information**

*Packard, Grant (Wilfred Laurier University); Gershoff, Andrew D. (University of Texas-Austin); Wooten, David B. (University of Michigan)*

We examine the impact of source self-enhancement on recipient perceptions of source credibility and persuasion. Three experiments find that cues highlighting uncertainty about a boastful (self-enhancing) source's motives moderate whether the source's advice is heeded. Participants are less likely to accept recommendations from a boastful individual when: (a) the source's motivation is linked with self-interest, (b) the recipient and source are dissimilar, (c) the recipient is exposed to an external suspicion prime, and (d) the source's self-enhancement is irrelevant to the conversation. Perceived trustworthiness mediates the relationship between source self-enhancement and persuasion. Implications for consumer judgment and decision-making are discussed. Contact: [gpackard@wlu.ca](mailto:gpackard@wlu.ca)

## **Session #1 Track II: Risk 1 - Essex**

### **Using Preferred Outcome Distributions to Estimate Value and Probability Weighting Functions in Decisions under Risk**

*Donkers, Bas (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Lourenço, Carlos (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Dellaert, Benedict (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Goldstein, Daniel (Microsoft Research)*

We propose the use of preferred outcome distributions to elicit individuals' value and probability weighting functions in decisions under risk. Extant approaches typically rely on chained sequences of lottery choices. In contrast, preferred outcome distributions can be elicited through an intuitive graphical interface and two preferred outcome distributions are sufficient to identify the parameters of rank-dependent utility models. We ran an incentive-compatible lab study in which participants constructed their preferred outcome distributions subject to a budget constraint. Results show that estimates of the value function are in line with previous research while probability weighting biases are diminished. Contact: [dellaert@ese.eur.nl](mailto:dellaert@ese.eur.nl)



## **Assessing “economic value”: Abstract magnitude representations underlie risky and riskless valuations**

*Schley, Dan R. (The Ohio State University); Peters, Ellen (The Ohio State University)*

Diminishing marginal utility (DMU) is a basic tenet of judgment and choice models, but its determinants are little understood. We propose that individuals' representations of abstract magnitudes explain DMU in risky and riskless choice. Numerical-cognition research indicates that individuals have curvilinear representations of numeric magnitudes (e.g., perceiving the difference between 5 and 15 as larger than that between 85 and 95). In three studies we demonstrated that curvilinear representations underlie valuation and mediate numeracy's relations with riskless valuations and risky choice. Current results highlight the fundamental notion that valuing \$100 depends critically on perceptions of the abstract magnitude “100.” Contact: [schley.5@osu.edu](mailto:schley.5@osu.edu)

## **Expected Risks and Returns in Children's, Adolescents', and Adults' Dynamic Risky Choice: Behavioral Effects and Neural Correlates**

*Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University); van Duijvenvoorde, Anna C. (Leiden University); Somerville, Leah H. (Harvard University); Powers, Alisa (Sackler Institute for Developmental Psychobiology); Weeda, Wouter D. (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Delgado, Mauricio R. (Rutgers University); Casey, B. J. (Sackler Institute for Developmental Psychobiology); Huizenga, Hilde M. (University of Amsterdam); Figner, Bernd (Radboud University Nijmegen; Columbia University)*

Adolescence is a phase of increased risk taking, neurodevelopmentally attributed to earlier-maturing subcortical versus later-maturing prefrontal networks, implicated in affective-motivational versus controlled-deliberative processes. The few relevant studies' results are difficult to reconcile, often lacking formal decision-frameworks. Using risk-return decomposition, we investigated the psychological and neural processes in children, adolescents, and adults in a dynamic risky choice task. Developmental behavioral and neural results indicate monotonically increasing return sensitivity, quadratic risk effects, and risk insensitivity in children. Conceptually, our work shows the advantages of using well-characterized decision-making frameworks, allowing more precise interpretation of results and operationalization of crucial concepts in risky choice.

Contact: [bf2151@columbia.edu](mailto:bf2151@columbia.edu)

## **Are risk and delay psychologically equivalent? Testing a common process account of risky and inter-temporal choice.**

*Luckman, Ashley J. (University of New South Wales); Newell, Ben R. (University of New South Wales); Donkin, Chris (University of New South Wales)*

This series of experiments investigated the relationship between risk and temporal delay in choice. The primary interest was how risk and delay are evaluated comparatively. One possibility is that risk and delay are discounted by a common process, and thus psychologically equivalent and interchangeable. Individuals' risk and delay tolerance were calculated separately for various amounts. Choices between risks and delays were then constructed based on these tolerances. In contrast to a common process account we found an overall preference for delay over risk, suggesting non-equivalence. The implications of the results for common process and utility-based accounts of choice are discussed. Contact:

[a.luckman@unsw.edu.au](mailto:a.luckman@unsw.edu.au)

## **Session #1 Track III: Health and the Environment - Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **Field Tests of Informational Strategies to Promote Healthy Eating**

*VanEpps, Eric M. (Carnegie Mellon University); Downs, Julie (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)*

Despite successful implementations in lab settings, real-world implementations of nutrition labeling on restaurant menus typically fail to reduce calorie consumption, raising the question of whether informational strategies can change eating behavior. Using an Internet-based lunch-ordering system in a corporate field setting, we experimentally manipulated different strategies designed to promote lower-calorie ordering, measuring their effects among the same individuals over multiple weeks. In this context, separating decisions from visceral cues such as aroma and visual imagery, participants were responsive to nutrition information displayed on the menu at the point of purchase, significantly reducing the total calories in their orders. Contact: [eric.m.vanepps@gmail.com](mailto:eric.m.vanepps@gmail.com)

### **Green and Graying: Age Differences in Environmental Decision Making**

*Zaval, Lisa (Columbia University); Spada, Erica (Columbia University); Weber, Elke (Columbia University)*

Across two studies, we test theoretical arguments about age differences in environmental decision-making using a heterogeneous sample of healthy adults from early to late adulthood. We adjudicate among hypotheses on the relationship between age and climate change judgments that are related to temporal focus, generative motives, and age-related changes in affect. We find an enduring negative correlation between age and pro-environmental attitudes. Age differences were mediated by future time perspective and moderated by generative concern. These results suggest that examining sustainability as an intergenerational issue may encourage elders to defer immediate gains in order to take responsibility for future generations. Contact: [erica@decisionsciences.columbia.edu](mailto:erica@decisionsciences.columbia.edu)



## **Empirical Approaches to Examine the Hawthorne Effect in Consumer Energy Behavior**

*Schwartz, Daniel (Carnegie Mellon-SDS / University of Pennsylvania-Wharton); Fischhoff, Baruch (Carnegie Mellon University-SDS/EPP); Krishnamurti, Tamar (Carnegie Mellon University-Teppei/EPP); Sowell, Fallaw (Carnegie Mellon University-Teppei)*

Often referred to as the “Hawthorne Effect,” changes in behavior due to novel treatment or subject knowledge of being in an experiment, is a phenomenon reported as one of the most influential in the social sciences. We conducted a field experiment with electricity customers notifying them about their participation in a study about household electricity usage. We found evidence for a Hawthorne (study participation) Effect, seen in a reduction of electricity usage. Responses to the follow-up survey suggested that the effect reflected heightened awareness of energy consumption. Contact: [danielsp2318@gmail.com](mailto:danielsp2318@gmail.com)

## **The effect of type and source of uncertainty on decisions regarding climate change**

*Benjamin, Daniel (Fordham University); Budescu, David (Fordham University)*

Policy-makers must make tough decisions to mitigate the effects of climate change using limited resources. We examine how two different types and sources of uncertainty affect people’s interpretation of climate projections. We distinguish (1) between uncertainty within one expert (intra-personal) and between multiple experts (inter-personal) and (2) between uncertainty in interpreting models (judgmental) and uncertainty regarding the model’s structure (structural). In a study involving 4 scenarios regarding the effects of climate change, participants who received projections from multiple experts were more sensitive to model uncertainty. Specifically, they reduced their estimated ranges more (compared to the experts’ projections) under structural uncertainty. Contact: [dbenjamin3@fordham.edu](mailto:dbenjamin3@fordham.edu)

## **Session #2 Track I Choice Architecture 1 - Willow East**

### **What Makes Choice Architecture Acceptable? The Role of Trust and Perceived Effectiveness**

*Shu, Suzanne B. (UCLA); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University); Bang, Min (Duke University)*

Critics of choice architecture argue that it is coercive, altering individuals’ decisions without consent. However, little is known about how average decision-makers react to choice architecture interventions once made aware of them, or whether they have preferences for some interventions over others. To better understand their reactions, we test framing and transparency interventions in within-subjects designs, with additional source-of-intervention manipulations and measurement of individual characteristics. We find that while interventions continue to influence choice, individuals are generally positive about such interventions, have clear ideas about which are acceptable, and are also sensitive to perceived motivations of the intervention’s source. Contact: [suzanne.shu@anderson.ucla.edu](mailto:suzanne.shu@anderson.ucla.edu)

### **Partitioning option menus to nudge single-item choice**

*Tannenbaum, David (UCLA); Fox, Craig R. (UCLA); Goldstein, Noah J. (UCLA); Doctor, Jason N. (USC)*

Three studies demonstrate a new decision architecture tool for single-item riskless choice-partitioning option menus. The number of options comprising a choice-set can be organized in any number of ways; we show that whenever options are individually listed out or “unpacked” they are more likely to be chosen than when those same options are grouped into a superordinate category. These partitioning effects occur both in laboratory and field settings, when participants are experts in the task domain, and when participants are motivated to accurately state their preferences. Contact: [david.tannenbaum@anderson.ucla.edu](mailto:david.tannenbaum@anderson.ucla.edu)

### **Healthy Defaults Drive Away Sales**

*Colby, Helen (Rutgers University); Li, Meng (University of Colorado, Denver); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University)*

Defaults are widely recognized as powerful tools to encourage desirable behavior. Many recommendations focus on improving choice by changing default options to healthier foods, higher contribution rates to 401(k)s, and organ donor statuses. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate the effectiveness of healthy food defaults using real-world consumption settings. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that while improving healthy eating, these changes also can have negative consequences in the form of lowered sales in both a real store and hypothetical online setting. Studies 5 and 6 investigate the mechanism through which healthy defaults cause lowered sales. Contact: [hcolby@rci.rutgers.edu](mailto:hcolby@rci.rutgers.edu)

### **In Search Of Optimally Effective Defaults**

*Goswami, Indranil (University of Chicago, Booth School); Urminsky, Oleg (University of Chicago, Booth School)*

Extant research has suggested that high defaults may be detrimental, and in practice, low defaults are most common (for 401(k) contribution rates, charitable contributions, etc.). In ten completed studies across various domains with both hypothetical and real stakes we investigated whether setting defaults too low or too high is likely to have a greater impact. Pooling data from these experiments, a meta-analysis shows very limited evidence for backlash against high defaults but instead, reduced efficacy for low defaults. High reactance and low trust reduces the effect of all defaults. Meta-analysis of other published and unpublished work reveals similar results. Contact: [oleg.urminsky@chicagobooth.edu](mailto:oleg.urminsky@chicagobooth.edu)

## **Session #2 Track II: Reflection, Intuition, and Insight - Essex**

### **The Bat and Ball Problem**

*Meyer, Andrew (Yale); Spunt, Bob (UCLA); Frederick, Shane (Yale)*

We examine three explanations why people miss the “Bat and Ball” problem (Frederick, 2005): (1) failure to check answers against the problem’s constraints; (2) checking answers against a distorted version of the problem’s constraints and (3) checking answers against the actual constraints, yet violating basic arithmetic to maintain initial impressions. Though we find some evidence for each of these explanations, to our surprise, we find considerable support for the third. Mere exposure to the problem increases the rate at which respondents explicitly endorse the idea that a \$1.00 object costs \$1.00 more than a \$0.10 object. Contact: [andrew.meyer@yale.edu](mailto:andrew.meyer@yale.edu)

### **The CRT, system 2, reflection-impulsivity, and actively open-minded thinking**

*Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania); Fincher, Katrina (University of Pennsylvania); Metz, S. Emlen (University of Pennsylvania); Scott, Sydney (University of Pennsylvania)*

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is thought to measure system-2 correction of an initial intuitive response. We find, however, that CRT-type items (using logic as well as arithmetic) can work just as well when they do not have obvious intuitive answers. Moreover, long response times, as well as high accuracy, are sometimes valid predictors of other effects. The CRT might thus be considered as a test of reflection-impulsivity (R-I). However, R-I is only part of actively open-minded thinking (AOT). Tests of AOT are also useful in predicting cognitive biases. We report data from such measures. Contact: [baron@psych.upenn.edu](mailto:baron@psych.upenn.edu)

### **Outcome neglect: How insight failure undermines simple utility maximization.**

*Urminsky, Oleg (University of Chicago, Booth School); Yang, Adelle (University of Chicago, Booth School)*

In a jackpot guessing game (in lab and field studies), people neglected the equal probabilities of winning across guesses but a higher conditional payoffs for larger guesses. Participants made sub-optimal guesses in the middle of the range, as opposed to guessing the highest valid number, which could not be explained by beliefs about the probabilities. Consistent with insight failure, guesses are improved (but remain non-optimal) in a simplified game or when probability and outcome are decoupled. The effect persists but is somewhat reduced for experts (MBA students, SJDM attendees), those higher in CRT or with more economics or statistics training. Contact: [oleg.urminsky@chicagobooth.edu](mailto:oleg.urminsky@chicagobooth.edu)

### **The method of deciding matters: lessons from research on intuitive and unconscious choice**

*Tennant, Raegan (University of Chicago, Booth School); Xia, Jane (University of Chicago); Hastie, Reid (University of Chicago, Booth School)*

Researchers have long debated which method of deciding is the best one. Some have argued intuitive choice is good, while others have advocated specific methods to help overcome bounded cognition. Our paper discusses these different approaches and empirically examines the most recent, the Unconscious Thought Effect [UTE], and we show that two psychological processes, overthinking and selective forgetting, account for the effect. Moreover, we test a novel method of deliberation that outperforms all others. We conclude by discussing the implications of the present research for the debate about the functions of consciousness and the role of procedural rationality in decision-making. Contact: [rtennant@uchicago.edu](mailto:rtennant@uchicago.edu)

## **Session #2 Track III: Biases in Judgment and Choice - Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **“Heads or Tails?” First tosses (and choices) are biased**

*Bar-Hillel, Maya (Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Peer, Eyal (Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University); Aquisti, Alessandro (Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University)*

Studies of people attempting to “be-like-a-coin” concluded that people are incapable of generating random sequences in their minds. None, however, ever investigated the very 1st toss of a mentally generated sequence. Existing data sets show that about 80% of respondents started their coin-toss sequence with Heads, rather than Tails. This we attribute to the linguistic preponderance of “Heads-or-Tails” over “Tails-or-Heads.” Our experiments revealed, however, that this bias -- though genuine -- can be reversed by task instructions or response format. We propose that the “1st-toss” bias might be a special case of a more general “1st-available-option” response bias. Contact: [maya@huji.ac.il](mailto:maya@huji.ac.il)

## **Judging a Part by the Size of its Whole: The Category Size Bias in Probability Judgments**

*Isaac, Mathew S. (Seattle University); Brough, Aaron R. (Pepperdine University)*

The notion that categorization influences probability estimates is referred to as partition dependence and has been attributed to variation in the number of categories into which the set of possible outcomes is divided. In this research, we propose that partition dependence can also occur because of variation in category size (i.e., the number of outcomes in each category), even when the number of categories is held constant. Five studies show that a specific outcome is perceived as more (less) likely to occur when classified into a large (small) category, even when categories are arbitrarily constructed and non-diagnostic. Contact: [aaron.brough@gmail.com](mailto:aaron.brough@gmail.com)

## **On the role of automatic and deliberate processes in the standard anchoring task**

*Tam, Cory (University of Alberta); Schweickart, Oliver (University of Alberta); Brown, Norman R. (University of Alberta)*

We introduce a new perspective on anchoring, “consistency theory,” which embeds anchoring within the broader context of information uptake, and which highlights the role of deliberate processes in numerical judgment. Consistent with this view, we demonstrate (a) that the influence of anchors on numerical estimates increases as a function of source credibility, and (b) that the standard anchoring effect is practically eliminated when people are required to evaluate the quality of the anchor value and consider it to be a bad estimate of the true value. These findings challenge the view that anchoring is primarily the result of automatic, activation-based processes. Contact: [ctam2@ualberta.ca](mailto:ctam2@ualberta.ca)

## **Harder Than it Should Be: The Effort-Outcome Link and the Construction of Deliberative Choice Processes**

*Schrift, Rom Y. (The Wharton School); Kivetz, Ran (Columbia University); Netzer, Oded (Columbia University)*

The notion that effort and hard work yield desired outcomes is ingrained in many cultures and affects our thinking and behavior. However, could the belief in the value of effort complicate our lives? In this research, we show that a strong tendency to link effort and hard work with positive outcomes leads to complicating what should be easy decisions. In four studies we find that decision-makers alter their preferences, distort the information they recall, and selectively interpret information in a manner that intensifies the conflict experienced during the deliberation phase. Contact: [roms@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:roms@wharton.upenn.edu)

## **Session #3 Track I: Morality and Ethics 1 - Willow East**

### **Intentional harms are worse, even when they're not**

*Ames, Daniel L. (Princeton University); Fiske, Susan T. (Princeton University)*

Three sets of experiments demonstrate that people judge intended harms as worse than unintended harms, even when the two harms are objectively identical. Notably, this bias persists even when the damage is clearly quantified (in dollars) and when participants have financial incentives to be accurate. A motivational account fully mediates the effect. The potential scope of this bias is explored across diverse contexts, including humanitarian disasters, economic losses in a corporate setting, and interpersonal affective outcomes. This work provides a novel psychological mechanism for previous observations regarding the misallocation of public funds, and also has implications for legal damage assessments. Contact: [dames@princeton.edu](mailto:dames@princeton.edu)

### **Cruel nature: Harmfulness as an overlooked dimension in judgments of moral standing**

*Piazza, Jared (University of Pennsylvania); Landy, Justin (University of Pennsylvania); Goodwin, Geoffrey (University of Pennsylvania)*

Past perspectives on the attribution of moral standing have focused exclusively on the role of “patience” (or experience) and “agency” (or intelligence). We contend that harmful intent is an equally, if not more important, determinant of moral standing. We provide support for this hypothesis across four studies using non-human animals as targets. We show that the effect of harmful intent on attributions of moral standing is not reducible to agency and primarily reflects a motivation to prevent human suffering. Our results also call into question the extent to which people perceive patience and agency as truly independent dimensions. Contact: [jpiazza@psych.upenn.edu](mailto:jpiazza@psych.upenn.edu)

### **To kill or not to kill: Self-regulatory affect in moral behavior**

*Dillon, Kyle D (Harvard University); Cushman, Fiery (Brown University)*

We judge others not just by the outcomes they cause, but also by the actions they perform. We condemn actions more than omissions, harm as a means more than as a side-effect, and typical harmful behaviors more than atypical ones. Might our focus on the “act itself” when judging others ultimately derive from self-regulatory processes--that is, our aversion to performing the action ourselves? We asked participants to engage in pretend harmful behaviors, testing whether mere action--absent any harmful outcome--was sufficient to elicit self-regulatory affect, and whether this affect responded to principles that guide third party moral judgment. Contact: [kdillon@g.harvard.edu](mailto:kdillon@g.harvard.edu)

### **For trust not him that hath broken faith once: Judging the morality of others**

*Vosgerau, Joachim (Carnegie Mellon/Tilburg University); Brandimarte, Laura (Carnegie Mellon University); Kuehn, Sarah (Slippery Rock University); Acquisti, Alessandro (Carnegie Mellon University)*

Do people heed the advice given in Shakespeare's play? We show that a person's past immoral/unfair behaviors have a much longer lasting impact on how s/he is evaluated and treated than her past moral/fair behaviors. The lesser depreciation over time is caused by immoral behaviors being perceived as more indicative of a person's character than moral behaviors. We also test whether people's morality judgments of others are accurate by comparing estimated recidivism likelihood ratios for violent and property offenses to actual recidivism likelihood rates. US respondents are found to grossly overestimate the stability of immorality over time and across domains. Contact: [vosgerau@cmu.edu](mailto:vosgerau@cmu.edu)

### **Session #3 Track II: The Past vs. The Future - Essex**

#### **The Temporal Doppler Effect: When the Future Feels Closer than the Past**

*Caruso, Eugene M. (University of Chicago); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado at Boulder); Chin, Mark (Swarthmore College); Ward, Andrew H. (Swarthmore College)*

People routinely remember events that have passed and imagine those that are yet to come. The past and the future are sometimes psychologically close ("just around the corner") and sometimes psychologically distant ("ages away"). We demonstrate a systematic asymmetry whereby future events are psychologically closer than past events of equivalent objective distance. We suggest that this asymmetry arises because the subjective experience of movement through time (whereby future events approach and past events recede) is analogous to the physical experience of movement through space. We discuss how reducing psychological distance to the future may function to prepare for upcoming action. Contact: [eugene.caruso@chicagobooth.edu](mailto:eugene.caruso@chicagobooth.edu)

#### **Starting Your Diet Tomorrow: People Believe They Will Have More Control Over the Future Than They Did Over the Past**

*Williams, Elanor F. (University of California, San Diego); LeBoeuf, Robyn A. (University of Florida)*

Insanity is "doing the same thing over and over again but expecting different results." We propose a potential cause for this kind of insanity: people believe the future is different from, and specifically, more controllable than, the past. Across several real and hypothetical scenarios, participants expressed the belief that, despite the future's inherent uncertainty, future outcomes, both good and bad, would be more controllable than identical past outcomes would have been. We consider implications of this effect and discuss how it fits with the growing body of work suggesting that people perceive past and future to be fundamentally different. Contact: [ewilliams@ucsd.edu](mailto:ewilliams@ucsd.edu)

#### **The belief in a favorable future**

*Rogers, Todd (Harvard Kennedy School); Norton, Michael I (Harvard Business School)*

We explore people's belief in a "favorable future"--the tendency to predict that the future will align with one's preferred views of the world. People believe that their ideological, policy and entertainment preferences - from same sex marriage to American Idol - will become more common in the future. However, people's construction of the future is not a projection of their current self, but a motivated projection of a favorable future. People believe their bad attributes will become more common in the future and their good attributes rarer - such that only people's positive aspects will stand out in the crowd. Contact: [todd\\_rogers@hks.harvard.edu](mailto:todd_rogers@hks.harvard.edu)

#### **The Performance Heuristic: A Misguided Reliance on Past Success When Predicting Future Improvement**

*Critcher, Clayton R. (University of California, Berkeley); Rosenzweig, Emily L. (Tulane University)*

Three studies show people use a performance heuristic: When forecasting the likelihood of subsequent performance improvement, people lean on previous absolute performance as a positive cue. That is, when participants' initial performance was better -- either at a darts or an anagram task -- participants bet more money, or estimated a higher subjective likelihood, that their subsequent performance would show specified improvement. Reliance on the heuristic hurt forecasting accuracy. Additional evidence distinguished two mechanistic accounts, showed how to debias participants, and established the performance heuristic as a general-purpose heuristic that is applied to non-self-related (i.e., mutual fund) improvement forecasting as well. Contact: [ClaytonCritcher@haas.berkeley.edu](mailto:ClaytonCritcher@haas.berkeley.edu)

### **Session #3 Track III: Choice 1 - Simcoe/Dufferin**

#### **Misjudging the impact of advice: How advisors systematically misperceive their influence**

*Rader, Christina (Duke University); Sah, Sunita (Georgetown University); Larrick, Richard (Duke University)*

We study advisors' perceptions of their influence and find that advisors exhibit systematic biases. In two studies we show that when advisors do not know what the advisee would have done absent the advice, advisors do not sufficiently account for that missing information. Therefore, advisees may appear to have taken advice, when in fact they were planning on taking that action in any case, leading advisors to overestimate their influence. Likewise, advisees can appear to have ignored the advice, when in fact, they shifted substantially from a position that was even further removed, resulting in advisors underestimating their influence. Contact: [christina.rader@duke.edu](mailto:christina.rader@duke.edu)

#### **Would Others Be Gaga for Lady Gaga? Making Decisions For Others After Repeated Exposure**

*Campbell, Troy (Duke University); O'Brien, Ed (University of Michigan); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado); Schwarz, Norbert (University of Michigan); Ubel, Peter (Duke University)*

People often seek out individuals who are distinguished by their repeated experience with emotional content (comedy, art, Lady Gaga) to make decisions for them. However, as a result of the repeated experiences, these individuals can become desensitized. After repeated exposure, we find that these individuals incorrectly use their own desensitized reactions to predict unexposed others' reactions to similar experiences. Thus, they become worse at deciding for unexposed others. However, unexposed others predict the opposite and choose to follow recommendations from well exposed others. These studies suggest that repeated exposure can dramatically and negatively influence sharing, recommendations, and social behavior. Contact: [tcampbel@gmail.com](mailto:tcampbel@gmail.com)

#### **Matters of Taste: Differences in Perceived Preference Structures**

*Spiller, Stephen A. (UCLA); Belogolova, Helen (UCLA)*

Products vary on horizontal (taste) and vertical (quality) attributes. We find significant disagreement regarding attribute classification. Classifying an attribute as horizontal is associated with lower perceived consensus and greater connection of one's choice to one's self, as indicated by greater use of self-referential language. Explaining the choice of someone who chose a different option (compared to the choice of someone who chose the same option or one's own choice) increases the likelihood of classifying an attribute as horizontal. The relationship between horizontal quality and self-referential language is corroborated using a publicly available dataset of movie reviews. Contact: [stephen.spiller@anderson.ucla.edu](mailto:stephen.spiller@anderson.ucla.edu)

#### **Choice Utility**

*Evangelidis, Ioannis (Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam); Levav, Jonathan (Graduate School of Business, Stanford University)*

We introduce the concept of choice utility, which describes the utility obtained by how people attain an outcome independent of what the actual outcome is. We focus on two normatively equivalent processes for obtaining the same outcome: action and inaction. Our studies show that under low (high) preference uncertainty the choice share of a high utility option (any option) decreases (increases) when it is framed as an inaction than as an action. We document preference reversals in classic decision problems such as the Asian Disease problem, Money Illusion, Asymmetric Dominance, and the Disjunction Effect. Contact: [jlevav@stanford.edu](mailto:jlevav@stanford.edu)

### **Session #4 Track I: Choice Architecture 2 - Willow East**

#### **Applying Behavioral Economics in the Field: Nudging Customers to Pay their Credit Card Dues**

*Mazar, Nina (University of Toronto); Ariely, Dan (Duke University)*

In a large-scale field experiment over nine months with over 500,000 credit card accounts, we manipulated the automated phone messaging that customers receive when not paying their monthly dues. Across five experimental conditions plus one control condition (the standard script), we found that creating a sense of urgency, being more informative, and making customers pledge that they will pay in a specific amount of time substantially increased overdue customers' likelihood to pay their dues before the end of the next month -- thereby reducing their credit costs.

## Healthier by Precommitment

*Schwartz, Janet (Tulane University); Mochon, Daniel (Tulane University); Wyper, Lauren (Discovery Vitality); Morabe, Josiase (Discovery Vitality); Patel, Deepak (Discovery Vitality); Ariely (Dan, Duke University)*

We tested a voluntary commitment device to help grocery shoppers improve the health of the food they purchased. Thirty-six percent of households who were offered the commitment device agreed, and subsequently showed a 3.5% increase in the percentage of healthy grocery items in each of the study's six months as compared to the control group who made a hypothetical commitment and those who were offered the commitment and declined. These results suggest that self-aware consumers will seize opportunities to create environments for themselves that restrict choices, even at if it comes at some risk of financial loss. Contact: [dmocho@tulane.edu](mailto:dmocho@tulane.edu)

## Subjective Knowledge Attenuates Default Effects

*Hadar, Liat (IDC Herzliya); Tannenbaum, David (UCLA); Fox, Craig R. (UCLA)*

Model comparisons have been used to test the central claim of the adaptive toolbox approach that people use fast-and-frugal heuristics and select between them adaptively. We show that there is a methodological problem in core publications supposedly supporting this claim. Weighted compensatory strategies that are considered alternatives to fast-and-frugal heuristics are specified in a way that underestimates their use. Specifically, the common practice of not correcting validities for chance level results in a disadvantage for weighted compensatory strategies. A reanalysis of published data and simulations show overestimation of the reliance on fast-and-frugal heuristics for task environments used in prominent studies. Contact: [lhadar@idc.ac.il](mailto:lhadar@idc.ac.il)

## Information as a Constrained Resource

*Kyung, Ellie (Dartmouth College, Tuck School of Business)*

In this digital age, it has become increasingly easy to solicit, collect, and disseminate personal information from individuals. Although people largely agree that privacy is important and that their information is valuable, they regularly share information in relatively unprotected forums in exchange for very little, if anything at all - a "privacy paradox." Four experiments examine the how the lack of perceived constraints, relative to time or money, leads people to undervalue this resource and how priming resource constraints can lead to lower rates of personal disclosure. This research has important implications for educating consumers about valuing their personal information. Contact: [ellie.kyung@tuck.dartmouth.edu](mailto:ellie.kyung@tuck.dartmouth.edu)

## Session #4 Track II: Risk 2 - Essex

### Risky Decisions, Interrupted

*Kupor, Daniella (Stanford Graduate School of Business); Liu, Wendy (UCSD Rady School of Management); Amir, On (UCSD Rady School of Management)*

Interruptions are ubiquitous. Across three studies, we demonstrate that interruptions in decision making can increase risk taking. When an individual is interrupted during a risky decision, we find that his/her previous consideration of the decision causes it to feel more familiar. This interruption-induced familiarity increases risk taking by decreasing avoidance motivation and increasing the perceived likelihood of a successful risk outcome. These findings have important implications for understanding how risk preferences may be powerfully influenced by the dynamic--and often interrupted--course of decision making. Contact: [dkupor@stanford.edu](mailto:dkupor@stanford.edu)

### Choice Bracketing and Construal Level Theory: The Effects of Problem Representation and Mental Representation on Sequential Risk-Taking

*Webb, Elizabeth C. (UCLA Anderson); Shu, Suzanne B. (UCLA Anderson)*

We attempt to integrate the theories of choice bracketing and construal level, uncovering commonalities and/or differences in their effects on risk-taking. In three studies we demonstrate (a) construal level (manipulated through temporal distance) and choice bracketing have independent effects; (b) temporal distance acts through mental construal while bracketing acts through another mechanism; and (c) the effect of temporal distance is mediated by risk perception. We are able to confirm these effects using two types of bracketing (problem and outcome) and across different gambling types (mixed and pure-loss gambles). Ultimately, our results indicate the two theories have independent effects on risk-taking. Contact: [elizabeth.webb.2013@anderson.ucla.edu](mailto:elizabeth.webb.2013@anderson.ucla.edu)



## **Communicating Health Risks with Visual Aids**

*Garcia-Retamero, Rocio (U. Granada; Max Planck Institute, Berlin); Cokely, Edward T. (Michigan Technological Univ.; Max Planck Institute, Berlin)*

Informed and shared decision making require that people understand health risks. Unfortunately, many people are not risk literate and are biased by common risk communication practices. In this talk, we review a collection of studies investigating the benefits of visual aids for communicating health risks to diverse vulnerable individuals (e.g., varying in abilities, ages, risk characteristics, and cultural backgrounds). Studies show that appropriately designed visual aids are often highly effective, transparent, and ethically desirable tools for improving decision making, changing attitudes, and reducing risky behavior. Theoretical mechanisms, open questions, and emerging applications are discussed. Contact:

[retamer@ugr.es](mailto:retamer@ugr.es)

## **Following Your Gut: Emotion-Understanding Ability Enables the Use of Somatic Markers as Signals for Risk Avoidance**

*Yip, Jeremy A. (Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Cote, Stephane (Rotman School, University of Toronto); Carney, Dana R. (Haas School, University of California Berkeley)*

We examined whether a key dimension of emotional intelligence, emotion-understanding ability, enables individuals to use their physiological reactions to make better decisions. When physiological reactions are triggered by potential danger associated with risky decision options, they provide a valuable source of information to avoid risk. While all normal individuals can generate physiological reactions, we propose that only individuals with high emotion-understanding ability are able to correctly identify their relevance and rely on their reactions to avoid risk. The results from the Iowa Gambling Task confirmed our prediction, suggesting that adaptive utilization of our physiology when making decisions requires emotional intelligence. Contact: [jeremy.yip2011@gmail.com](mailto:jeremy.yip2011@gmail.com)

## **Session #4 Track III: Symposium - The Relationship Between Altruism and Personal Benefits - Simcoe/Dufferin**

Symposium description: The logic of altruism suggests that prosocial actions are tainted when the actor receives material, social or intrapsychic benefits from their good deeds. For instance, individuals often reconstrue selfless behavior as self-interested and discount prosocial acts in the presence of personal benefits (Critcher & Dunning, 2011; Lin-Healy & Small, 2011). The present symposium explores the boundaries of this skepticism and the ways in which benefits to the self-influence prosocial behavior and perceptions of altruism. The first two papers explore how individuals give others credit for their good deeds. First, Newman & Cain find that people view charitable behaviors that result in personal benefits as worse than selfish behaviors that produce no charitable benefits. Second, Barasch et al. examine when emotional benefits signal altruistic character rather than selfishness. The latter two papers explore how attitudes towards altruism influence actual behavior. Imas, Gneezy and Kennan find that individuals work harder for charity than for themselves, but only when incentive stakes are low. Finally, Olivola demonstrates that people prefer altruistic actions that involve self-sacrifice over easier, but more efficient alternatives. Together, these papers give insight into when and why personal benefits affect the judgment and performance of prosocial acts.

### **Tainted Altruism: When doing some good is evaluated worse than doing no good at all**

*Newman, George E. (Yale); Cain, Daylian M. (Yale)*

Four studies find that people evaluate efforts that realize both charitable and personal benefits as worse than analogous selfish behaviors that produce no charitable benefit. This “tainted altruism effect” is observed across a variety of contexts, extending to both moral evaluations of others as well as participants’ own behavioral intentions. This effect seems to be driven by the accessibility of different counterfactuals: when someone is charitable for self-interested reasons, people consider their behavior in the absence of the self-interest. However, when someone is only selfish, people do not spontaneously consider whether the person could have been more altruistic. Contact: [george.newman@yale.edu](mailto:george.newman@yale.edu)

### **Selfish or selfless? On the signal value of emotion in altruistic behavior**

*Barasch, Alixandra (Wharton, UPenn); Levine, Emma E. (Wharton, UPenn); Berman, Jonathan Z. (Wharton, UPenn); Small, Deborah A. (Wharton, UPenn)*

Theories that reject the existence of altruism argue that emotional benefits imply selfishness. We find that lay beliefs about the relationship between emotion and altruism reflect the opposite: emotions signal authentic concern for others. Five studies find that emotion-driven prosocial deeds merit greater charitable credit than the same deeds performed without emotion. Furthermore, a lack of emotion, even when accompanied by logical reasons for giving, triggers suspicion. Individuals only penalize emotional prosocial actors when they are explicitly described as motivated by emotional benefits. Results suggest that authenticity of motives may be more important than selflessness for judgments of altruism. Contact:

[abarasch@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:abarasch@wharton.upenn.edu)

## Prosocial Incentives

*Imas, Alex (UC San Diego); Gneezy, Ayelet (UC San Diego); Keenan, Elizabeth (UC San Diego)*

Recent studies have shown that individuals report greater happiness when spending on others than on themselves. We explore this finding using a prosocial incentive scheme, where effort is tied directly to charitable contributions. In a real-effort task, individuals indeed work harder for charity than for themselves, but only when incentive stakes are low. When stakes are raised, the difference in provided effort disappears. Additionally, individuals correctly anticipated these effects, choosing to work for charity at low incentives and for themselves at high incentives. The results have implications for optimal incentive design and the use of subjective well-being measures. Contact: [aimas@ucsd.edu](mailto:aimas@ucsd.edu).

## The Welfare-Distorting Role of Self-Sacrifice in Altruism

*Olivola, Christopher Y. (Carnegie Mellon University)*

When faced with several different routes to helping others in need (e.g., volunteering times vs. donating money), what factors do people consider? Common sense and most normative theories dictate that altruistic options bringing about the most good should be preferred, ceteris paribus. We demonstrate a striking violation of this principle: People prefer (and judge more positively) altruistic actions that involve self-sacrifice (on the part of the giver) than easier alternatives, even when the former are transparently less efficient (i.e., fewer people benefit). We explore the causes and moderators of this puzzling bias and discuss its implications for improving human welfare. Contact: [colivola@andrew.cmu.edu](mailto:colivola@andrew.cmu.edu)

## Session #5 Track I: Morality and Ethics 2 - Willow East

### On the deviance of triangles: Differences in deviance perception partly explain ideological divides in social policy support

*Gromet, Dena (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Okimoto, Tyler (University of Queensland)*

We propose that political differences in social policy support may be partly driven by the tendency for conservatives to perceive greater deviance than liberals, even among non-social targets. In two studies, participants were shown geometric figures and were asked to identify the extent to which they were triangles (or circles, squares, etc.). More conservative participants perceived a larger difference between true and imperfect shapes than more liberal participants. This greater perception of geometric deviance later predicted harsher punishment of wrongdoers and less support for public aid for disadvantaged groups, partly accounting for the relationship between political ideology and social policy. Contact: [denag@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:denag@wharton.upenn.edu)

### Grouping Promotes Equality: Effect of Recipient Grouping in Allocation of Limited Medical Resources

*Colby, Helen (Rutgers University); DeWitt, Jeff (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen B. (Rutgers University)*

The allocation of scarce medical resources often involves a tradeoff between efficiency and equality. Perceptions of fairness can be influenced by subtle features of the question, and the current studies investigated the effect of arbitrary groupings on the allocation of scarce transplant organs. Across three studies (N=746), we find support for the idea that the existence of even unmistakably arbitrary groups decreases the efficiency of resource allocation decisions because decision makers tend to spread the resource across the groups. Contact: [jrd202@rci.rutgers.edu](mailto:jrd202@rci.rutgers.edu)

### When cheating would make you 'a cheater': Noun wording prevents unethical behavior

*Bryan, Christopher J. (University of California, San Diego); Adams, Gabrielle S. (London Business School); Monin, Benoît (Stanford University)*

In three experiments, people were less likely to cheat for personal gain when a subtle change in phrasing framed such behavior as diagnostic of an undesirable identity. Participants were given the opportunity to claim money they were not entitled to; instructions referred to cheating with either a verb (e.g., "cheating") or a noun (e.g., "being a cheater"). Participants in the verb condition claimed significantly more money than participants in the noun condition. These results demonstrate the power of a subtle linguistic difference to prevent even private unethical behavior by invoking people's desire to maintain a self-image as good and honest. Contact: [cbryan@ucsd.edu](mailto:cbryan@ucsd.edu)

### "It all happened so slow!": The impact of action speed on assessments of intentionality

*Burns, Zachary C. (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University); Caruso, Eugene M. (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)*

From YouTube to the courtroom, people have an increasing number of opportunities to view the actions of others. We uncover a novel factor that influences the assessment of an actor's videotaped behavior: the speed at which the recorded behavior is observed. Using videos of physical contact in various sporting events, we demonstrate that participants who view events in slow motion (compared to regular speed) believe that actions are more intentional and that the actors who committed them deserve more punishment for harmful outcomes. We discuss the implications of this phenomenon for how people evaluate the ethicality of ambiguous behavior. Contact: [z-burns@kellogg.northwestern.edu](mailto:z-burns@kellogg.northwestern.edu)



## **Session #5 Track II: Self-Control - Essex**

### **Delay-of-gratification decisions emerge from rational predictions: Behavioral and neural evidence**

*McGuire, Joseph T. (University of Pennsylvania); Kable, Joseph W. (University of Pennsylvania)*

In an uncertain world, choosing to start waiting for a delayed reward need not imply that one is willing to continue waiting indefinitely. We identify situations in which it is rational to give up on delayed rewards, and hypothesize that the choice to persist (or not) stems from a dynamic reassessment of the awaited reward's subjective value. This hypothesis is supported through behavioral manipulations of timing statistics, surveys of temporal expectations in naturalistic scenarios, and a neuroimaging investigation of value representations during a delay. Our findings suggest a new perspective on both successes and apparent failures in delaying gratification. Contact: [mcguirej@psych.upenn.edu](mailto:mcguirej@psych.upenn.edu)

### **Holding the Hunger Games Hostage at the Gym: An Evaluation of Temptation Bundling**

*Milkman, Katherine (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Minson, Julia (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Volpp, Kevin (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)*

We introduce and evaluate temptation bundling--a method for simultaneously tackling two types of self-control problems by harnessing consumption complementarities. We describe an experiment measuring the impact of bundling tempting rewards (page-turner audiobooks) with visiting the gym. Participants were randomly assigned to a full treatment condition with gym-only access to tempting audiobooks, an intermediate treatment involving encouragement to restrict audiobook enjoyment to the gym, or a control condition. Exercise initially increased in the treatment groups but later waned. Post-study, 61% of participants opted to pay to have tempting audiobook access restricted to the gym, suggesting demand for this commitment device. Contact: [kmilkman@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:kmilkman@wharton.upenn.edu)

### **The Fresh Start Effect: Temporal Landmarks Motivate Aspirational Behavior**

*Dai, Hengchen (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Milkman, Katherine L. (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Riis, Jason (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)*

The popularity of New Year's resolutions suggests that goals may be easier to tackle immediately following salient temporal landmarks. If true, this little-researched phenomenon has the potential to help people overcome important willpower problems that often limit goal attainment. Across three field studies, we show that aspirational behaviors (dieting, exercising, and goal commitment) increase following temporal landmarks (e.g., the outset of a new week/month/year/semester, birthdays, holidays). We propose that temporal landmarks relegate past imperfections to a previous mental accounting period, making the current self feel superior and thus capable of pursuing its aspirations. Results from laboratory studies support this explanation. Contact: [hengchen@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:hengchen@wharton.upenn.edu)

### **The Burden of Responsibility: Some Interpersonal Costs of Having High Self-control**

*Zhou, Christy (Duke University); van Dellen, Michelle R. (University of Georgia); Fitzsimons, Gráinne M. (Duke University)*

Across four studies, we showed that people have higher performance expectations and assign more task responsibilities to individuals who are high on self-control resources compared to those who are low on self-control resources, and they also underestimate how much effort is needed for high (vs. low) self-control individuals in their goal pursuits. We further suggest that the higher performance expectations, greater task responsibilities and underestimation of effort lead to a feeling of burden for high self-control individuals, leaving them feeling overwhelmed and less satisfied with their relationships with their interacting partners. Contact: [christy.zhou@duke.edu](mailto:christy.zhou@duke.edu)

## **Session #5 Track III: Financial Decision Making - Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **Spending Credit Like a Windfall Gain**

*Cryder, Cynthia (Washington University in St. Louis); Xiao, Laura (Washington University in St. Louis)*

People spend more with credit cards than with other currency, but why? This project examines a novel reason for the "credit card premium": the term "credit" encourages people to mentally represent spending as a reduction of a gain rather than as a more subjectively painful loss. Across five experiments, participants considering "credit" compared to "loan" or a control scenario exhibited stronger associations with gain-related words, stronger associations with gain-domain bar graphs, and a greater likelihood of spending. This tendency to view spending as a reduction of a gain could contribute to overspending, and over time, to excess consumer debt. Contact: [cryder@wustl.edu](mailto:cryder@wustl.edu)

## **Debt Repayment Strategy and Consumer Motivation to Get Out of Debt**

*Kettle, Keri (University of Miami); Trudel, Remi (Boston University); Blanchard, Simon (Georgetown University); Häubl, Gerald (University of Alberta); Wendel, Steve (HelloWallet)*

Why does it matter how indebted consumers allocate their debt repayments across accounts? We propose that paying down debt accounts sequentially (focusing on repaying one account) rather than simultaneously (spreading repayments out across accounts) enhances consumers' motivation to repay their debt. Using credit card transaction data on 2,522 indebted consumers, we develop a measure of debt repayment strategy, and demonstrate that paying down debt accounts sequentially rather than simultaneously predicts subsequent debt repayment success in the field. A follow-up experiment shows that a sequential debt repayment strategy enhances perceived progress, and thus increases consumers' motivation to repay their debt. Contact: [kkettle@bus.miami.edu](mailto:kkettle@bus.miami.edu)

## **Expense Neglect in Forecasting Personal Finances**

*Berman, Jonathan Z. (University of Pennsylvania); Tran, An (University of Colorado Boulder); Lynch, John G. (University of Colorado Boulder); Zauberman, Gal (University of Pennsylvania)*

We demonstrate evidence for an “expense neglect bias” in the manner in which individuals forecast their future finances. Specifically, we show that even though individuals expect that both their income and expenses will increase in the future, they systematically under-weigh expenses relative to income when forecasting their future finances (i.e., how much spare money they will have in the future). Six main studies and a meta-analysis demonstrate the robustness of this effect across participants with a wide range of financial conditions. We further show that those who are chronically attuned to expenses (Tightwads) are less likely to demonstrate this bias. Contact: [jberm@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:jberm@wharton.upenn.edu)

## **Spending Underestimation: Field Evidence from a Large Grocery Chain**

*Gneezy, Uri (University of California, San Diego); Greenberg, Adam Eric (University of California, San Diego)*

Many studies have examined the under-saving phenomenon, but few have addressed why individuals fail to meet spending targets. We conduct a field experiment in a large grocery chain in which participants are asked how much they expect they are about to spend directly before checkout. We find that a disproportionate number of participants underestimate spending by economically significant magnitudes. Moreover, those with the lowest incomes (food stamp customers) exhibited a greater bias. We observe that consumers spend more than they expect to, and rule out a number of known biases including memory, inattention, and self-control as causes of spending underestimation. Contact: [aegreenb@ucsd.edu](mailto:aegreenb@ucsd.edu)

**SUNDAY NOV 17, 2013**

**Rooms – Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **Session #6 Track I: Altruism and Charitable Giving – Civic North**

#### **Altruistic Patience: Giving More Beats Giving Now**

*Banker, Sachin (MIT)*

People are known to make altruistic decisions and depart from the standard rational economic model when incurring material costs to oneself to benefit others. While the basic observation that individuals do in fact care about the well-being of others is becoming better accounted for, much remains to be understood about altruistic decision-making as a distinct domain of decision problems. This work aims in particular to characterize the properties of altruistic decisions that are made over time. Here I uncover the altruistic patience bias, or the tendency of individuals to prefer larger, later donations over value-equivalent smaller, sooner donations. Contact: [banker@mit.edu](mailto:banker@mit.edu)

#### **Altruistic Performance, Egoistic Choice**

*Yang, Adelle (University of Chicago, Booth School); Hsee, Chris (University of Chicago, Booth School); Urminsky, Oleg (University of Chicago, Booth School)*

In three studies using simple yet laborious low-pay tasks, we found that participants exerted more effort on the task if they were earning funds for others than if they were earning for themselves, indicating altruistic motivation. However, when given a choice, most participants chose to keep their earnings rather than donate, indicating egoistic choice. We propose that consideration of the possibility of keeping the earnings plays a crucial role in these contradictory results. These findings shed new light on research in pro-social behavior and altruism, and provide important implications for incentivizing donation behaviors. Contact: [oleg.urminsky@chicagobooth.edu](mailto:oleg.urminsky@chicagobooth.edu)

## **Explaining the processes behind identifiability and singularity effects on charitable giving**

*Dickert, Stephan (Vienna University of Economics and Business); Kleber, Janet (University of Vienna); Västfjäll, Daniel (Linköping University); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)*

Two prominent findings on the valuation of human lives highlight the importance of the psychological mechanisms influencing charitable giving: (1) the identified victim effect and (2) the singularity effect. We argue that both phenomena can be understood by their specific affective and cognitive underpinnings. In two studies we present evidence that mental imagery and perceived impact of a donation are mediated by affective motivators, and postulate a model that explains effects of victim identifiability and singularity on charitable giving in terms of the indirect effects of multiple mediators. Contact: [stephan.dickert@wu.ac.at](mailto:stephan.dickert@wu.ac.at)

## **Exceptional Framing Enhances Charitable Behavior**

*Sussman, Abigail (University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Sharma, Eesha (Dartmouth College); Alter, Adam (New York University)*

Previous research has shown that consumers spend more on the same item when they categorize it as an exceptional rather than ordinary expense (Sussman and Alter 2012). While earlier work focused on how this bias might harm individuals, the current research shows that exceptional framing can also yield societal benefits. In three lab studies and one field study, we collaborated with a health-related charity to examine whether exceptional framing of charitable behavior would increase willingness to help the charity. Results suggest that exceptional framing narrows the perceived size of the charitable expenses category and boosts charitable behavior. Contact: [eesha.sharma@gmail.com](mailto:eesha.sharma@gmail.com)

## **Session #6 Track II: Predictions and Forecasts – Civic South**

### **Elephants Weigh More Than...Elephants: Intuitive Biases Can Generate Prediction Bubbles**

*Simmons, Joseph (University of Pennsylvania)*

People's reliance on consensually held intuitions when deciding whether a quantity is too high or too low can generate prediction bubbles. In a sequential prediction task that requires people to consider whether a quantity is higher or lower than an ever-changing price, estimates (and hence prices) of intuitively large quantities tend to increase over time whereas estimates (and hence prices) of intuitively small quantities tend to decrease over time. Contact: [jsimmo@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:jsimmo@wharton.upenn.edu)

### **Fast & Frugal Forecasting for the Individual and the Crowd**

*Swift, Samuel A (UC Berkeley); Tetlock, Philip (University of Pennsylvania); Mellers, Barbara (University of Pennsylvania); Horowitz, Michael (University of Pennsylvania); Atanasov, Pavel (University of Pennsylvania)*

We test fast and frugal approaches to geopolitical forecasting at both the individual and crowd levels in the context of the IARPA ACE forecasting tournament. A largely novel set of decision heuristics derived from political science and psychology performed worse than the average individual forecaster. An investigation into the potential for fast and frugal approaches at the aggregate level was more fruitful and revealed that forecasting performance is subject to sharply diminishing returns with respect to increasing volume, duration, and granularity of crowd judgments. Contact: [samswift@berkeley.edu](mailto:samswift@berkeley.edu)

### **Seeing Algorithms Err Increases Algorithm Aversion**

*Dietvorst, Berkeley (The Wharton School); Simmons, Joseph P. (The Wharton School); Massey, Cade (The Wharton School)*

Forecasters prefer to rely on human judgment rather than superior statistical algorithms, but the basis for this preference is unknown. We asked participants to decide whether to base their incentivized forecasts of MBA applicants' success on their own predictions or on a (superior) statistical model. Participants were less likely to rely on the statistical model when they saw how well the model performed during a practice round, even for those who saw the model outperform their own forecasts. This suggests that people's dislike for algorithmic forecasts springs from seeing algorithms err, even when those errors are smaller than their own. Contact: [diet@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:diet@wharton.upenn.edu)

### **The fragile wisdom of dyads: Discussion undermines the benefits of collaboration on quantitative judgment tasks**

*Minson, Julia A. (Harvard University); Mueller, Jennifer S. (University of San Diego); Larrick, Richard P. (Duke University)*

We examine the effect of discussion for judgment accuracy. When making estimates on a bounded numerical scale, participants working in dyads and making estimates through discussion considered a narrower range of estimates than pairs of individuals working independently. Consequently, the estimates of dyads were no more accurate than those of individuals. When making estimates on an unbounded scale, discussion enabled dyad members to eliminate extreme "order of magnitude" errors, and led to a small accuracy benefit. We document a tradeoff whereby discussion engenders assimilation effects that minimize the benefits of collaboration, while enhancing collaborators' ability to detect egregious errors. Contact: [julia\\_minson@hks.harvard.edu](mailto:julia_minson@hks.harvard.edu)

## **Session #6 Track III: Choice and Probability Modeling - Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **Parameter Recovery for Decision Modeling Using Choice Data**

*Broomell, Stephen (Carnegie Mellon University); Bhatia, Sudeep (Carnegie Mellon University)*

Building on research in information theory and adaptive design optimization, we develop a computational framework for applying Kullback-Leibler divergence to quantify the effectiveness of a set of decision problems for recovering choice model parameters. This method can be applied to analyze the properties of previously used decision sets and for developing new decision sets without responses from a decision maker. We demonstrate our computational approach on three recent experimental decision sets designed for estimating cumulative prospect theory parameters from choice data, and we show that these sets differ strongly in their ability to recover underlying parameters. Contact: [broomell@cmu.edu](mailto:broomell@cmu.edu)

### **Are People Naive Probability Theorists: An Examination of the Probability Theory + Variation Model**

*Fisher, Christopher R. (Miami University); Wolfe, Christopher R. (Miami University)*

In two studies, we found limited support for the Probability + Variation Model. The model assumes that probability judgments follow probability theory, but errors result from noisy judgments. In study 1, averaging judgments increased rather than decreased conjunction and disjunction errors and decreased semantic coherence. No change was observed for minimum conjunction and maximum disjunction errors. In study 2, averaging conditional probability judgments decreased conversion errors, but increased conditional reversals and decreased semantic coherence. An averaging model was more consistent with some but not all of the findings. Both studies highlight the importance of modeling noise in judgments. Contact: [fisherc2@miamioh.edu](mailto:fisherc2@miamioh.edu)

### **Comparing Theories of Reference-Dependent Choice**

*Bhatia, Sudeep (Carnegie Mellon University)*

Reference dependence has traditionally been attributed to loss-averse framing. Recent research has however shown that reference points can also act as primes, affecting the accessibility of associated attributes. We outline diverging choice predictions of priming and framing theories of reference dependence, and present the results of a series of studies that use these diverging predictions to compare the two theories. We find that attribute priming provides a better quantitative fit to choice data, relative to loss-averse framing. Priming can also account for a number of choice patterns not predicted by framing. Contact: [sudeepb@andrew.cmu.edu](mailto:sudeepb@andrew.cmu.edu)

### **Delay resolution of uncertainty: a measurement**

*Abdellaoui, Mohammed (HEC); Diecidue, Enrico (INSEAD); Kemel, Emmanuel (Paris 1); Onculer, Ayse (ESSEC)*

We measure the impact of the delay of resolution of uncertainty in decision under risk. In a series of choices between temporal prospects we detect a systematic effect: decision makers are willing to reduce their probability of winning in order to resolve the uncertainty at an earlier stage. We model the impact of resolution of uncertainty by prospect theory. The decision weights are sensitive to the timing of uncertainty. This dependency is expressed by probability weighting functions whose parameters are affected by the earlier resolution of uncertainty showing less elevation and less sensitivity the later the uncertainty is resolved. Contact: [enrico.diecidue@insead.edu](mailto:enrico.diecidue@insead.edu)

## **Session #7 Track I: Intertemporal Choice - Civic North**

### **Loss Aversion for Time and Money: Reference Dependence in Intertemporal Choice**

*Walters, Daniel (Anderson School of Management, UCLA); Fox, Craig (Anderson School of Management, UCLA); Read, Daniel (University of Warwick)*

We demonstrate that conventional measures of temporal discounting are distorted by loss aversion for both time and money. In discount-delay tasks, more loss-averse individuals are more reluctant to give up the larger-later amount and therefore appear more patient. We introduce a measure of “delay-aversion” showing that people are more sensitive to time losses than time gains. While delay-aversion is highly correlated with loss aversion, it predicts opposite time preferences: more delay-averse individuals are more reluctant to give up the sooner payment and are therefore more impatient. Both effect sizes vary systematically with which payment is primed as the reference point. Contact: [daniel.j.walters@gmail.com](mailto:daniel.j.walters@gmail.com)

## **Virtues and Vices in Monetary Tradeoffs: Evidence of Comparative Mental Accounting in Intertemporal Choice**

*Scholten, Marc (ISPA University Institute); Read, Daniel (Warwick Business School)*

We provide an integrative analysis of monetary tradeoffs involving single dated outcomes, sequences of single-valence outcomes, virtues (schedules of investment followed by benefits), and vices (schedules of benefits followed by debt). Results include debt aversion, aversion to absolute and relative vices, and attraction to absolute and relative virtues. We propose a comparative mental accounting model, in which people directly compare the outcomes afforded by the options at consecutive delays. Sooner comparative gains are attenuated by later comparative losses, and sooner comparative losses are buffered by later comparative gains. This model accounts for many puzzling phenomena in choice involving sequences. Contact: [scholten@ispa.pt](mailto:scholten@ispa.pt)

## **Zeroing in on the Hidden Zero Effect: Asymmetric Attention to Opportunity Costs Drives Intertemporal Choice**

*Read, Daniel (Warwick Business School); Olivola, Christopher (Carnegie Mellon University); Hardisty, Dave (University of British Columbia)*

Intertemporal choices have opportunity costs. We investigate whether people respond more to nudges that highlight earlier or later opportunity costs. We do this by adapting research showing that patience increases when both opportunity costs are highlighted by an explicit zero frame (“\$100 now AND \$0 in 1 year or \$0 now AND \$150 in one year”) relative to a hidden zero frame that highlights neither opportunity cost. We find patience increases when the later opportunity cost is highlighted (i.e., “\$0 in 1 year”) but that if only the earlier opportunity cost is highlighted (“\$0 now”) patience is unaffected. Contact: [daniel.read@wbs.ac.uk](mailto:daniel.read@wbs.ac.uk)

## **The Role of Attention in Intertemporal Choices**

*Fisher, Geoffrey (Caltech); Rangel, Antonio (Caltech)*

We run an eye tracking experiment designed to understand how visual attention is allocated in a simple intertemporal choice environment. Subjects make decisions between receiving a payment today or a larger, delayed payment. We find that those who are more patient spend significantly more time looking at the monetary amounts, as opposed to the delays when those amounts will be implemented. Those who are impatient spend more time looking at the word “today.” Additionally, we run several experiments designed to exogenously vary how attention is deployed and report how it impacts behavior. Contact: [rangel@hss.caltech.edu](mailto:rangel@hss.caltech.edu)

## **Session #7 Track II: Research and Academia - Civic South**

### **What's a failure to Replicate?**

*Simonsohn, Uri (Penn)*

I revisit published replication attempts of the endowment effect, the impact of weather on life-satisfaction, and the embodiment of morality as cleanliness, to demonstrate the current standard, of calling a replication a failure if  $p > .05$ , is unacceptable. I propose a new standard: replications fail when their results indicate that the effect of interest, if it exists at all, is too small to have been detected by the original study. This new standard: changes the conclusions for several published replications towards more intuitively compelling ones, and leads to a simple sample size requirement for replications: 2.5 times the original sample. Contact: [uws@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:uws@wharton.upenn.edu)

### **When are our experimental findings better than a guess?**

*Davis-Stober, Clinton (University of Missouri); Dana, Jason (University of Pennsylvania)*

We demonstrate that, at sample and effect sizes common to behavioral research, sample means estimate their corresponding population means less accurately than a benchmark estimator that randomizes the direction of treatment effects. Given the factors under an experimenter's control - sample size and number of treatment groups - we derive how much variance must be explained to outperform this benchmark. Using simulation methods, we confirm that sample means are unreliable under these conditions by showing that they do a poor job of even capturing the correct order of the population means. We discuss implications for replication research and possible remedies. Contact: [stoberc@missouri.edu](mailto:stoberc@missouri.edu)

## **Social Comparisons and Deception Across Workplace Hierarchies: Field and Experimental Evidence**

*Edelman, Benjamin (Harvard Business School); Larkin, Ian (Harvard Business School)*

We examine the link between negative social comparisons and deception by employees at different levels in a corporate hierarchy. In a field study, we show that full professors are more likely to deceptively download their own papers on SSRN's working paper network than junior professors when one of their papers is downloaded less often than a peer's paper. This relationship is especially strong for professors with a high degree of previous success, measured by Google Scholar citations. Two scenario-based experiments confirm that employees higher in a hierarchy are more likely to react to negative social comparisons by engaging in deception. Contact: [ilarkin@hbs.edu](mailto:ilarkin@hbs.edu)

## **Peering into Peer Assessment: Expert vs. Novice Judgments of Essay Quality**

*Tsai, Paige (Princeton University); Oppenheimer, Daniel M. (UCLA)*

To provide college credit, Massively Online Open Course platforms (MOOCs, e.g. Coursera) must find ways to grade thousands of students' essays; a problem they have solved through peer-grading. This strategy could be informed by the literature on novice vs. expert judgment. While previous research has shown high correlations between novice (peer) and expert (TA or professor) judgments of essay quality, we show this relation to be spurious. Novices grade on writing quality, while experts grade on factual content. Smart students write both well and accurately, allowing peer-grading to approximate experts, but the relationship breaks down under predictable circumstances. Contact:

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## **Session #7 Track III: Judgment - Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **On the psychology of self-prediction: How potential obstacles are, and are not, considered when people predict their future behaviour**

*Koehler, Derek J. (University of Waterloo); Poon, Connie S. K. (Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Hong Kong); Buehler, Roger (Wilfrid Laurier University)*

We consider three reasons why people may not adjust sufficiently for potential obstacles when predicting their future behavior. First, self-predictions may focus exclusively on current intentions, ignoring potential obstacles altogether. We test this possibility with manipulations that draw greater attention to obstacles. Second, obstacles may be discounted in the self-prediction process. We test this possibility with prediction models that place greater weight on obstacles. Neither possibility was supported. Instead, the evidence supports a third possibility: In light of the uncertainty introduced by potential obstacles, self-predictions ought to be markedly regressive with respect to current intentions, but they are not.

Contact: [dkoehler@uwaterloo.ca](mailto:dkoehler@uwaterloo.ca)

### **Motivated mental imagery: The role of visual-spatial distance in the mental simulation of threatening outcomes**

*Lucas, Brian J. (Northwestern University)*

Humans have the unique capacity to simulate future outcomes in order to inform their present decisions. In the current research we tested whether self-protection motivation influences the visual-spatial perception of mental images during the simulation of threatening future outcomes. In Studies 1-2 threatening outcomes were simulated with greater visual-spatial distance than non-threatening outcomes. In other words, threatening mental images were perceived as smaller in the mind's eye. Study 3 manipulated visual-spatial distances and found that those who simulated a threatening outcome with greater visual-spatial distance experienced less cognitive depletion and greater positive affect. Contact:

[b-lucas@kellogg.northwestern.edu](mailto:b-lucas@kellogg.northwestern.edu)

### **Fooled by heteroscedastic randomness: The biasing effect of heteroscedasticity on cue-outcome inferences**

*de Langhe, Bart (University of Colorado at Boulder); Puntoni, Stefano (Erasmus University); van Osselaer, Stijn (Cornell University); McGill, Ann (University of Chicago)*

Many cue-outcome relationships across a variety of domains (e.g., consumer, managerial, medical, and legal decision making contexts) are characterized by heteroscedasticity. We show that decision makers make outcome inferences that are systematically more extreme when random variation in the outcome is heteroscedastic rather than homoscedastic. This is because experience in the region where random variation in the outcome is low leads them to believe that the cue-outcome relationship is stronger than it really is. We highlight implications of heteroscedasticity, for example, for understanding the emergence and persistence of stereotypical beliefs (e.g., "poor people are criminals," "cheap products have poor quality"). Contact: [bart.delanghe@colorado.edu](mailto:bart.delanghe@colorado.edu)

### **Multiple numeric competencies in judgment and decision-making processes**

*Peters, Ellen (Ohio State University); Bjälkebring, Par (University of Gothenburg)*

Numeracy includes multiple facets-Objective Numeracy Ability (ONS), Subjective Numeracy Sense (SNS), and Approximate Number Sense (ANS). We examined their relations to performance in three judgment-and-decision-related tasks (memory for numeric and non-numeric information, sensitivity to the presence of a small loss in a bet, and risky-choice valuation). We conclude that, although the competencies are correlated, they have dissociable influences. SNS taps into important motivational effects whereas ANS involves the ability to distinguish between magnitudes. ONS itself relates to attending to numbers (and number comparisons) and using logical number-related algorithms. Contact:

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**MONDAY NOV 18, 2013**

**Rooms - Civic North, Civic South, Simcoe/Dufferin**

**Session #8 Track I: Morality and Ethics 3 - Civic North**

**Does Could Lead to Good? When Contemplating Possible Actions Generates More Creative Ethical Solutions**

*Zhang, Ting (Harvard Business School); Gino, Francesca (Harvard Business School); Margolis, Joshua D. (Harvard Business School)*

When faced with difficult dilemmas that feature competing ethical and performance-oriented objectives, individuals naturally ask themselves, “What should I do?” Across four experiments, we demonstrate that asking “What could I do?” instead helps individuals realize that these seemingly incompatible objectives are more compatible, influencing individuals to arrive at moral insights that meet both objectives. We show that individuals asked to consider “coulds” expended more effort to find creative ethical solutions. In contrast, those considering “should” were more likely to view these ethical and performance-oriented objectives as incompatible, forcing them to prioritize one objective while neglecting the other. Contact: [tzhang@hbs.edu](mailto:tzhang@hbs.edu)

**Competence by any Means: Cheating as a Response to Ego Threat**

*Moore, Celia (London Business School); Gino, Francesca (Harvard Business School); Wakeman, S. Wiley (London Business School)*

Research on unethical behavior argues that individuals are willing to cheat up until the point that cheating damages their self-image. Inverting this idea, we demonstrate in 4 studies that threats to self-perceptions of personal competence can motivate cheating, and that cheating provides an alternate route to renew one’s sense of competence, circumventing legitimate routes to performance. We discuss theoretical implications for current theories of both ego-protective behavior and unethical behavior, and identify fruitful directions for future research. Contact: [cmoore@london.edu](mailto:cmoore@london.edu)

**Know who you're up against: Counterpart identifiability enhances competitive behavior**

*Haran, Uriel (Ben-Gurion University); Ritov, Ilana (Hebrew University)*

Prior research has highlighted the role of certain competitors’ attributes in determining competition intensity. We find similar effects even when competitors are anonymous, but are merely identifiable -- their identities have been determined but not revealed. Three experiments demonstrate that arbitrary information about one’s competitors enhances one’s goal-driven behavior: when their counterparts were identifiable, participated exerted more effort and performed better on a competitive task, and offered more money to outbid their counterparts in an auction, than when their counterparts were unspecified. Additionally, identifiability seems to influence both the desire to win and the aversion to losing, albeit in different ways. Contact: [uharan@som.bgu.ac.il](mailto:uharan@som.bgu.ac.il)

**Minor lies preserving a positive self-view or simply avoiding suspicion? A test in ethical decision making.**

*Hilbig, Benjamin E. (University of Mannheim)*

Recent research has consistently shown that most people tend to limit their (un)ethical behavior and resort only to minor lies. This pattern is compatible with the idea that dishonesty poses a threat to one’s self view. However, many findings are actually inconclusive as they can alternatively be explained by people avoiding large (unjustified) payoffs, most plausibly because the latter are more suspicious. We teased the two explanations apart in a large-scale experiment (N = 765) using a modified dice-game paradigm. Findings clearly support the idea that people indeed avoid major lies -- not just suspicious responses. Contact: [hilbig@psychologie.uni-mannheim.de](mailto:hilbig@psychologie.uni-mannheim.de)

**Session #8 Track II: Consumer Decision Making - Civic South**

**How the psychological tangibility of costs affects choice as the number of alternatives increases**

*Shah, Avni M. (Duke University); Bettman, Jim (Duke University); Payne, John (Duke University)*

Research has demonstrated that as the number of alternatives increases, buying initially increases and then decreases, resulting in an inverted U-shape function. However, we propose that increasing (decreasing) how psychologically tangible the costs associated with decision-making are can magnify (mitigate) the negative effects of choosing from increasing assortment sets. Across three studies, we demonstrate that reducing the psychological salience of money in order to pay for an item (debit/credit versus cash), the economic cost of the item (\$0.25 versus \$1 or \$2), and purchasing an item for another person all mitigate choice overload effects. Contact: [avni.shah@duke.edu](mailto:avni.shah@duke.edu)



### **The Impact of Comparison Frames and Category Width On Strength of Preferences**

*Malkoc, Selin (Washington University St. Louis); Ulkumen, Gulden (University of Southern California)*

The strength with which one option is preferred over another generally increases when options are perceived as more different, and thus easier to distinguish. We demonstrate that “width” (granularity) of previously exposed categorizations moderates this effect. Decision makers primed with broad categorizations adopt the salient comparison orientation (i.e., focus on either similarities or differences between options). However, decision makers primed with narrow categorizations employ both salient and non-salient comparison orientations (consider both similarities and differences between options). When differences are more salient, broad categories strengthen subsequent preferences: decisions are faster, and people pay larger premiums for chosen over non-chosen products. Contact: [ulkumen@marshall.usc.edu](mailto:ulkumen@marshall.usc.edu)

### **The Desire to Acquire Wish List Items**

*Popovich, Deidre L. (Emory University); Hamilton, Ryan P. (Emory University)*

Consumers often postpone an online purchase by placing the item onto a wish list. Goal-directed choice theory predicts that deferring a purchase should increase the desire to acquire the item. In contrast, we demonstrate that using a wish list leads to weaker product preferences. A theoretical extension of two-stage decision making explains how and why consumers’ reevaluations decrease subsequent purchase likelihood. The mechanism driving this effect is a focus on desirability of the intended purchase in the first decision stage and later on the feasibility of purchasing the item. Five experiments lend support for the theory and empirical predictions advanced. Contact: [deidre.popovich@emory.edu](mailto:deidre.popovich@emory.edu)

### **Questioning the “I” in Experience: Experiential Purchases Foster Social Connection**

*Kumar, Amit (Cornell University); Mann, Thomas C. (Cornell University); Gilovich, Thomas D. (Cornell University)*

We demonstrate that experiential purchases (money spent on doing) foster social connection more than material purchases (money spent on having). People feel more connected to those who have made the same or similar experiential purchases, even when the other person has made an “upgraded” version of their own purchase (Studies 1 and 2). After reflecting on experiential purchases, participants also report feeling more connected to people in general (Study 3), are more likely to engage in social activities (Study 4), and act more prosocially (i.e. by being more generous when assigned the allocator role in a dictator game; Study 5). Contact: [ak756@cornell.edu](mailto:ak756@cornell.edu)

### **Session #8 Track III: Choice 2 - Simcoe/Dufferin**

#### **Reining in regret: Strategic orientations modulate regret in decision making**

*Reeck, Crystal (Duke University); Lai, Carmen G. (Duke University); LaBar, Kevin S. (Duke University)*

Whereas the influence of regret on decision making is well-established, it remains unclear whether different strategic orientations may cognitively modulate both the affective experience of regret and its influence on decisions. The present experiment demonstrates that approaching a series of decisions as a portfolio leads to diminished influence of regret on choices compared to focusing on each decision in isolation. Moreover, this broad, portfolio orientation led to less extreme affective reactions to outcomes and lowered physiological arousal levels. These findings support a role for cognitive strategies in mitigating both the affective experience of regret and its consequences for decision making. Contact: [crystalreeck@gmail.com](mailto:crystalreeck@gmail.com)

#### **Staying the Course: The Impact of No-choice Options on Post-Choice Persistence**

*Schriфт, Rom Y. (Wharton); Parker, Jeffrey R. (Georgia State University)*

Decision-makers regularly face adversity in the pursuit of chosen goals. Persistence, the steadfast continuance on a course of action despite obstacles or adversity, is an important factor in determining whether or not they achieve those goals. In this paper we demonstrate that including a seemingly irrelevant no-choice option at the time of choice increases decision-makers’ persistence on their chosen courses of action. In a series of 6 studies we find this effect across several incentive-compatible tasks and show that the effect is driven by self-perception (seeing myself choosing this course of action over doing nothing) mitigating post-choice counterfactual thinking. Contact: [jeffparker@gsu.edu](mailto:jeffparker@gsu.edu)

## **Knowing without Remembering: How Articulation Reduces the Accuracy of Numeric Comparisons**

*Kyung, Ellie (Dartmouth College, Tuck School of Business); Thomas, Manoj (Cornell University, Johnson School of Business)*

Three experiments on memory-based price comparisons demonstrate a paradoxical finding: Participants first asked to articulate the comparison standard before making comparative judgments were less accurate than those not asked to do so. We propose that people rely on a subjective feeling of knowing when making comparative numerical magnitude judgments. Disrupting this FOK through (1) attempting explicit articulation of the comparison standard or (2) negative feedback can make these judgments less accurate. Ironically, merely attempting to articulate a memory-based comparison standard reduces the accuracy of comparative magnitude judgments -- an articulation paradox. A fourth experiment replicated these findings for frequency judgments. Contact: [ellie.kyung@tuck.dartmouth.edu](mailto:ellie.kyung@tuck.dartmouth.edu)

## **What was I Thinking? Effect of Construal Level on Memory-Based Choice**

*Baskin, Ernest (Yale University); Wakslak, Cheryl (University of Southern California); Novemsky, Nathan (Yale University)*

While research in construal level theory typically looks at one-time decisions, we consider decisions that require learning over time. In a series of studies, we show when construal acts through attribute weighting at the point of information retrieval rather than attentional processes in information encoding. Contact: [ernest.baskin@yale.edu](mailto:ernest.baskin@yale.edu)

## **Session #9 Track I: Gambling and Insurance - Civic North**

### **The hidden cost of insurance on trust and reciprocity**

*Calseyde van de, Philippe (Tilburg University); Keren, Gideon (Tilburg University); Zeelenberg, Marcel (Tilburg University)*

To trust is to risk and a common solution to mitigate problems of risk is to buy insurance. In multiple experiments we find that buying insurance may have a hidden cost: Trustees are more likely act opportunistically when trustors choose to be insured against the risk of betrayal. The reason that trustees are less likely to cooperate is that by choosing insurance, trustors signal that they expect the trustee to behave opportunistically. These results shed new light on the weakness of financial safeguards: The remedy against the risk of betrayal may paradoxically increase the probability of betrayal. Contact: [s642391@uvt.nl](mailto:s642391@uvt.nl)

### **Are Longshots Only for Losers? A New Look at the Last Race Effect**

*McKenzie, Craig R. M. (UC San Diego); Sher, Shlomi (Pomona College); Lin, Charlette (Ohio State University); Liersch, Michael J. (Merrill Lynch); Rawstron, Anthony George (PUC Rio de Janeiro)*

Betting on longshots increases in the last race of a day of horse racing. Previous models have assumed that the phenomenon is driven by bettors who have lost money and are trying to recoup their losses. To test this assumption, two laboratory experiments simulated a day at the races. The results showed a clear longshot bias in the last round, regardless of whether, and how many, points were gained or lost in previous rounds. Winning or losing, bettors prefer to "go out with a bang" at the end of a series of gambles. Contact: [cmckenzie@ucsd.edu](mailto:cmckenzie@ucsd.edu)

### **Superstitious Reluctance to Hedge Desired Outcomes**

*Morewedge, Carey K. (Carnegie Mellon University)*

A substantial proportion of people are unwilling to accept an emotional hedge against uncertain desired outcomes. A substantial proportion of US voters, NFL fans, and NCAA basketball fans refused a free hedge against their preferred candidate winning the 2012 Presidential election or the victory of their team, respectively. Participants refused to earn real money (or other goods) with no risk of loss to them, if the outcome did not occur. This reluctance appeared to be due to the belief that hedging against the desired outcome would reduce its probability of occurring. Contact: [morewedge@andrew.cmu.edu](mailto:morewedge@andrew.cmu.edu)

### **I can only bet on my failure, not yours: Differences in betting behavior for the self and close other**

*Tang, Simone (Duke University); Larrick, Richard (Duke University)*

We show that people are willing to experience motivational conflict (winning money or obtaining desired event) for their own outcomes, but unwilling to do so for close others. In Study 1, despite equal expected value gambles, MBA students were more willing to bet on their favorite presidential candidate. In Study 2, participants were more likely to bet on their friends' success than their own or a stranger's. In Study 3, we replicate the effect and show that it was mediated by loyalty towards friends. These results have implications for insurance-based behaviors and reluctance for utilitarianism. Contact: [simone.tang@duke.edu](mailto:simone.tang@duke.edu)

## **Session #9 Track II: Emotions, Optimism, and Well-Being - Civic South**

### **Hedonic Durability**

*Yang, Yang (Carnegie Mellon University); Hsee, Christopher (University of Chicago); Urminsky, Oleg (University of Chicago); Zhang, Li (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)*

Although individuals' happiness with most items fades over time, some items are more hedonically durable than others are. We introduce a simple survey method (i.e., the Hedonic Durability Questionnaire) to estimate the hedonic durability of different items at a single occasion. We test the validity of the HDQ and show that it produces remarkably similar results to real online measures (Study 1), and that it is sensitive to factors that have been shown to influence hedonic adaptation (Studies 2 and 3). Finally, we apply the HDQ to a variety of items in everyday life (Study 4).

Contact: [yy1@cmu.edu](mailto:yy1@cmu.edu)

### **Partisan Identity's Intense Well-Being Consequences: Losing 2012 Election Hurt More Than Newtown Shootings and Boston Marathon Bombings**

*Pierce, Lamar (Washington University in St. Louis); Rogers, Todd (Harvard Kennedy School); Snyder, Jason A. (UCLA)*

The hurt of losing an election is worse than the joy of winning one -- and losing hurts a lot. We use a unique large dataset to study the well-being consequences of electoral outcomes for partisans in the 2012 US Presidential election. We find that election outcomes strongly affect partisan losers but have minimal impact on partisan winners, consistent with research on good-bad hedonic asymmetry. Second, this impact is intense: twice the impact of either the Newtown shootings on respondents with children or the Boston Marathon bombings on Bostonians. This highlights how central partisan identity is to the self and well-being. Contact: [pierce@wustl.edu](mailto:pierce@wustl.edu)

### **Issue specific emotionality: Beyond effects of utility**

*Moran, Simone (Ben Gurion University of the Negev); Ritov, Ilana (Hebrew University)*

People often deal with multiple issues varying in utility and in emotional activation. Using negotiations as an example, we manipulate intensity of issues' emotional associations, independent of their utility. Results suggest that being emotionally charged about a particular issue doesn't spill over to other issues. Moreover, negotiators are more reluctant to concede on emotionally charged (vs. neutral) issues and consequently *obtain more efficient outcomes when the higher utility issue is also the more emotional evoking one. Participants seem aware of this effect*: when preparing for negotiations they are more likely to prefer emotional over non-emotional information for high utility issues. Contact: [simone@bgu.ac.il](mailto:simone@bgu.ac.il)

### **Optimistic About Optimism: The Belief That Optimism Improves Performance**

*Tenney, Elizabeth R. (University of California, Berkeley); Logg, Jennifer M. (University of California, Berkeley); Moore, Don A. (University of California, Berkeley)*

A series of experiments investigated why people believe it is good to be optimistic and whether they are right to do so. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants prescribed optimism for someone implementing decisions but not for someone deliberating, indicating that people prescribe optimism selectively, when it can affect performance. Additional experiments tested the accuracy of this belief; optimism did not improve performance as much as participants expected. Thus, people prefer optimism when they believe it has the opportunity to improve the chance of success -- unfortunately, people may be overly optimistic about just how much optimism can do. Contact: [eliz.tenney@gmail.com](mailto:eliz.tenney@gmail.com)

## **Session #9 Track III: Framing and Response Elicitation - Simcoe/Dufferin**

### **Lay Understanding of Observed Distributions: Frequencies versus Fractiles**

*Rothschild, David (Microsoft Research); Goldstein, Daniel G. (Microsoft Research)*

This paper examines a family of related questions concerning graphical and traditional techniques for eliciting distributions from laypeople. It shows that psychologically-grounded graphical interfaces impose lower user costs and lead to more accurate responses than stated methods. When provided the same revealed distributions, respondents can describe the data more accurately in terms of frequency distributions than in terms of fractiles or cumulative distributions. Graphical interfaces expand the range of questions researchers can efficiently ask users and thus the quantity of information obtained. Contact: [davidmr@microsoft.com](mailto:davidmr@microsoft.com)

## **Imago Animi Sermo Est - Speech is the Mirror of The Mind: The Effect of Vocal Expression on Preferences**

*Klesse, Anne-Kathrin (Tilburg University); Levav, Jonathan (Stanford University); Goukens, Caroline (Maastricht University)*

We compare non-vocal elicitation modes (i.e., pushing a button) to vocal preference elicitation (i.e., expressing one's choice by speech). Three laboratory studies and one field study reveal that vocally expressing one's choice increases the likelihood to choose vices rather than virtues. Specifically, speaking prompts individuals to choose a regular ice cream rather than the low-fat version (study 1) or an unhealthy rather than a healthy dessert (study 2). Further, speaking results in snack choices higher in calorie content (study 3 and 4). The tendency to choose something one really likes mediates the effect of expression mode on choice. Contact: [a.k.klesse@uvt.nl](mailto:a.k.klesse@uvt.nl)

## **Dichotomizing data changes perceptions of covariation**

*Schiro, Julie (University of Colorado, Boulder); de Langhe, Bart (University of Colorado, Boulder); Fernbach, Philip (University of Colorado, Boulder)*

When inferring the strength of a relationship between two variables people place unequal weight on different types of data, focusing primarily on cases where the antecedent is present and neglecting cases where it's absent. This cell weight inequality is one of the most replicated phenomena in the judgment literature, but we show that it is substantially reduced when people reason about continuous as opposed to dichotomized data. Merely suggesting dichotomization by placing gridlines on the data is sufficient to replicate the typical effect, suggesting that previous literature has overstated the case for general accounts of reasoning about relationships between variables. Contact: [julie.schiro@colorado.edu](mailto:julie.schiro@colorado.edu)

## **Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: How Whole Unit Framing Increases Effort**

*Barasz, Kate N. (Harvard Business School); John, Leslie K. (Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael I. (Harvard Business School)*

Can arbitrarily framing tasks as whole units (you are now completing task 1 out of 5), as opposed to multiple units of the same total quantity (you are now completing task 1) increase effort levels? Two studies show that whole unit framing increases the number of tasks participants are willing to complete -- even when not paid for their effort. A third study shows that individuals are more willing to accept a risky gamble in pursuit of whole unit fulfillment. Finally, we use verbal reference points to show that whole unit framing increases charitable contributions.

Contact: [kbarasz@hbs.edu](mailto:kbarasz@hbs.edu)

# **SJDM SUNDAY MORNING POSTER SESSION #1 & BOOK AUCTION**

**8:30am – 10:30am w/Continental Breakfast - Sheraton Hall**

- 1) A bias in heuristics: Rational and intuitive thinking styles  
*Blettner, Daniela (Simon Fraser University); Rothengatter, Marloes (Tilburg University)*
- 2) Anchors Bias Judgment and Increase Confidence  
*Smith, Andrew R. (Appalachian State University); Marshall, Lindsay D. (Appalachian State University)*
- 3) Hindsight Bias: A correct judgment bias or simply a memory bias  
*Pinegar, Shannon (Ohio University); Chimeli, Janna (Ohio University); Bellezza, Frank (Ohio University)*
- 4) Cognitive Biases in Borrowing Decisions: Implications for the Student Debt Crisis  
*Chabot, Aimee M. (University of California, San Diego); Parris, Julian L. (University of California, San Diego); Bryan, Christopher J. (University of California, San Diego)*
- 5) Status-Quo Bias Revisited: Label versus Knowledge  
*He, Xin (University of Central Florida); Gong, Baiyun (Nova Southeastern University)*
- 6) Complexity Bias in Stock Choice and Retirement Plan Selection  
*Terpstra, Natasha (Michigan Technological University); Cokely, Edward (Michigan Technological University)*
- 7) Self-Perception Bias as a Barrier to Behavior Change  
*Amato, Michael S. (University of Wisconsin - Madison); Moore, Colleen F. (Montana State University); Shaw, Bret R. (University of Wisconsin - Madison)*
- 8) Implicit categorization causes biases in the perception of sequences  
*Gao, Jie (Center for Decision Science, Columbia University); Corter, James (Teachers College, Columbia University)*
- 9) When two heads are worse than one: Biases towards single authorship in the evaluation of creative works  
*Smith, Rosanna K. (Yale University); Newman, George E. (Yale University)*

- 10) Does trait mindfulness attenuate cognitive biases related to the representativeness heuristic?  
*Young, Diana L. (Georgia College); Heppner, Whitney L. (Georgia College)*
- 11) Assessing the effectiveness of an analogical debiasing technique  
*Bago, Bence (University of Edinburgh); Szollosi, Aba (ELTE, Hungary); Foldes, Andrei (ELTE, Hungary); Aczel, Balazs (ELTE, Hungary)*
- 12) Withdrawn
- 13) How to Decrease the Amortization and Exponential Growth Bias: Experience vs. Rules  
*Foltice, Bryan (Finance Center Muenster); Langer, Thomas (Finance Center Muenster)*
- 14) Individual differences and self-framing in the sunk cost bias  
*Yan, Haoyang (University of Iowa); Gaeth, Gary J (University of Iowa); Levin, Irwin P (University of Iowa)*
- 15) Remembering the best and worst of times: Memories for extreme outcomes bias risky decisions  
*Ludvig, Elliot A. (Princeton University); Madan, Christopher R. (University of Alberta); Spetch, Marcia L. (University of Alberta)*
- 16) The effectiveness of cognitive reappraisal in reducing a decision-making bias, measured using a stock market simulation  
*Grayson, Paul J (The Open University); Fenton-O'Creevy, Mark (The Open University); Hardy, Ben (The Open University)*
- 17) Methodological questions in measuring individual differences in decision biases  
*Aczel, Balazs (ELTE, Hungary); Bago, Bence (ELTE, Hungary); Foldes, Andrei (ELTE, Hungary); Szollosi, Aba (ELTE, Hungary)*
- 18) The role of narcissism and should counterfactual thinking in the hindsight bias  
*Kausel, Edgar (University of Chile); Reb, Jochen (Singapore Management University); Culbertson, Satoris (Kansas State University); Jackson, Alexander (Kansas State University); Leiva, Pedro (University of Chile)*
- 19) Wisdom of the crowd can improve confidence interval estimates, but a systematic bias could lead to underperformance  
*Yeung, Saiwing (Beijing Institute of Technology)*
- 20) Don't Judge a Decision by its Outcome: Influence of Event Construal on the Outcome Bias  
*Savani, Krishna (National University of Singapore); King, Dan (National University of Singapore)*
- 21) The Pearson Correlation Heuristic: Interpretations of the Pearson Coefficient of Correlation are Optimistically Biased  
*Gamliel, Eyal (Ruppin Academic Center); Gur, Roi (Ruppin Academic Center)*
- 22) Is a picture worth a thousand words? The interaction of visual display and attribute representation in attenuating framing bias  
*Gamliel, Eyal (Ruppin Academic Center); Kreiner, Hamutal (Ruppin Academic Center)*
- 23) Effects of training format and numeracy on Bayesian reasoning  
*Weber, Bethany (Iowa State University); Yeung, Kam Leung (Iowa State University); Pappas, Nikolaos (University of Wisconsin-Madison); Carpenter, Shana (Iowa State University)*
- 24) Conditional Syllogism Training Improves Judgments on Wason's Selection Task  
*Hunt, Gayle (New Mexico State University); Trafimow, David (New Mexico State University)*
- 25) Adjusting, but From Where? Judgment in the Presence of Multiple Anchors  
*Bixter, Michael T. (Stony Brook University); Luhmann, Christian C. (Stony Brook University)*
- 26) Extending the Cognitive Reflection Test  
*Toplak, Maggie E. (York University); West, Richard F. (James Madison University); Stanovich, Keith E. (University of Toronto)*
- 27) How working memory load impacts decision strategies  
*Fechner, Hanna B. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Schooler, Lael J. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Pachur, Thorsten (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 28) Denominator neglect in cigarette graphic warning labels  
*Meilleur, Louise (Ohio State); Moreno-Vasquez, Tomas (Ohio State); Peters, Ellen (Ohio State)*
- 29) Unfolding Anchoring: Individual Difference Approach  
*Teovanovic, Predrag (Institute for Psychology, University of Belgrade)*
- 30) The Effect of Sample Size on Judgments of Average Physical Size  
*Price, Paul C. (California State University, Fresno); Kimura, Nicole M.. (California State University, Fresno); Smith, Andrew R. (Appalachian State University); Marshall, Lindsay D. (Appalachian State University)*

- 31) Gas Neglect  
*Schley, Dan R. (The Ohio State University)*
- 32) The When and Why of Reverse Endowment Effects: A Query Theory Investigation  
*Jasper, John (University of Toledo); Corser, Ryan (University of Toledo); Westfall, Jonathan E. (Centenary College of Louisiana)*
- 33) Same old problems? Causal structure as an intervention to overcome Base Rate Neglect  
*McNair, Simon (Leeds University Business School); Feeney, Aidan (Queen's University Belfast)*
- 34) The cost of liking odd numbers  
*Hafenbraedl, Sebastian (University of Lausanne); Woike, Jan K. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 35) Aging and the Framing Effect: A Meta-analysis  
*Best, Ryan (Florida State University); Charness, Neil (Florida State University)*
- 36) The Psychology of Leaving Things Behind, from Parties to Partners  
*Sezer, Ovul (Harvard University/ Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael I. (Harvard Business School); Gino, Francesca (Harvard Business School)*
- 37) A Closer Look at the Effects of Actions Versus Inactions on Post-Decisional Regret: Do Perceptions of Self Versus Others Play a Role?  
*Johnson, Desiree N. (University of Nebraska-Omaha); Scherer, Lisa L. (University of Nebraska-Omaha)*
- 38) Can 10 minutes-10 months-10 years lead to better decisions?  
*Shin, Hee Yeon (Harvard Business School); Gino, Francesca (Harvard Business School)*
- 39) Time preferences and environmental decisions  
*Stevens, Jeffrey R. (University of Nebraska-Lincoln); Arthurs, Leilani (University of Nebraska-Lincoln)*
- 40) The effect of time pressure on group polarization and the first advocacy effect in group decision making  
*Tsuzuki, Takashi (Department of Psychology, Rikkyo University); Manabu, Kikuchi (Department of Psychology, Rikkyo University); Itsuki, Chiba (Graduate School of Psychology, Rikkyo University)*
- 41) The effects of time pressure on faking  
*Zhang, Don (Bowling Green State University); Nye, Christopher (Michigan State University)*
- 42) Money, Choices, & Time: Does understanding numbers help?  
*Bhattacharya, Chandrima (University of Toledo); Jasper, John D. (University of Toledo)*
- 43) Combining Response Time and Choice Data in a Neuroeconomic Model of the Decision Process Improves Out-of-Sample Predictions  
*Clithero, John A. (Caltech); Rangel, Antonio (Caltech)*
- 44) Giving Money vs. Giving Time: The Effect of Compensation on Judgments of Transgressions  
*Wan, Jing (University of Toronto); Aggarwal, Pankaj (University of Toronto)*
- 45) Probabilistic reasoning under time pressure: Developmental evidence for good intuition  
*Furlan, Sarah (University of Padova); Agnoli, Franca (University of Padova); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell University)*
- 46) Fighting for Self-Control: The Influence of Impulsivity on Unhealthy Habits  
*Jackson, Marc D. (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana M. (Auburn University)*
- 47) Is it all about the self? The effect of self-control depletion on ultimatum game proposers  
*Halali, Eliran (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev); Bereby-Meyer, Yoella (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev); Ockenfels, Axel (University of Cologne)*
- 48) The Emergency Reserve: The Effects of Slack on Self-Control Behavior  
*Sharif, Marissa A. (UCLA Anderson School of Management); Shu, Suzanne B. (UCLA Anderson School of Management)*
- 49) Seeing the future in what might have been: Counterfactual thought in decision process tracing  
*Frame, Mary E. (Miami University); Zhang, Ruohui (Miami University); Summerville, Amy (Miami University); Bristow, R. Evan (Miami University); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University); Trask-Tolbert, Amanda R. (Miami University)*
- 50) Epistemic vs. Aleatory Representations of Uncertainty: Content Analysis Indicators of Accuracy in Geopolitical Forecasting  
*Scott, Sydney E. (University of Pennsylvania); Metz, S. Emlen (University of Pennsylvania); Rohrbaugh, Nick (University of Pennsylvania); Mellers, Barbara A. (University of Pennsylvania); Tetlock, Philip E. (University of Pennsylvania); Schwartz, H. Andrew (University of Pennsylvania)*

- 51) Convergence across three indicators of temporal discounting and associations with cognitive ability  
*Basile, Alexandra (York University); Saoud, Wafa (York University); Toplak, Maggie (York University)*
- 52) Temporal Perspective and Decision Coping Patterns as Determinants of Conflict Management Styles  
*Upadhyay, Divya (Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, India); Mukherjee, Kanchan (Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, India)*
- 53) Decision Field Theory-Dynamic: A Model of Planning On the Fly  
*Hotaling, Jared (Indiana University)*
- 54) Thinking Beyond the Here and Now: Mental Simulation Across Psychological Distance  
*Wheeler, Natalie M. (The University of Chicago); Caruso, Eugene M. (The University of Chicago); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado)*
- 55) Experienced Regret and Impulsivity: To Delay or not Delay?  
*Darbor, Kathleen E. (Texas A& M University); Lench, Heather C. (Texas A& M University)*
- 56) Training People to be Myopic or Far-Sighted  
*Zhang, Hang (New York University); Kim, Hyoseok (New York University); Daw, Nathaniel D. (New York University); Maloney, Laurence T. (New York University)*
- 57) Self-Regulation in Decisions for the Self versus Other  
*Komoski, Stephanie E. (Wake Forest University); Stone, Eric R. (Wake Forest University); Masicampo, E. J. (Wake Forest University)*
- 58) I'd Move Mountains for You: Construal Level Theory and Costly Sacrifices in Romantic Relationships  
*Asyabi-Eshghi, Behzad (University of Toronto); Impett, Emily A. (University of Toronto)*
- 59) Modeling Age Differences in the Rapid Integration of Gains and Losses  
*Horn, Sebastian S. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Mata, Rui (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Pachur, Thorsten (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 60) Deferring Important Decisions  
*Krijnen, Job M. T. (Tilburg University); Breugelmans, Seger M. (Tilburg University); Zeelenberg, Marcel (Tilburg University)*
- 61) Information distortion and the role of psychological distance  
*Kim, Ka Eun (Yonsei University); Rim, Hye Bin (Yonsei University)*
- 62) Withdrawn
- 63) Consumer Choice in Price-Free Situations  
*Ramaswami, Seshan (Singapore Management University)*
- 64) Experts' perspective on consumers' perception and decision making in retail finance  
*Jonaityte, Inga (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)*
- 65) QuickChoice: Using Defaults to Help Consumers Choose High-Value Health Insurance  
*Gao, Jie (Columbia University); Appelt, Kirstin C. (Pacific Business Group on Health); von Glahn, Ted (Pacific Business Group on Health); Johnson, Eric J. (Columbia University)*
- 66) Designing Risk Communications that Help Consumers to Make Better decisions  
*Liberali, Jordana M. (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Dellaert, Benedict G. C. (Erasmus University Rotterdam)*
- 67) Withdrawn
- 68) The influence of online interaction in virtual community on consumer Decisions  
*Guan, Yuhong (Tsinghua University); Liu, Maggie Wenjing (Tsinghua University)*
- 69) You Are Where You Shop: Discrepancies between Explicit and Implicit Self-Esteem and Consumer Judgment  
*Jin, Lu (Rotman, University of Toronto); Mitchell, Andrew (Rotman, University of Toronto)*
- 70) Not All Control is Created Equal: The Effects of Behavioral and Decisional Control on Consumer Judgments  
*Hagen, Anna Linda (Ross School of Business, University of Michigan)*

- 71) Look for the signature: The influence of personal signatures on product evaluations and purchase behavior  
*Kettle, Keri (University of Miami); Mantonakis, Antonia (Brock University)*
- 72) The Nature and Effects of High Service Attentiveness  
*Liu, Maggie Wenjing (Tsinghua University); Zhang, Lijun (Peking University); Keh, Hean Tat (Monash University)*
- 73) Does ownership duration really matter? Experimental study  
*Rosenboim, Mosi (Ben Gurion University of the Negev); Shavit, Tal (The College of Management Academic Studies)*
- 74) Owning the Experience: How Possessions Shape our Memory and Decisions  
*Hur, Julia D. (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University); Nordgren, Loran F. (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)*
- 75) What's in it for me? The role of exchange equity in tax evasion  
*Plantinga, Arnoud (Tilburg University); van Wolferen, Job (Tilburg University)*
- 76) Neural correlates of emotional and rational considerations in moral tradeoffs  
*Montaser-Kouhsari, Leila (Caltech); Hutcherson, Cendri (Caltech); Rangel, Antonio (Caltech)*
- 77) Withdrawn
- 78) Morality as an argument: people think of moral beliefs as neither objective truths nor subjective preferences  
*Fernandez-Duque, Diego (Villanova University); McCusker, Kelly (Villanova University); Jackiewicz, Michael (Villanova University); Evans, Jessica (Villanova University)*
- 79) Third Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence? - A Comparison Between Groups and Individuals  
*Tan, Fangfang (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance); Xiao, Erte (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 80) Essentialism of religious identity  
*Ginges, Jeremy (New School for Social Research); Salari Rad, Mostafa (New School for Social Research)*
- 81) Giving Even When it Hurts: Highly Interdependent People are Willing to Sacrifice for a Romantic Partner Even in the Face of High Costs  
*Day, Lisa C. (University of Toronto); Le, Bonnie M. (University of Toronto); Impett, Emily A. (University of Toronto)*
- 82) What can be learned about social preferences by investigating cognitive processes?  
*Fiedler, Susann (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Glockner, Andreas (University of Gottingen); Nicklisch, Andreas (University of Hamburg); Dickert, Stephan (University of Wien)*
- 83) Influence of Belief in God on Decision Making  
*Wieland, Alice (U Nevada-Reno)*
- 84) The Language of Trust  
*Radzevick, Joseph R. (Gettysburg College)*
- 85) The Discloser's Iron Hand - How Disclosures Make Us Harsher  
*Brandimarte, Laura (Carnegie Mellon University); Acquisti, Alessandro (Carnegie Mellon University); Gino, Francesca (Harvard Business School)*
- 86) Willingness to Engage in Helping Behaviors when Considering Costs and Benefits  
*Zhang, Ruohui (Miami University); Frame, Mary E. (Miami University); Chapa, Kayla (Miami University); Wilkin, Bryn (Miami University); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University)*
- 87) The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Quantifying Presumption of Innocence in Relation to Criminal Stereotypes and Types of Crime  
*John, Richard (Univ. of Southern California); Scurich, Nicholas (Univ. of California, Irvine); Lee, Ryan (Univ. of Southern California)*
- 88) Where did that come from? Identifying the source of a sample  
*Lindskog, Marcus (Uppsala University); Winman, Anders (Uppsala University); Juslin, Peter (Uppsala University)*
- 89) Risk Preferences for Outcomes Involving Mood  
*Fuller, Elizabeth M. (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra (University of South Florida)*
- 90) Risk and responsibility  
*Summers, Barbara (University of Leeds); Duxbury, Darren (University of Leeds)*
- 91) Modeling riskless choice in dual process decision-making  
*Guo, Lisa (IMBS at UCI); Trueblood, Jennifer S. (Cognitive Sciences at UCI)*



- 92) Influencing Risk Behavior: The Effect of Framing and Goal under Positive Mood  
*Han, Sidney Su (University of Guelph)*
- 93) Self-reported risk taking across the lifespan: Meta-analyses and Survey Data  
*Josef, Anika K. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Mata, Rui (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Hertwig, Ralph (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 94) How to assess risky choice in older adults?  
*Frey, Renato (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Mata, Rui (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Hertwig, Ralph (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 95) Thinking about risky choice: Cognitive motivation, ability, and resources  
*Stroh, Nathan W. (Appalachian State University); McElroy, Gary T. (Appalachian State University); Dickinson, David L. (Appalachian State University)*
- 96) Subjective Value, Risk Preference, and Repeated Gambles  
*Ramirez Jr., Patrick (University of Texas at Arlington); Levine, Daniel (University of Texas at Arlington)*
- 97) It All Comes Down to Risk: Ruling Out Additional Explanations for the Uncertainty Effect  
*Moon, Alice (UC Berkeley); Nelson, Leif D. (UC Berkeley)*
- 98) Choice Behavior under Risk with High Stakes  
*Chen, Zhiqin (University of Southern California); John, Richard S. (University of Southern California)*
- 99) Probability neglect in risky choice: the role of numeracy and intrinsic happiness  
*Taylor, Andrea (University of Leeds); Ranyard, Rob (University of Bolton)*
- 100) Feeling Lucky: Predicting Risk-Taking Behavior  
*Ranieri, Andrea Y. (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra L. (University of South Florida)*
- 101) Emotions and preferences: risky choices and retrospective frequency judgments  
*Heilman, Renata M. (City University London UK; Babes-Bolyai University Romania); Kusev, Petko (Kingston University London, UK; City University London, UK); van Schaik, Paul (Teesside University, Middlesbrough, UK)*
- 102) The effect of positive mood on risky choice and advice  
*Yang, Hwajin (Singapore Management University); Yang, Sujin (The Catholic University of Korea, School of Medicine)*
- 103) A Simple Approach to Predicting Risk of ACL Injury  
*Petushek, Erich J. (Michigan Technological University); Cokely, Edward T. (Michigan Technological University); Ward, Paul (University of Greenwich); Myer, Gregory D. (Cincinnati Children's Hospital)*
- 104) Age-related Changes in Adaptive Risky Decision Making and Decision Competence: Examining Ages 8-17  
*Bossard, Elaine A. (University of Iowa); Levin, Irwin P. (University of Iowa); Weller, Joshua A. (Idaho State University)*
- 105) Reactions to Recent Experience in Risky Situations  
*Stershic, Sandra (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra (University of South Florida)*
- 106) Variations on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task  
*McCoy, Anthony W. (Kansas State University); Young, Michael E. (Kansas State University)*
- 107) Gain versus pain: The power of probability weighting in modeling risky choice  
*Pachur, Thorsten (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); Kellen, David (Albert Ludwigs University Freiburg)*
- 108) Numeracy Affects Probability Weighting via Affective Reactions to Risks  
*Petrova, Dafina (University of Granada, Spain); van der Pligt, Joop (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands); Garcia-Retamero, Rocio (University of Granada, Spain)*
- 109) Be afraid, be very afraid: Effects of fearful and fatalistic gists on young adult risk behavior predicted by fuzzy-trace theory  
*Avrutine, Julie (Columbia University); Reyna, Valerie (Cornell University); Wilhelms, Evan (Cornell University); Brust-Renck, Priscila (Cornell University)*
- 110) Subjective Numeracy and Mathematics Self Doubt as Predictors of Numeracy-Related Constructs and Risk Information Processing  
*Friedrich, James (Willamette University); Wenger, Jonathan (Willamette University); Demezas, Kirstin (Willamette University)*

- 111)** A cross-national study of uncertainty and perceptions of Global Climate Change  
*Budescu, David V. (Fordham University); Por, Han-Hui (Fordham University); Broomell, Stephen (Carnegie Mellon University); Michael Smithson (Australian National University)*
- 112)** Public Perception of Scientific Uncertainty  
*Broomell, Stephen (Carnegie Mellon University); Kane, Patrick (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 113)** The Impact of Different Sources of Uncertainty in Climate Change Communication  
*Chai, Hui Yih (University of New South Wales); Newell, Ben R. (University of New South Wales)*
- 114)** The Relationships Among Intolerance of Uncertainty, Decision-Making and Working Memory  
*Spitaletta, Jason (Department of Psychology, The Catholic University of America); Seaman, Kendra (Department of Psychology, The Catholic University of America); Sebrechts, Marc (Department of Psychology, The Catholic University of America)*
- 115)** The Assumption of Class-Conditional Independence in Categorization Under Uncertainty  
*Jarecki, Jana (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); Meder, Bjorn (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); Nelson, Jonathan D. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin)*
- 116)** Understanding decision making in avalanche terrain - A conceptual framework applying prospect theory  
*Zweifel, Benjamin (ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Haegeli, Pascal (Simon Fraser University, Canada); Boutellier, Roman (ETH Zurich, Switzerland)*
- 117)** Adversary Modeling in Security Games  
*Cui, Jinshu (Department of Psychology, University of Southern California); John, Richard S. (Department of Psychology, University of Southern California)*
- 118)** Third Party Compensation in Behavioral Games: Different Drivers in Different Contexts  
*Thulin, Erik (University of Pennsylvania); Bicchieri, Cristina (University of Pennsylvania)*
- 119)** The effect of unpacking on probabilistic information interpretation  
*Belogolova, Helen (UCLA); Fox, Craig (UCLA)*
- 120)** Possibilities and Probabilities  
*Leonhardt, James (New Mexico State University); Keller, Robin (UC Irvine)*
- 121)** Improving Estimation of Joint Probabilities with Ratio Judgments  
*Por, Han-Hui (Fordham University); Budescu, David V. (Fordham University)*
- 122)** Withdrawn
- 123)** Withdrawn
- 124)** Perceptual grouping of possible outcomes as obstacle to simple probability assessments  
*Hurst, Ada (University of Waterloo)*
- 125)** Evidence of Systematic Rounding Errors in Human Working Memory When Estimating Conjunction Probabilities  
*Tee, James (New York University); Zhang, Hang (New York University); Maloney, Laurence T. (New York University)*
- 126)** Booms, Crashes and Early Investment Experiences in a Laboratory Experiment  
*Papadovasilaki, Dimitra (University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics); Guerrero, Federico (University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics); Safford, Amanda (University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics); Sundali, James (University of Nevada, Reno, Managerial Sciences Department); Stone, Gregory R. (University of Nevada, Reno, Finance Department)*
- 127)** Combo bets are more attractive than single bets  
*Nilsson, Hakan (Department of Psychology, Uppsala University); Andersson, Patric (Stockholm School of Economics)*
- 128)** Effects of Asymmetry on Investment in Experimental Contexts  
*Hart, Einav (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel); Kareev, Yaakov (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel); Avrahami, Judith (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel)*
- 129)** (When) Does Hierarchical Bayesian Modelling Pay off?  
*Scheibehenne, Benjamin (University of Basel); Pachur, Thorsten (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 130)** Health, Beliefs and Cognition: An Exploration of the Compensatory Health Beliefs Scale  
*Lavins, Bethany D. (Ohio University); Gonzalez-Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio University)*

- 131)** Effects of Affective Dimensions of Music on Decision Making  
*Kim, Jongwan (University of South Carolina); Wedell, Douglas H. (University of South Carolina)*
- 132)** The Bias Blind Spot in Jurors' Ability to Diagnose Bias during Voir Dire  
*Yokum, David (University of Arizona); Robertson, Christopher (University of Arizona)*
- 133)** The Present Bias Revisited: Loss of Psychological Control as an Underlying Mechanism  
*Lee, Kelly K. (Washington University in St. Louis); Malkoc, Selin A. (Washington University in St. Louis); Rucker, Derek D. (Northwestern University)*
- 134)** Higher Decision Confidence Predicts More Framing Bias: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Approach  
*Corbin, Jonathan C. (Cornell); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell); Wilhelms, Evan A. (Cornell); Weldon, Rebecca (Cornell)*
- 135)** Hindsight bias about 2012 US election outcomes: Individual differences in knowing it all along  
*Bruine de Bruin, Wandí (University of Leeds and Carnegie Mellon University); McNair, Simon (University of Leeds); Peters, Ellen (Ohio State University); Fischhoff, Baruch (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 136)** Adolescent Empathy Gaps  
*Markey, Amanda R. (Carnegie Mellon University); Downs, Julie S. (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 137)** Self-Regulatory Emotions & Cheating: How Anger, Pride & Guilt Affect Unethical Behavior  
*Motro, Daphna (University of Arizona); Ordonez, Lisa (University of Arizona)*
- 138)** Probabilistic inferences under emotional stress: How arousal affects decision processes  
*Wichary, Szymon (University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw, Poland); Mata, Rui (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany); Rieskamp, Jorg (University of Basel, Switzerland)*
- 139)** Prosocial Lies: When Deception Breeds Trust  
*Levine, Emma E. (Wharton, The University of Pennsylvania); Schweitzer, Maurice E. (Wharton, The University of Pennsylvania)*
- 140)** Quitting: The Downside of Great Expectations in Professional Tennis  
*Tuckfield, Bradford (The Wharton School); Dietvorst, Berkeley (The Wharton School); Milkman, Katherine L. (The Wharton School); Schweitzer, Maurice E. (The Wharton School)*
- 141)** Bounded emotion, the psychophysics of affect and scope: Collapse of affect in donation and non-donation judgment tasks  
*Vastfjall, Daniel (Decision Research); Hagma, William (Linköping University); Dickert, Stephan (Linköping University); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)*
- 142)** The Worst Sort: Judging & Punishing Sex Offenders  
*Lively, Chaz (University of Pennsylvania); Goodwin, Geoffrey (University of Pennsylvania)*
- 143)** Agency alters social preferences and decisions  
*Choshen-Hillel, Shoham (The University of Chicago); Yaniv, Ilan (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)*
- 144)** Moralizing Goals Enhances Goal Commitment and Pursuit  
*Hosey, Christine (University of Chicago); Risen, Jane (University of Chicago)*
- 145)** Fear of the unknown: An examination of the determinants of ambiguity aversion  
*Guney, Sule (University of New South Wales); Newell, Ben R. (University of New South Wales)*
- 146)** Judging the controllability of destiny: Human agency appraisals increase helping for assistance efforts but decrease helping for victims  
*Carpenter, Stephanie M. (University of Michigan); Vickers, Brian D. (University of Michigan); Yates, J. Frank (University of Michigan)*
- 147)** Cost for the donor and benefit for the receiver: An explanation of psychophysical numbing  
*Rubaltelli, Enrico (University of Padova); Hysenbelli, Dorina (University of Padova); Dickert, Stephan (Vienna University of Economics and Business); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)*
- 148)** Understanding the developmental sources of scope insensitivity in helping behavior  
*Kogut, Tehila (Ben Gurion University); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research & University of Oregon); Vastfjall, Daniel (Decision Research)*
- 149)** Strategic cheating in monetary donations to social organizations  
*Ayal, Shahar (Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya); Hochman, Guy (Duke University); Gneezy, Uri (UC San Diego); Ariely, Dan (Duke University)*
- 150)** I'll be still in pain: Forecasting emotional reactions to social vs. non-social events after social exclusion  
*Kim, Aeri (Yonsei University); Rim, Hye Bin (Yonsei University); Sim, Olivia Suhyung (Yonsei University)*

# SJDM SUNDAY EVENING POSTER SESSION #2 & BOOK AUCTION

5:30pm – 7:30pm w/ Cash Bar - Sheraton Hall

- 1) A Crisis of Choice: Regulatory Focus and Mode Predict Decision Difficulty in Maximization  
*Hughes, Jeffrey (University of Waterloo); Scholer, Abigail A. (University of Waterloo)*
- 2) How Voice Affects Choice: Auditory Heuristics and Employment Decisions  
*Truncellito, Richard D. (Carnegie Mellon University); Kassam, Karim S. (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 3) Set-fit effects in choice  
*Evers, Ellen R. K. (Tilburg University); Inbar, Yoel (Tilburg University); Zeelenberg, Marcel (Tilburg University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon)*
- 4) The description-experience choice gap is attenuated in older adults  
*Camilleri, Adrian R. (Duke University); McCarrey, Anna C. (National Institute on Aging)*
- 5) Gain and Loss in Intertemporal choice: Impulsivity, Procrastination, and Response Dynamic Measurements  
*Cheng, Jiuqing (Ohio University); Gonzalez-Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio University)*
- 6) Why being unattainable makes a choice alternative desirable: Thought suppression as a motive for choice  
*Usta, Murat (Grenoble School of Business)*
- 7) Known Unknowns in Judgment and Choice  
*Walters, Daniel (Anderson School of Management, UCLA); Fernbach, Philip (Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado, Boulder); Sloman, Steven (Brown University)*
- 8) Cognitive Processes behind Food Choices  
*Chimeli, Janna (Ohio University); Gonzalez-Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio University)*
- 9) I'll take it because: No Paradox of Choice among satisficers and maximizers  
*Yamagishi, Kimihiko (Tokyo Institute of Technology); Ikawa, Norio (Macmem Inc.)*
- 10) Heuristics for Trust-Based Personnel Choices  
*Wang, X. T. (University of South Dakota); Hu, Zhan (Fudan University)*
- 11) User Acceptance of Decision Aids for Complex Choices: Regret Anticipation Moderates the Impact of Cognitive Complexity  
*Fyraki, Agapi Thaleia (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Dellaert, Benedict G. C. (Erasmus University Rotterdam)*
- 12) Heuristic and Discount Models of Intertemporal Choice: A Quantitative Test  
*Regenwetter, Michel (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Stevens, Jeffrey (University of Nebraska at Lincoln); Guo, Ying (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Popova, Anna (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Zwilling, Chris (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)*
- 13) How do discount functions reflect attribute-based strategies in intertemporal choice?  
*Suter, Renata (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Pachur, Thorsten (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Hertwig, Ralph (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)*
- 14) Wanting to Stay Versus Not Wanting to Go: Romantic Relationship Stay/Leave Decisions Conceptualized as Multiattribute Choices  
*Joel, Samantha (University of Toronto); Page-Gould, Elizabeth (University of Toronto); MacDonald, Geoff (University of Toronto)*
- 15) Can economic models be built on bounded rationality?  
*Caldwell, Leigh (The Irrational Agency)*
- 16) Withdrawn
- 17) Withdrawn
- 18) Color frequency affects attribute frames  
*McCormick, Michael (University of North Carolina at Greensboro); Seta, John J. (University of North Carolina at Greensboro)*
- 19) Fatal Attractiveness: How Mating Cues Affect Managerial Decision Making  
*de Bellis, Emanuel (University of St. Gallen); Haubl, Gerald (University of Alberta); Hildebrand, Christian (University of St. Gallen); Hertwig, Ralph (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Herrmann, Andreas (University of St. Gallen)*

- 20) Who gets the organ? How policy framing affects public's preference  
*Li, Meng (University of Colorado Denver); Dewitt, Jeff (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University)*
- 21) A New Look at the Hot Hand Fallacy: How Rate of Change Affects Gambling Behavior  
*Prunier, Stephen G. (University of Toledo); Jasper, John D. (University of Toledo)*
- 22) Withdrawn
- 23) Predicted Emotional Reaction and Disaster Preparedness: The Change After the Prediction  
*Noda, Masayo (Kinjo Gakuin University)*
- 24) Testing Two Pathways to Inaction - The roles of Indecisiveness, Anxiety, Perceived Control, and Worry  
*McNeill, Ilona (University of Western Australia); Dunlop, Patrick (University of Western Australia); Skinner, Timothy (Charles Darwin University); Morrison, David (Murdoch University)*
- 25) Personality influences on the manipulation of emotion in the Iowa Gambling Task  
*Humeny, Courtney (Carleton University); West, Robert (Carleton University)*
- 26) Withdrawn
- 27) Laboratory experiments on anxiety and procrastination  
*Xu, Ping (Ohio University); Gonzalez, C. Vallejo (Ohio University)*
- 28) It Smells Good But Feels Bad: The Cross Cueing Effects of Olfactory Induced Emotion on Self-Regulation  
*Maranduik, Alex J. (University of Guelph)*
- 29) Envy is a Focusing Illusion  
*O'Brien, Ed (University of Michigan); Ellsworth, Phoebe C. (University of Michigan); Schwarz, Norbert (University of Michigan)*
- 30) Sensation Seeking and Response-Scale Effects on Rating Versus Categorizing Rewards: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Account  
*Weldon, Rebecca (Cornell University); Reyna, Valerie (Cornell University); Wilhelms, Evan (Cornell University); Corbin, Jonathan (Cornell University); Chick, Christina (Cornell University); Brust Renck, Priscila (Cornell University)*
- 31) Differentiating Hot-State and Construal-Level Accounts of Curiosity: Why We search for Negative Information Against Our Better Judgment  
*Barkan, Rachel (Ben-Gurion University, Israel); Shani, Yaniv (Tel-Aviv University, Israel); Danziger, Shai (Tel-Aviv University, Israel)*
- 32) Why Are You Mad? The Effect of Different Anger Sources on Cooperation  
*Motro, Daphna (University of Arizona); Kugler, Tamar (University of Arizona); Connolly, Terry (University of Arizona)*
- 33) Valuing the lives you can save in tragic situations  
*Mayorga, Marcus M. (Decision Research, University of Oregon); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research, University of Oregon)*
- 34) Different mechanisms underlie the Identified Victim Effect, Proportion Dominance Effect and In-group Effect in helping situations.  
*Erlandsson, Arvid (Lund University)*
- 35) Mood and Economic Expectations After the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election  
*Williamson, Leanne M. (The Ohio State University); Peters, Ellen (The Ohio State University); Bruine de Bruin, Wandt (Centre for Decision Research, Leeds University Business School; Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 36) Nudging Hybrid Vehicle Purchase by Framing  
*Yeung, Kam Leung (Iowa State University); Weber, Bethany (Iowa State University)*
- 37) How acceptable are nudges to the public?  
*Castelo, Noah (University of British Columbia); Felsen, Gidon (University of Colorado School of Medicine); Reiner, Peter B. (National Core for Neuroethics)*
- 38) The Role of Conflicting Normative Information on Perceptions of Binary Sequences  
*Beckstead, Jason W. (University of South Florida)*
- 39) Evidence of Conflict Monitoring and Numerical Ability  
*Corser, Ryan (University of Toledo); Voss, Raymond (University of Toledo); Jasper, John D. (University of Toledo); Bodie, Timothy (University of Toledo)*

- 40) Withdrawn
- 41) Withdrawn
- 42) Misperceptions of Household Energy Consumption  
*Schley, Dan R. (The Ohio State University); DeKay, Michael L. (The Ohio State University)*
- 43) Who Did What? The Impact of Giving Credit on Agents' Motivation  
*Chaudhry, Shereen J. (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 44) Social Sampling: Decisions from Experience in Ultimatum Bargaining  
*Fleischhut, Nadine (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); Artinger, Florian (University of Warwick); Olschewski, Sebastian (University of Tuebingen); Volz, Kirsten (University of Tuebingen); Hertwig, Ralph (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin)*
- 45) When being smarter raises your credit score: How different individual differences determine financial decision-making skill  
*Enkavi, Zeynep (Columbia University); Gao, Jie (Columbia University); Li, Ye (UC Riverside); Zaval, Lisa (Columbia University); Johnson, Eric J. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)*
- 46) Measuring the Collateral Costs of Fundraising  
*Yeomans, Mike (Chicago Booth); Al-Ubaydli, Omar (George Mason)*
- 47) Cognitive segmentation tool for targeted pricing strategy: applying JDM research in the real world  
*Halonen, Elina (University of Turku, Finland); Caldwell, Leigh (The Irrational Agency, London)*
- 48) Lexicographic Decision Making in Ultimatum Bargaining  
*Fleischhut, Nadine (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); Artinger, Florian (University of Warwick); Olschewski, Sebastian (University of Tuebingen); Hertwig, Ralph (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin)*
- 49) More waste, less heed: Understanding domestic food waste from a judgment and decision making perspective  
*Bown, Nicola (Centre for Decision Research, University of Leeds)*
- 50) Goal adjustment in teams: problem-oriented search versus self-enhancement  
*Blettner, Daniela (Simon Fraser University); Zeigler-Hill, Virgil (Oakland University); Wang, Jim (University of Southern Mississippi)*
- 51) Exploring learning goal orientation  
*Yaoyuneyong, Gallayanee (University of Southern Mississippi); Blettner, Daniela (Simon Fraser University)*
- 52) The Influence of Active Goals on Evaluations of Hybrid Products  
*Kim, Moon-Yong (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)*
- 53) Working hard at not seeing the obvious: Competition, Goals & Bounded Awareness  
*Fletcher, Pinar (Harvard Business School)*
- 54) Motivational differences in aiming for narrow or wide goals  
*Xu, Amy Z. (University of Waterloo); Bohns, Vanessa K. (University of Waterloo); Scholer, Abigail A. (University of Waterloo)*
- 55) Buffering Against Threats in Performance Domains: Activating Goals vs. Self-Affirming  
*Wieland, Alice (University of Nevada, Reno); Amaral, Nelson B. (University of Minnesota)*
- 56) Reference-dependent Preference Reversals: A Dynamic Modeling Account  
*Trueblood, Jennifer S. (University of California, Irvine)*
- 57) You can't be better than me: The role of the reference point in modulating people's pursuit of wealth  
*Pittarello, Andrea (University of Padova); Rubaltelli, Enrico (University of Padova); Rumiati, Rino (University of Padova)*
- 58) Cultural Differences in Motives for Advice-seeking  
*Ning, Zhang (Queen's University); Li-Jun, Ji (Queen's University); Ye, Li (Huazhong Chian Normal University); Gillian, Harper (Queen's University)*
- 59) The effects of culture and content on decision mode selection  
*Gong, Han (Department of Psychology, Northwestern University); Medin, Douglas L. (Department of Psychology, Northwestern University)*
- 60) Maximizing Tendencies: Cross-Cultural Differences in Decision Regret and Life Satisfaction  
*Zhu, Xiaoyuan (Susan) (University of Connecticut); Daniels, Michael (Singapore Management University); Dalal, Dev (University of Connecticut)*

- 61) Physical Attractiveness Preference among Bicultural Individuals  
*Hsu, Yu-Wei (Northwestern University); Finkel, Eli J. (Northwestern University)*
- 62) Holistic thought and optimism: A three-way cultural comparison  
*Chen, Stephanie (The University of Michigan); Nisbett, Richard (The University of Michigan)*
- 63) Not All Fakes Are Created Equal: Authenticity and Cultural Differences in Considering Counterfeits  
*Chan, Steven (New York University); Amaral, Nelson (University of Minnesota)*
- 64) Behavioral Microfoundations of R & D Managers in New Product Development in Indian Firms  
*Lakshmanan, Prasad (Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore); Garud, Niharika (Indian Institute of Management Bangalore)*
- 65) Mindfulness in New Product Development Processes: Evidence from Indian Firms  
*Garud, Niharika (Indian Institute of Management Bangalore)*
- 66) Predicting Decision Delay amongst Residents of Wildfire Prone Areas  
*McNeill, Ilona M. (University of Western Australia); Dunlop, Patrick D. (University of Western Australia); Skinner, Timothy C. (Charles Darwin University); Morrison, David L. (Murdoch University)*
- 67) Predicting Individual Earnings and Forecasting Accuracy in Prediction Markets  
*Atanasov, Pavel (University of Pennsylvania); Rescober, Philip (University of Pennsylvania); Mellers, Barbara (University of Pennsylvania); Tetlock, Philip (University of Pennsylvania); Ungar, Lyle (University of Pennsylvania)*
- 68) Prediction specificity harms prediction quality  
*Kelly, Theresa F. (University of Pennsylvania); Simmons, Joseph P. (University of Pennsylvania)*
- 69) Eye Blink Rate Predicts Decision Strategy in Adolescents  
*Barkley-Levenson, Emily (University of Southern California); Fox, Craig (University of California Los Angeles); Huang, Olivia (University of California Los Angeles); Jones, Caroline (Boston University); Galvan, Adriana (University of California Los Angeles)*
- 70) Withdrawn
- 71) "The longer you can look back, the farther you can look forward": Past duration predicts individual and collective environmental decision-making  
*Bang, Hye Min (Duke University); Hershfield, Hal E. (New York University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)*
- 72) Rational thinking and cognitive abilities in antisocial youth: The importance of considering sample characteristics when predicting outcome variables  
*Sorge, Geoff B. (Department of Psychology, York University); Skilling, Tracey (Centre for Addiction and Mental Health); Toplak, Maggie E. (Department of Psychology, York University)*
- 73) Judgment in forecasting: Moving from artificial experiments to the organizational environment  
*De Baets, Shari (Vlerick Business School); Vanderheyden, Karlien (Vlerick Business School); Buelens, Marc (Vlerick Business School)*
- 74) Boosting the Communicated Accuracy of Imprecise Intelligence Forecasts  
*Mandel, David R. (DRDC / York University)*
- 75) A process tracing study of screening's impact on decision accuracy  
*Ganesh Pillai, Rajani (North Dakota State University); He, Xin (University of Central Florida); Echambadi, Raj (University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign)*
- 76) How Accurate are Lay-Perceptions of Effect Size Indicators?  
*Dalal, Dev K. (University of Connecticut); Nolan, Kevin P. (Hofstra University); Zhum, Xiaoyuan (Susan) (University of Connecticut)*
- 77) Probabilistic Coherence Weighting for Increasing Accuracy of Judgment  
*Olson, Kenneth C. (George Mason University); Karvetski, Christopher W. (George Mason University); Mandel, David R. (DRDC / York University); Twardy, Charles R.*
- 78) Effects of data display types on project management decision-making  
*Lee, Patricia (Fordham University)*
- 79) Maximizing and Decisions From Experience  
*Weinhardt, Justin (University of Calgary); Gonzalez, Cleotilde (Carnegie Mellon University); Harman, Jason (Carnegie Mellon University)*

- 80)** The upside of information distortion: It's quicker, easier, and more satisfying  
*Erford, Breann M. (The Ohio State University); DeKay, Michael L. (The Ohio State University)*
- 81)** Selective attention framing effects in narrative vs. non-narrative contexts  
*Steinhardt, Joseph (Cornell University); Shapiro, Michael A. (Cornell University)*
- 82)** The effect of framing on admission decisions in psychiatrists  
*Jefferies, Kiri (Herts Parts NHS Foundation Trust, Uni of Herts); Sharma, Shivani (University of Hertfordshire); Gale, Tim M. (Herts Parts NHS Foundation Trust, Uni of Herts); Hawley, Chris J. (Herts Parts NHS Foundation Trust, Uni of Herts); Georgiou, George J. (University of Hertfordshire)*
- 83)** Positive (and negative) effects of experience-based sampling and causal framing on intuitive statistical judgments  
*Hawkins, Guy E. (University of New South Wales); Hayes, Brett K. (University of New South Wales); Newell, Ben R. (University of New South Wales)*
- 84)** Global Warming vs Climate Change: Ideology Trumps Framing  
*Benjamin, Daniel (Fordham University); Por, Han-Hui (Fordham University); Budescu, David (Fordham University)*
- 85)** Gender differences in analytic cognitive style  
*Pennycook, Gordon (University of Waterloo); Barr, Nathaniel (University of Waterloo); Koehler, Derek A. (University of Waterloo); Fugelsang, Jonathan J. (University of Waterloo)*
- 86)** Gender, Number of Competitors, and Competition Entry Decisions  
*Hanek, Kathrin J. (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor); Garcia, Stephen M. (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor); Wu, Kaidi (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor); Tor, Avishalom (University of Notre Dame, The Law School)*
- 87)** The two sides of the coin: Thinking about money makes men more competitive about resources but less competitive about performance  
*Molouki, Sarah (University of Chicago); Shapira, Oren (University of Chicago); Mead, Nicole L. (Erasmus University); Caruso, Eugene M. (University of Chicago)*
- 88)** Withdrawn
- 89)** Influencing health decision making: A study of color and message framing  
*Voss, Raymond P. (University of Toledo); Corser, Ryan (University of Toledo); McCormick, Michael (University of North Carolina Greensboro); Jasper, John D. (University of Toledo)*
- 90)** Numeracy skills in health: Providers and newly insured adults face new challenges  
*Tompkins, Mary Kate (The Ohio State University); Meilleur, Louise (The Ohio State University); Peters, Ellen (The Ohio State University)*
- 91)** Influence of social support in health-relevant decision making in women with a family history of breast cancer  
*Garcia-Retamero, Rocio (University of Granada); Henneman, Lidewij (VU University Medical Center); van Asperen, Christi J. (Leiden University Medical Center); Oosterwijk, Jan C. (University Medical Center, Groningen University); Menko, Fred H. (VU University Medical Center, Amsterdam); Timmermans, Danielle R. M. (VU University Medical Center, Amsterdam)*
- 92)** Threats to security: Ironical consequences of secure data collection in healthcare  
*Moher, Ester (University of Ottawa); El Emam, Khaled (University of Ottawa)*
- 93)** Getting Ahead of Illness: Using Metaphors to Influence Medical Decision-Making  
*Scherer, Aaron M. (University of Iowa); Scherer, Laura D. (University of Missouri-Columbia); Fagerlin, Angela (University of Michigan)*
- 94)** Theory-informed design of values clarification methods: A cognitive psychological perspective on patient treatment decision making  
*Pieterse, Arwen H. (Leiden University Medical Center); De Vries, Marieke (Tilburg University); Kunneman, Marleen (Leiden University Medical Center)*
- 95)** Do physicians want to share decision making with their patients?  
*Garcia-Retamero, Rocio (U. Granada; Max Planck Institute); Wicki, Barbara (AO Clinical Investigation and Documentation); Cokely, Edward T. (Michigan Technological University); Hanson, Beate (AO Clinical Investigation and Documentation)*
- 96)** The Polarizing Effect of Calories: How Calorie Estimation Influences Food Perceptions  
*Popovich, Deidre L. (Emory University)*
- 97)** Assessing Decision Making Competence in High-Functioning Young Adults on the Autism Spectrum  
*Levin, Irwin (University of Iowa); Gaeth, Gary (University of Iowa); Yegorova, Vitaliya (University of Iowa); Yan, Haoyang (University of Iowa)*



- 98)** Applying decision theory to child injury prevention: Testing the coexistence hypothesis in situations involving pediatric injuries  
*Ishikawa, Takuro (University of British Columbia)*
- 99)** Exploring the Contributions of Liking and Wanting to the Intention-Behavior Link  
*Wudarzewski, Amanda (University of Waterloo); Koehler, Derek (University of Waterloo); Scholer, Abigail (University of Waterloo)*
- 100)** The Effect of Distraction on Memory-based Decision Making  
*Huffling, Steven K. (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana M. (Auburn University)*
- 101)** The effects of hemispatial attention on decision making  
*McElroy, Todd (Appalachian State University); Stroh, Nathan (Appalachian State University); Doherty, Shannon (Appalachian State University)*
- 102)** Withdrawn
- 103)** Impacts of maximizing tendencies on the size of information distortion  
*Rim, Hye Bin (Yonsei University)*
- 104)** Satisfaction in social microlending: The role of decision support systems and decision makers' mind sets.  
*Hafenbraedl, Sebastian (University of Lausanne); Pfeiffer, Jella (University of Mainz); Hoffrage, Ulrich (University of Lausanne)*
- 105)** Seeking an Ontology of Open-Mindedness  
*Metz, S. Emlen (University of Pennsylvania)*
- 106)** When copying hinders learning: Pitfalls of success-based group decision-making  
*Woike, Jan K. (ARC, Max Planck Institute f. Human Development, Berlin ); Bonardi, Jean-Philippe (HEC, Universite de Lausanne); Garcia-Retamero, Rocio (Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Granada)*
- 107)** The relationship between components of maximization and information search behavior  
*Patalano, Andrea L. (Wesleyan University); Weizenbaum, E. (Wesleyan University); Anderson, A. (Wesleyan University)*
- 108)** Evidence for influence of frame on cue ordering  
*Chrabaszcz, Jeffrey S. (UMD, College Park); Yu, Erica (UMD, College Park); Sprenger, Amber M. (The MITRE Corporation); Dougherty, Michael R. (UMD, College Park)*
- 109)** Estimating the Effectiveness of Computer-Mediated Help-Seeking  
*Roghanizad, M. Mahdi (University of Waterloo); Bohns, Vanessa K. (University of Waterloo)*
- 110)** Point Substitutions in a Cascaded Inference Model  
*Beam, Colin (University of Washington); Miyamoto, John (University of Washington)*
- 111)** An eye tracking and verbal protocol analysis of decision strategies in the context effects of multi-attribute decision making  
*Itsuki, Chiba (Graduate School of Psychology, Rikkyo University); Takashi, Tsuzuki (Department of Psychology, Rikkyo University); Masashi, Soma (Graduate School of Psychology, Rikkyo University)*
- 112)** Sense of Power and Advice Giving: Implications for the Feasibility and Desirability of Advice  
*Duan, Jinyun (Soochow University); Chang, Xiaoxi (University of Ottawa); Lu, Wenjuan (Soochow University); Bonaccio, Silvia (University of Ottawa)*
- 113)** Development and Validation of a New Measure of Intuition: The Types of Intuition Scale (TIntS)  
*Pretz, Jean E. (Elizabethtown College); Brookings, Jeffrey B. (Wittenberg University); Carlson, Lauren A. (Illinois State University); Humbert, Tamara Keiter (Elizabethtown College); Roy, Michael M. (Elizabethtown College); Jones, Meghan E. (Elizabethtown College)*
- 114)** Expectations-based trade  
*Levis, Amanda (Yale Marketing); Frederick, Shane (Yale Marketing)*
- 115)** Comparative Decision Making: From Playgrounds to CEOs  
*Yazbec, Angele (Grand Valley State University); Rydecki, Krista (Grand Valley State University); Fific, Mario (Grand Valley State University)*
- 116)** Processing payoffs in a perceptual decision task  
*Diederich, Adele (Jacobs University)*
- 117)** Measuring Decisional Regret Amongst French-Speaking Populations: Translation And Validation Of A Regret Scale  
*Girard, Annie J. (University of Ottawa); Bonaccio, Silvia (University of Ottawa)*

- 118)** The Case for a Broader Definition of Decision Making  
*Taylor, Graeme (UNSW. Australia)*
- 119)** The Priceless Entrepreneur  
*Shyti, Anisa (HEC Paris); Paraschiv, Corina (HEC Paris)*
- 120)** Withdrawn
- 121)** Is  $W(1) = 1$ ? A purely mathematical addition  
*Harin, Alexander (Modern University for the Humanities)*
- 122)** Agency, Risk and Responsibility judgments  
*Nordbye, Gro H. H. (University of Oslo); Teigen, Karl H. (University of Oslo)*
- 123)** Recency and Reference Point Formation: The effect on risky choice behavior  
*Yeomans, Mike (Chicago Booth); Wu, George (Chicago Booth)*
- 124)** Age Differences in Risk Perception and Risk Intentions across Risk Domains  
*Bonem, Emily (University of Michigan); Ellsworth, Phoebe (University of Michigan); Gonzalez, Richard (University of Michigan)*
- 125)** Using Reference Classes Leads to Lower Risk Sensitivity  
*Sinayev, Aleksandr (The Ohio State University); Peters, Ellen (The Ohio State University)*
- 126)** Individual Differences in Attitudes towards Nudges  
*Jung, Janice (UPenn); Mellers, Barbara (UPenn); Baron, Jonathan (UPenn)*
- 127)** Individual Differences in Greed: The Development of a Valid and Reliable Scale  
*Seuntjens, Terri G. (Tilburg University); Zeelenberg, Marcel (Tilburg University); Breugelmans, Seger M. (Tilburg University); Van de Ven, N. (Tilburg University)*
- 128)** Does a teaser always tease?  
*Tu, Yanping (University of Chicago); Hsee, Christopher (University of Chicago)*
- 129)** Loss Aversion and Exploration in a Search Task  
*Chin, Alycia (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)*
- 130)** How the psychological tangibility of money reduces loss aversion  
*Shah, Avni (Duke University); Bettman, Jim (Duke University); Payne, John (Duke University)*
- 131)** Size doesn't matter: The importance of small losses  
*Zeisberger, Stefan (University of Zurich)*
- 132)** Understanding the Psychology of Scarcity: When Limited Resources Prompt Abstract Thinking  
*Roux, Caroline (Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management); Goldsmith, Kelly (Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management)*
- 133)** From Individual Binary Choice to Strategic Interactions: When and How are Optimal Decisions Fueled by Competition?  
*Schulze, Christin (School of Psychology, University of New South Wales); van Ravenzwaaij, Don (School of Psychology, University of Newcastle); Newell, Ben R. (School of Psychology, University of New South Wales)*
- 134)** Understanding local warming: How warm days lead to increased belief in global warming  
*Zaval, Lisa (Columbia University); Keenan, Elizabeth A. (University of California); Johnson, Eric J. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)*
- 135)** Withdrawn
- 136)** The impact of post-decisional information on confidence judgments  
*Yu, Shuli (Michigan State University); Pleskac, Timothy (Michigan State University)*
- 137)** A Mathematical Theory of Qualitative Decision-Making  
*Broniatowski, David (Johns Hopkins University); Reyna, Valerie (Cornell University)*

- 138)** Value beyond context and elicitation: Values constructed on the spot influence more than decisions on the spot  
*Vickers, Brian D. (University of Michigan); Carpenter, Stephanie M. (University of Michigan); Yates, J. Frank (University of Michigan)*
- 139)** The Effects of Choosing on Subsequent Confidence: Tests of a Quantum Model of Decisions and Judgments  
*Kvam, Peter D. (Michigan State University); Pleskac, Timothy J. (Michigan State University); Busemeyer, Jerome R. (Indiana University)*
- 140)** Exploration strategies in human decision making  
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- 141)** Intransitive cycles and rational choice  
*Muller-Trede, Johannes (Rady School of Management, UCSD); Sher, Shlomi (Department of Psychology, Pomona College); McKenzie, Craig R.M. (Department of Psychology and Rady School of Management, UCSD)*
- 142)** Using Context to Predict Value  
*Hundtofte, Sean (Yale); Meyer, Andrew (Yale); Frederick, Shane (Yale)*
- 143)** A Penny Saved is a Partner Earned: The Romantic Appeal of Savers  
*Olson, Jenny G. (University of Michigan); Rick, Scott I. (University of Michigan)*
- 144)** The Effect of Using a Foreign Language on Delaying Gratification  
*Hayakawa, Sayuri L. (University of Chicago); Keysar, Boaz (University of Chicago); An, Sun-Gyu (University of Chicago)*
- 145)** How Soon is Immediate?  
*Yoon, Haewon (Rutgers University Department of Psychology); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University Department of Psychology)*
- 146)** Flexible group decisions: Abandoning the majority rule when necessary  
*Juni, Mordechai Z. (University of California, Santa Barbara); Eckstein, Miguel P. (University of California, Santa Barbara)*
- 147)** Exploring antecedents and consequences of decision mode selection  
*Gong, Han (Department of Psychology, Northwestern University); Medin, Douglas L. (Department of Psychology, Northwestern University)*
- 148)** Three things that make insurance fraud seem acceptable: Deductibles, insurance companies' profit, and paying premiums  
*van Wolferen, Job (TIBER / Tilburg University); Inbar, Yoel (TIBER / Tilburg University); Zeelenberg, Marcel (TIBER / Tilburg University)*
- 149)** On the Difficulty of Simultaneously Eliciting the Attraction, Compromise, and Similarity Effects  
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- 150)** A Meta-Analytic Review of Self-Licensing  
*Blanken, Irene (Tilburg University); van de Ven, Niels (Tilburg University); Zeelenberg, Marcel (Tilburg University)*
- 151)** The Sex-Partner Discrepancy Revisited: Strategy Differences and Mode Effects  
*Schweickart, Oliver (University of Alberta); Brown, Norman R. (University of Alberta); Moore, Sean E. (University of Alberta-Augustana); Sinclair, Robert C. (Laurentian University)*
- 152)** Selling Out  
*Bhattacharjee, Amit (Dartmouth College); Berman, Jonathan Z. (University of Pennsylvania); Dana, Jason (University of Pennsylvania); Mellers, Barbara (University of Pennsylvania)*