



JUDGMENT/DECISION MAKING

Society for Judgment and Decision Making 2003 Annual Meeting Schedule

November 8-10, 2003
Vancouver, BC
Hyatt Regency and Fairmont Hotels

Saturday, November 8, 2003 ****Registration & Psychonomic talks are in the HYATT****

8:00 – 5:25 *Psychonomics* Judgment & Decision Making Sessions (Hyatt: Georgia)

5:00 – 6:00 pm Early Registration (outside of *Psychonomics*, Hyatt: Georgia)

5:30 – 7:00 pm **Graduate Student Social Event** (Hyatt: Mosaic Bar & Grille, 2nd floor)

7:00 – 9:00 pm Board Meeting (Meet in Hyatt hotel lobby at 6:45 p.m.)

Sunday, November 9, 2003 ****All SJDM is in FAIRMONT; Psychonomics is in HYATT****

7:30 - 11:00 Registration (Fairmont, outside meeting rooms)

7:30 - 9:00 Continental Breakfast

8:00 – 9:55 *Psychonomics* Risky Decision Session (Hyatt: Georgia)

8:00 - 9:20 Paper Session 1A (Saturna), 1B (Waddington), 1C (Vancouver Island) (Fairmont)

9:25 – 10:45 Paper Session 2A (Saturna), 2B (Waddington), 2C (Vancouver Island) (Fairmont)

10:15 – 11:45 *Psychonomics* Context & Feedback Decision Making Session (Hyatt: Georgia)

10:45-11:00 Coffee Break

11:00–12:20 Paper Session 3A (Saturna), 3B (Waddington), 3C (Vancouver Island) (Fairmont)

12:21–1:29 pm. Lunch on your own

1:30 – 2:30 Invited Address by **Daniel Kahneman** (Fairmont: Saturna Island)

“Tying it all together: Rules of accessibility and a two-systems view”

2:40 – 4:10 Poster Session 1 with snacks (Fairmont: Pacific Ballroom)

4:20 – 5:40 Paper Session 4A (Saturna), 4B (Waddington), 4C (Vancouver Island) (Fairmont)

5:50 – 7:20 Poster Session 2 with Cash Bar (Fairmont: Pacific Ballroom)

9:00 – 2:00 **SJDM PARTY at FLUID** 1066 West Hastings Street 604-683-5843

Monday, November 10, 2003 ****NOTE: All sessions in the HYATT****

7:30 - 9:00 Continental Breakfast

8:00 – 8:45 Business Meeting (Hyatt: Regency C)

8:50 – 10:10 Paper Session 5A (Regency A), 5B (Regency B), 5C (Regency E) (Hyatt)

10:10 – 10:25 Coffee Break (outside Regency rooms in Hyatt)

10:30-11:50 Paper Session 6A (Regency A), 6B (Regency B), 6C (Regency E) (Hyatt)

12:00 - 1:30 Luncheon (Hyatt: Regency C)

Presidential Address by Josh Klayman

Student Poster Award presented by JD Jasper

Detailed Schedule

Sunday, 8:00-9:20

1A Overconfidence and Self-Deception

Fairmont – Saturna, 1st Floor

Overconfidence in the NFL Draft	Massey, B. Cade (Duke U); Thaler, Richard H. (U of Chicago)
A question of considerable interest to JDM researchers is whether biases persist when stakes are high and “professionals” make the judgments and decisions. To investigate this question, we analyze the decision making of National Football League teams during their annual player draft. We conjecture that teams overvalue picking early in the draft because of two biases: they are overconfident in their ability to predict the future performance of players, and they overestimate the likelihood other teams hold similar judgments, i.e., the false-consensus effect. Using 25 years of draft-day trades and on-field performance, we find that the evidence supports our conjecture.	
Cues and Processes Underlying Confidence in General Knowledge	Sieck, Winston R. (Klein Associates); Yates, J. Frank (U of Michigan)
Three experiments that address the following fundamental questions about confidence judgment are presented: (1) What cues form the basis for confidence in general knowledge? And (2) what are the cognitive processes that drive choice and confidence responses in the general knowledge task? Critical manipulations in the experiments included reasons generation, priming, and intensive demands to recall relevant domain knowledge. Behavioral and process tracing results from the three experiments provided evidence for a two-stage process wherein a preliminary choice stage is driven largely by familiarity, and an ensuing evaluation stage is determined mainly by accessibility and arguments for the preliminary choice.	
Motivated Recall of Decision Criteria	Dawson, Erica (Yale U); Gilovich, Thomas (Cornell U); Regan, Dennis (Cornell U)
People tend to apply a lower standard to evidence that appears to support cherished beliefs than to evidence that appears to contradict them. In so doing, people are often able to believe what they wish to believe. At the same time, people tend to believe themselves unbiased. Possibly, they are simply unaware that they apply different standards to different problems. This paper explores people's recollections of past reasoning about motivationally relevant problems. We find that people tend to misremember the degree to which they approach differently valenced issues in a consistent manner, supporting their view of themselves as unbiased.	
Weather to go to college	Simonsohn, Uri (U of Pennsylvania)
This paper studies the impact of weather during the visit of undergraduate applicants on their subsequent decision to enroll. It is found that sunny weather decreases the likelihood that students will choose to enroll in the visited school. An explanation for such an effect based on cognitive priming is proposed and receives supports from an experiment where weather is shown to prime academics. Further support for the explanation is obtained from the analysis of college admissions decisions made by admissions officials who on sunny days weight non-academic characteristics of applicants more heavily than on cloudy days.	

1B Financial Decision Making

Fairmont – Waddington, Conference Level

Testing a Behavioral Theory of Risk and Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry	Carp, Sari (NYU/Stern)
Traditionally, behavioral finance theories have been tested experimentally, if at all. Conventional financial models are usually evaluated empirically, but contain no behavioral elements. My research bridges this gap. I develop a theory of investor risk taking based on prospect theory and on March and Shapira's (1992) reference point model, then test the theory on pricing data from over 8000 U.S. and offshore mutual funds. My results strongly support the hypothesis that managers underperforming relative to reference points take increasing risks in an attempt to attain their targets, while managers meeting or exceeding their targets limit risk to maintain superior performance.	
The Impact of Framing on Spending and Saving: Why People Don't Spend Tax Rebates	Epley, Nicholas (Harvard U); Chen Idson, Lorraine (Harvard U); Mak, Dennis (Harvard U)
Money contributes a clearly specified amount to objective wealth, but may contribute varying amounts to subjective wealth. We argue that monetary consumption is partly based on the subjective experience of wealth, and investigate how financial spending is influenced by the description of financial windfalls. Two studies demonstrate that people's recall of spending as well as their actual spending was higher when income was described as a “bonus” than when it was described as a “rebate.” These findings have important implications for psychology and economics, and explain why people are more inclined to save tax rebates than to spend them.	
Promotion and Prevention across Mental Accounts: When Financial Products Dictate Consumers' Investment Goals	Zhou, Rongrong (HKUST); Pham, Michel Tuan (Columbia U)
We propose that consumers' investment decisions involve promotion and prevention self-regulation processes that are managed across separate mental accounts, with different financial products seen as representative of promotion versus prevention. Consistent with this general hypothesis, four experiments show that (a) investors are differentially sensitive to potential gains versus losses across financial products; (b) investors are differentially risk-seeking with money mentally associated with different financial accounts; (c) the mere evaluation of different financial products is enough to trigger distinct promotion versus prevention orientations; and (d) the priming of promotion versus prevention steers consumers' decisions toward financial products consistent with these orientations.	

Cumulative Prospect Theory and Non-linear Probability Weighting in Individual Asset Allocation	Davies, Greg B (U of Cambridge); Satchell, Stephen E. (U of Cambridge)
Implements a continuous version of Cumulative Prospect Theory, including non-linear probability weighting (Tversky and Kahneman 1992), into a model of individual asset allocation. We extend Prelec's probability weighting function (1998) to continuous distributions and derive the formulae for optimal asset allocation between risky and safe assets. UK and US equity returns data are used to examine the feasible parameter space. Earlier results for asset allocation with loss aversion are confirmed (Hwang and Satchell 2003); our non-linear model is compatible with observed equity proportions. The parameters are highly interconnected, but feasible combinations indicate that risk taking increases with probability weighting non-linearity.	

1C Memory and Cognitive Resources

Fairmont – Vancouver Island, Conference Level

Why Live Is Better than Taped: A Preference for Authenticity in Consumption	Werthebroch, Klaus (INSEAD); Vosgerau, Joachim (INSEAD); Carmon, Ziv (INSEAD)
We propose that people prefer watching events 'live' rather than 'taped' even when obvious factors such as whether or not they know the outcome ahead of time are controlled for, and that this is an instance of a more general phenomenon-- a preference for authenticity or "realness" in consumption. In three studies we document the preference for 'live' over taped, provide evidence that it is due authenticity, and control for other potential causes-- curiosity or suspense, impatience (i.e., time discounting), sharing the experience with others, and illusion of control.	
Does forgetting serve an adaptive function in memory based inference?	Schooler, Lael J. (Max Planck Inst for Human Development); Hertwig, Ralph (Max Planck Inst for Human Development)
Bjork & Bjork (1996) argue that forgetting serves adaptive functions, such as filtering out obsolete information. Here we suggest that forgetting may maintain the non-random ignorance critical to the recognition heuristic (RH) (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). First, we implement the RH in the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), and examine the conditions under which forgetting fosters the RH's inference performance. Second, we implement a fluency based inference mechanism in ACT-R, which is more sensitive than the RH to the relative accessibility of stored memories. The performance advantage of the fluency-based decisions varies widely, depending on the comparison set.	
Decision Fatigue: Making Choices Consumes a Limited Resource	Baumeister, Roy F. (Florida State U); Vohs, Kathleen D. (U of British Columbia)
The basic idea underlying this presentation is that making decisions and choices is an effortful activity that depletes a limited resource. Choosing is thus strenuous and exhausting. The same energy resource is used for both self-control and decision-making, probably because the self evolved to deal with both types of demand. Several laboratory experiments and one shopping-mall field study show that making one big choice or several little choices produces a "depleted" state in which self-control is impaired. Conversely, initial acts of self-control deplete this resource, making people more passive in their decision-making.	
Dynamics of Exploration and Exploitation in Strategic Interactions: A Function of Memory Size on Adaptive Learning in Repeated Zero-sum Games.	Takezawa, Masanori (Max Planck Inst for Human Development); Ohtsubo, Yohsuke (Nara U)
The purpose of this study is, through developing an adaptive learning model in repeated zero-sum games, to examine how memory size is related to an ability of exploration and exploitation of opponent's behaviors in strategic interactions. Ohtsubo (2002) found a dynamics of exploration of patterns in opponent's behaviors and exploitation of such patterns in repeated zero-sum games. We extended this finding and constructed adaptive learning model. Through a series of simulations and experiments, we show that memory size (or, decay) plays a crucial role in adaptive learning for exploring and exploiting an opponents' behaviors.	

Sunday 9:25-10:45

2A. Symposium in Honor of Janet Snizek

Fairmont – Saturna Island, 1st Floor

Budescu, David (U of Illinois)

Janet Snizek, a long time member of the Society of Judgment and Decision Making and a regular participant at its annual meetings, has passed away this summer. Janet has made numerous important contributions to the field in the areas of judgment accuracy, over-confidence, group and organizational decision making, and advice giving and taking in judge-advisory systems. The symposium will start with a brief review of Janet's career and her contributions to the field that will be followed by four papers presented by former students and colleagues. The papers are either recent collaborative research with Janet, or follow up on previous collaborations with her. The presentations will highlight the breadth of her interests and contributions to the field of human judgment and decision-making.

Constituent papers:

1. *Bias in the Courtroom: Do Jurors Always Trust Confident Eyewitnesses?* Zenith, Paul (Saint Mary's College of California); Cogan, Jennifer (New York U) Presenter: Zarnoth, Paul (Saint Mary's College of California)
Abundant evidence exists that jurors conflate eyewitness confidence and eyewitness accuracy. This suggests that verdicts are more influenced by confident eyewitnesses than by less certain witnesses. Research by Zarnoth and Snizek (1997), however, suggests that there

is not a positive, linear relationship between source confidence and information utilization. Instead, people appear to discount information from a source if the perceived discrepancy between confidence and information quality is large enough to imply the presence of a bias. Applying this research to the realm of eyewitness testimony, we can now identify situations in which jurors are not more persuaded by confident eyewitnesses.

2. *Antecedents and consequences of unsolicited versus explicitly solicited advice* Mitchell Gibbons, Alyssa (U of Illinois); Snizek, Janet (U of Illinois); Dalal, Reeshad (U of Illinois) Presenter: Mitchell Gibbons, Alyssa (U of Illinois)

The social dynamic between decision-makers ("Judges") and their advisors is investigated by focusing on two extreme cases: (1) Judges can solicit advice but Advisors cannot volunteer unsolicited advice ("explicitly solicited advice" condition), or (2) vice versa ("unsolicited advice" condition). Judge-Advisor dyads answered twenty moderately difficult two-alternative items. On any item, an advising interaction could occur between initial and final responses. This study examines the antecedents and frequency of occurrence of unsolicited and explicitly solicited advising interactions, and the extent to which these types of advice influence advice utilization, final decision quality and confidence, and satisfaction with the advising process.

3. *The preference for advisors with unshared information* Van Swol, Lyn (Northwestern U); Ludutsky, Cara (Northwestern U) Presenter: Van Swol, Lyn (Northwestern U)

Unstructured groups discuss shared information known to all members before discussion more than unshared information. This study examined information exchange in a group structured as a Judge-Advisor System (JAS) with 1 member designated as the decision-maker (DM) and the other 2 members as advisors. The JAS structure was hypothesized to eliminate the preference for shared information. One advisor shared 100% of their information with the DM, while the second advisor shared only 50%. The DM solicited more information from the advisor with more unshared information and rated this advisor's information as more important and influential.

4. *Studying effects of cue repetition using a dynamic computational model of cue weighting* Chernyshenko, Oleksandr (U of Canterbury); Stark, Stephen (U of South Florida); Miner, Andrew (Target Corporation) Presenter: Chernyshenko, Oleksandr (U of Canterbury)

The authors present different computational modeling studies using a Differential Cue Weighting model (DCWM: Chernyshenko, Miner, Bowman, and Snizek, 2003) that combines the information sampling and cue weighting approaches (Stasser, 1988; Gigone & Hastie, 1996) models of group decision-making. They demonstrate how a static, deterministic model can be converted to a dynamic, probabilistic model "in silica." They also extend previous research by simulating the influence of five cue repetition models on individual and group judgment. In doing so, they demonstrate how computational models can allow researchers to explore the influence of models that are not accessible in empirical data.

2B Ethical Behavior and Trust Fairmont – Waddington, Conference Level

To Trust or Not to Trust: Monitoring in Interdependent Relationships	Schweitzer, Maurice E. (U. of Pennsylvania); Ho, Teck, H. (U. of California, Berkeley)
We conceptualize monitoring as a substitute for trust, and investigate the relationship between monitoring and trust-like behavior in a laboratory experiment. We anonymously paired participants (n=210) for 15 rounds of trust game decisions with monetary incentives. Across dyads, we manipulated the nature and frequency of monitoring. We fit logit models to participants' decisions, and identify systematic relationships between monitoring schemes and behavior. Anticipated monitoring significantly increases trust-like behavior for specific anticipated monitoring rounds, but decreases trust-like behavior overall. We also find that many participants systematically misplace their trust. We discuss implication of these results for both trust models and managers.	
Experimental Evidence on Behavioral and Distributive Preferences	Croson, Rachel (Wharton, UPenn); Konow, James (Loyola Marymount)
We use a two-stage dictator game to provide experimental evidence on norms, both those invoked by interested and by disinterested parties. We examine both the extent to which these norms are reciprocal (sensitive to previous actions of the second-stage recipient), interested (vary based on the self-interest of the second-stage sender) and examine the interaction between these two effects.	
Ambiguous Probabilities and Self-serving Biases of Fairness	Haisley, Emily (Carnegie Mellon U); Weber, Roberto (Carnegie Mellon U)
Three studies seek to elucidate the relationship between ambiguity and self-serving biases of fairness. (1) Subjects play a binary choice dictator game modified to incorporate risk (i.e., subjects allocate lottery pay-offs). Monetary predictions are distorted in a self-serving manner to a greater extent when decisions involve ambiguous lotteries compared to unambiguous lotteries. (2) After making an allocation decision subjects choose to have the allocation settled by either ambiguous or unambiguous lotteries. Increased ambiguity seeking was observed when preceded by less equitable allocations. (3) In contextualized decisions, more self-interested decisions were made in an ambiguous context than in an unambiguous context.	
Exploiting Moral Wriggle Room: Altruism Inconsistent with Fair Outcome Preference	Dana, Jason (Carnegie Mellon U); Weber, Roberto (Carnegie Mellon U); Kuang, Jason Xi (U of Pittsburgh)

Economic models typically assume that altruism reflects a preference for equitable outcomes. We challenge this notion by showing that intervening choices, such as whether to acquire information, adversely affect altruism. In an allocation task, a shift from generosity to selfishness occurred when a receiver's payoffs were hidden from a sender who could reveal them costlessly. In a strategic context, a majority of players "diffused responsibility" by taking a self-interested action rather than an equity-ensuring one when this alone did not ensure inequity. Ambiguous giving situations allow the "moral wriggle room" to be self-interested without believing that this directly harms another

2C Individual Differences: Gender and Culture**Fairmont – Vancouver Island, Conference Level**

Trust and Gender: An Examination of Behavior, Biases, and Beliefs in the Investment Game	Buchan, Nancy R. (U of Wisconsin - Madison); Croson, Rachel T.A. (U of Pennsylvania); Solnick, Sara J. (U of Vermont)
We study the influence of gender on trust, being trusted, and trustworthiness. We do so behaviorally (by looking at individual behavior in an experimental game) and attitudinally (by examining individual perceptions and beliefs). Behaviorally, we find that men trust more than women, but that women are more trustworthy than men. Attitudinally, we show these effects are mediated by attitudes. Men viewed the situation cooperatively rather than competitively, prompting them to send significantly higher amounts; cooperative attitudes partially mediate trust behavior. Women felt they were more actively pursuing their partners' interests than their own; this pursuit completely mediates trustworthiness.	
Gender and the initiation of negotiations in ambiguous situations	Small, Deborah A. (Carnegie Mellon U); Babcock, Linda (Carnegie Mellon U); Michele J. Gelfand (U of Maryland); Hillary Gettman (U of Maryland)
Unlike typical negotiation experiments, we investigate when people initiate negotiations without overt prescription to negotiate. In a novel paradigm, subjects played a board game and were subsequently offered the lowest compensation possible by the experimenter. Across 3 studies, women asked the experimenter for greater compensation much less often than men. Situational ambiguity also affected initiation of negotiation- stronger cues about the negotiability of payment increased rates of asking. Finally, cues to "ask" compared to cues to "negotiate" increased asking more for women than for men, suggesting the gendered connotation of the term "negotiation".	
The Symptoms of Resource Scarcity: Judgments of Food and Finances Impact Partner Preferences	Nelson, Leif D. (New York U); Morrison, Evan L. (Stanford U)
Even in vastly different cultures, males typically seek the same features in a female partner, but show systematic variation in preferences for ideal female body weight. Across geography and time, in wealthy cultures, men seek a thinner ideal than do men in poor cultures. We explore the individual level emergence of the relationship between resource availability and partner preferences—that is, within a single culture, situational fluctuations in personal feelings of resource availability predict individual preferences. Consistent with Schwarz's feelings as information hypothesis, when situational manipulations make men feel financially or calorically unsatisfied, they tend to prefer heavier women.	
Positive vs. Negative Emphasis: Cultural Variations in Effort Decisions	Chua, Hannah Faye (U of Michigan); Yates, J. Frank (U of Michigan); Oe, Tomoko (U of Tokyo); Yamaguchi, Susumu (U of Tokyo)
Higgins's (1997) regulatory focus theory has brought attention to individual differences in the relative emphases that decision makers sometimes put on potential positive vs. negative outcomes of their options. The studies described in this talk examined cultural variations in such emphases, in the context of academic effort decisions. Consistent with expectations, results implied less emphasis on positive outcomes in the Philippines and Japan than in the United States. For instance, Filipino and Japanese participants indicated significantly less experience than American participants with appeals to the promise of positive outcomes, and they anticipated making fewer such appeals in the future themselves.	

Sunday 11:00-12:20**3A Prospect Theory and Reference Points****Fairmont – Saturna Island, 1st Floor**

Inside the Minds of Buyers and Sellers: Mental Construals in the Endowment Effect	Mishra, Himanshu (U of Iowa); Nayakankuppam, Dhananjay (U of Iowa)
Prior research has suggested that the endowment effect results from a focus on the foregone. We extend prior research and hypothesize that the endowment effect results from differing mental construals of the object in the minds of buyers and sellers. Study One provides process measures suggesting buyers and sellers have differential access to valenced features of the object. Study Two utilizes response latencies to provide further evidence of systematic errors and biases in the mental representations of buyers and sellers. Study Three demonstrates that affective explanations are also mediated through the mental construals suggested in our conceptualization.	
Anchoring Effects on the Willingness-to-Pay and Willingness-to-Accept	Simonson, Itamar (Stanford); Drolet, Aimee (UCLA)
We contrast the determinants of willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) judgments and investigate their susceptibility to influence by arbitrary anchors. In a series of studies, we show that purchase prices are more susceptible to influence by arbitrary anchors. However, when sellers are uncertain whether they wish to trade the item, they too become susceptible to an anchoring effect. Furthermore,	

sellers are influenced by arbitrary anchors that affect the perceived market price. The implications of these findings for our understanding of anchoring and the endowment effect are discussed.	
Reservation price changes with underlying fixed utility	Silva, Jose (U.C. Berkeley); Ariely, Dan (M.I.T.)
We show that a consumer with fixed utility may nevertheless have reservation prices for a target object that change as a function of irrelevant primes. We show that the similarity and relative utility of a given prime moderate the effect of the priming price: Priming objects that are preferred to the target object lead to lower reservation prices than when the priming is done with objects to which the target object is preferred. The effect of preference is moderated by similarity between the priming and the target object. The implications of the theory are validated with a series of experiments.	
Loss Aversion and Predictions of Utility	McGraw, A. Peter (Princeton U); Kahneman, Daniel (Princeton U); Schkade, David (U of Texas); Schoppe, Kurt (Princeton U)
Schkade and Kahneman (2002) raised the possibility of boundary conditions for loss aversion. Here we investigate the possibility that a response artifact caused our failure to observe loss aversion. Rather than using a rating scale, respondents matched the force exerted on a handgrip dynamometer to the intensity of their anticipated experience. Study 1 examines how changes due to a relocation influence changes to well-being. Study 2 examines the intensity of people's feelings about monetary gains and losses. In both studies loss aversion is evident in predictions of utility; respondents exerted more force for negative events than for equivalent positive events.	

3B Uncertainty 1 Fairmont – Waddington, Conference Level

The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest	Cain, Daylian (CMU-GSIA); Moore, Don (CMU-GSIA); Loewenstein, George (CMU-SDS)
Conflicts of interest can lead experts to give biased and corrupt advice. Although disclosure has been proposed as a potential solution to this, we show that disclosure can have perverse effects, and might even increase bias. Disclosure may increase bias because it leads advisors to feel morally licensed and strategically encouraged to exaggerate their advice even further from the truth. Proper use of the disclosure depends on understanding how that which is disclosed, as well as the disclosure itself, might bias advice. Because people lack this understanding, disclosure can fail to solve the problems created by conflicts of interest.	
Giving the Benefit of the Doubt	Heyman, James (U of California - Berkeley); Mellers, Barbara (U of California - Berkeley)
This research focuses on how people decide whether to give the benefit of the doubt when the evidence results in a dead heat. We address this question with a series of experiments that differ in cognitive complexity: attention, memory, and reasoning. Using Signal Detection Theory to disentangle task difficulty and decision maker response bias, we find that, in some tasks, people can vary their tendency to give the benefit of the doubt based on task difficulty. We argue that individuals use a difficulty-sensitive decision heuristic to set their response thresholds	
Beyond a reasonable doubt	Dhami, Mandeep K. (U of Victoria)
Verdicts in criminal trials are based on a standard of proof: whether the jury is the convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the defendant is guilty as charged. We examined the validity of four measurement techniques -- self-report on probability scale method, parallel ranking method, decision theory-based method, and membership function method -- in predicting mock jurors' pre-deliberation verdicts and confidence in their verdicts for real criminal cases. We also examined the effect of case factors (typicality of defendant and severity of sentence) and judges' instructions (linguistic versus numerical) on juror's interpretations of beyond reasonable doubt.	
The Retrospective Gambler's Fallacy	Oppenheimer, Daniel M. (Stanford U); Monin, Benoit (Stanford U)
The gambler's fallacy traditionally describes a bias to make inferences about future random events based on the outcome of previous random events. In this study we demonstrate an inverse gambler's fallacy; that individuals also make inferences about unknown past/historical events based upon knowledge of what random outcomes have occurred since. Further, we show that these inferences have a biasing effect on memory.	

3C Anger and Empathy Fairmont – Vancouver Island, Conference Level

Green, Mean and Mistrusting: The Influence of Envy on Trust and Trustworthiness	Dunn, Jennifer R. (U of Pennsylvania); Schweitzer, Maurice E. (U of Pennsylvania)
In this paper, we explore the effects of envy on trust and trustworthiness. Although prior trust models predict that a trustee's positive traits will increase trust in him or her, we show that this relationship depends on the relative standing of the trustor with respect to these traits. Specifically, when the trustor desires but lacks the positive traits of the trustee, envy will reduce trust - even when the traits that cause envy should, normatively, increase trust. We demonstrate that envy reduces trust in both competitive and non-competitive contexts. We test coping strategies as mediators of this relationship.	
Mad, Mean, and Mistaken: The Effects of Anger on Perceptions and First Offers in Negotiations	Gonzalez, Roxana M. (Carnegie Mellon U); Lerner, Jennifer S. (Carnegie Mellon U); Moore, Don A. (Carnegie Mellon U)
Social conflict can inspire powerful emotions, but the consequences of these emotions are poorly understood in negotiations. After participants received either egregiously negative or neutral personal feedback, participants prepared to negotiate with the person whom they believed had critiqued them (Study 1) or with a new person (Study 2). In both studies, anger caused by the harsh criticism led participants to	

make significantly more demanding initial offers, increased their motivations to "beat" the other side, and increased mistakes in identifying their own interests. Results highlight anger's role in impairing the accuracy of social perception in negotiations.

On Feeling Angry and Self Assured

Lerner, Jennifer S. (Carnegie Mellon U); Gonzalez, Roxana M. (Carnegie Mellon U)

Relative to incidental fear, incidental anger elicited in one situation has been shown to globally increase unrealistically self assured judgments in other, unrelated situations. Four studies addressed the thorny questions of when, and under what conditions, debiasing techniques can eliminate this emotional carry over. Each of three techniques significantly moderated the carry-over, two attenuating it, one ironically amplifying the anger-self-assurance effect, but none eliminating it. Discussion identifies implications for theories of emotion and judgment, including the fact that moderators operate differently for different emotions. Discussion also speculates about the everyday costs and benefits of being angry and self assured.

The "identified victim" effect: Caring about individuals and groups

Kogut, Tehila (Hebrew U); Ritov, Ilana (Hebrew U)

People's greater willingness to help an identified relative to an unidentified victim was examined by varying the singularity of the victim (single vs. a group of eight individuals), and the availability of individually identifying information (the main difference being the inclusion of a picture in the "identified" versions). Results of several experiments, both hypothetical and with real monetary contributions, support the hypothesis that the "identified victim" effect is largely confined to single individuals: the identified single victim elicited considerably more contributions than the non-identified single victim, while the effect of identification of the group members was small or non-existent.

Sunday 4:20-5:40

4A Affect

Fairmont – Saturna Island, 1st Floor

The Affect Heuristic and the Attractiveness of Simple Gambles

Bateman, Ian (U of East Anglia, UK); Peters, Ellen (Decision Research); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research); Starmer, Christopher (U of Nottingham, UK)

Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2002) invoked the affect heuristic and Hsee's concept of evaluability to explain why playing the gamble 7/36 win \$9; 29/36 lose 5¢ is much more attractive than playing the gamble 7/36 win \$9; 29/36 win \$0). The present paper reports an extensive series of studies that test this explanation. The results clearly demonstrate the importance of contextual factors in determining affect and preference. They show that the meaning, utility, and weighting of even a very familiar monetary outcome is not fixed, but depends greatly upon these contextual factors.

Deciphering Descartes's Error - Experimental Tests of the Somatic Marker Hypothesis

Leland, Jonathan (IBM TJ Watson Research); Grafman, Jordan (NINDS)

Damasio's (1994) Somatic Marker hypothesis posits that emotion-generated mental markers influence our decisions and curb inherent tendencies to be risk seeking, impatient and callous in social situations. Ventromedial (VM) prefrontal cortex damage interferes with this marking process, resulting in risk seeking behavior, impatience and socially inappropriate behavior. We present 27 normal controls and 17 patients with prefrontal cortex lesions with questions probing their attitudes toward risk, intertemporal preferences and behavior in social contexts. We find no differences between subject groups on any of these dimensions. We discuss why VM damage in humans influences decisions in certain circumstances but not others.

Evaluation of public goods: Coherence, categories, and context

Ritov, Ilana (Hebrew U); Baron, Jonathan (U of Pennsylvania)

Context effects in evaluation of public goods, whereby one good is ranked higher than a second good in isolated evaluation and lower than the same good in simultaneous judgment, have been explained by assuming that the isolated evaluation is largely determined by immediate emotional response. In the present research we explore the role of emotion in joint evaluation of public policies. Our findings suggest that comparative evaluation is different from an isolated one in two respects: emotions themselves are modified by the context, but at the same time, their role in shaping the judgment outcome is also diminished.

Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemo-Dialysis: A Study Using Ecological Momentary Assessment

Riis, Jason (Princeton U); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon U); Baron, Jonathan (U of Pennsylvania); Jepson, Christopher (U of Pennsylvania); Fagerlin, Angela (U of Michigan and Veterans Affairs Medical Center,); Peter A. Ubel, U of Michigan and Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Ann Arbor, Michigan

Using an Ecological Momentary Assessment measure of mood we reveal two causes of the robust finding that healthy people underestimate the self-reported well-being of seriously ill or disabled people. First, hemo-dialysis patients were as happy as healthy non-patients, suggesting that they have adapted to their condition. Healthy controls failed to anticipate this adaptation. Second, when estimating their mood for a typical week, patients tended to overestimate and controls tended to underestimate. Such a difference in the manner in which patients and healthy people make overall or summary reports of well-being may also account for some of the discrepancy.

4B Uncertainty 2 Fairmont – Waddington, Conference Level

Estimates, Preferences and Preference Change: Biasing, Debiasing, and Seeding Effects in Thinking About Base Rates

Lurie, Nicholas (U of North Carolina at Chapel Hill); Ranney, Michael A. (U of California at Berkeley)

<p>In this paper we examine the effects of frequency estimates on the allocation of charitable contributions to health care research on various leading causes of death. We present results from two studies that show that mortality estimates can have biasing and debiasing effects on consumer preferences and that preferences can also bias estimates. Making estimates before decisions can also inhibit preference change following the receipt of true mortality data. Providing information seeds about the frequency of other diseases can moderate these effects by improving the accuracy of estimates.</p>	
Unpacking Implicit Probability Judgment	Sloman, Steven (Brown U); Rottenstreich, Yuval (U of Chicago Graduate School of Business); Wisniewski, Edward (U of North Carolina at Greensboro); Hadjichristidis, Constantinos (U of Plymouth); Fox, Craig R. (U of California, Los Angeles)
<p>Support theory predicts that unpacking a category (e.g., seven-letter words beginning with a consonant) into a disjunction of constituents (e.g., z, q, or some other seven-letter word beginning with a consonant) generally increases judged probabilities, a pattern known as "implicit subadditivity." We contrast this hypothesis with the conjecture that category descriptions are interpreted narrowly, in terms of typical constituents, which predicts that one should often observe the opposite pattern. We varied the typicality of unpacked constituents and found no effect of unpacking with typical instances (additivity) and a negative effect of atypical unpackings (superadditivity), contrary to support theory.</p>	
Handedness Differences in Anchoring Effects	Jasper, J.D. (U of Toledo); Christman, Stephen (U of Toledo)
<p>Research has shown that strength of handedness predicts who is and is not susceptible to attribute framing effects (Jasper & Christman, 2002). The present study extends this line of work to decision anchoring effects. Participants responded to 12 real-world knowledge questions. For half of the questions, subjects were provided with low anchors; for the other half, subjects were given high anchors. Results indicated that "mixed-" and "strong-handers" showed different anchoring effects. A belief-updating theory centered around the notion of hemispheric specialization and the communication between the two halves of the brain is used to account for these data.</p>	
The long and short of it: Anchoring and adjustment with physical quantities	LeBoeuf, Robyn A. (U of Florida); Shafir, Eldar (Princeton U)
<p>In line with previous research on anchoring and numerical estimates, we show that non-numerical anchors can bias estimates of (non-numerical) physical quantities. Physical anchors systematically influenced attempts to match the magnitude of a physical stimulus to the magnitude of a target stimulus. Whether estimating weight, loudness, or length, participants who attempted to match the target (e.g., a previously-encountered sound) by increasing the magnitude of a low anchor (e.g., a quiet sound) produced lower estimates than did those who matched by decreasing the magnitude of a high anchor (e.g., a loud sound). Implications for theory and practice are considered.</p>	

4C A New Look At Constructed Preferences (Symposium) Fairmont – Vancouver Island, Conference Level

Novemsky, Nathan (Yale U)

Constituent papers:

- The psychology of matching and the prominence effect* Frederick, Shane (MIT); Shafir, Eldar (Princeton U), Presenter: Frederick, Shane (MIT)

In this paper, we dissect the prominence effect by examining: (1) different strategies respondents use to solve matching tasks (including difference matching, ratio matching, and adjustment), and (2) the degree to which choice proportions are responsive to the magnitude of attribute differences (the implied degree of "lexicographicness"). While many strategy-task combinations lead to patterns that are consistent with the prominence effect, many others imply opposite effects (i.e. the imputed weight of more important attribute is greater in the matching task than the choice task). We also explore the meanings of self-explicated "importance" ratings.
- The effect of subjective experiences during decision-making on choice* Novemsky, Nathan (Yale U); Dhar, Ravi (Yale U); Simonson, Itamar (Stanford U); Schwarz, Norbert (U of Michigan) Presenter: Novemsky, Nathan (Yale U)

Attitude construction research and preference construction research have had little influence on each other despite many parallels between the two fields. We apply the feelings-as-information framework from the attitude literature to preference context effects. We find that giving respondents a subjective feeling of difficulty during the decision-making process enhances the compromise effect and the no-choice effect, but attenuates the attraction effect. This reveals some important differences in the processes underlying these effects. Compromise and no-choice effects seem to be the result of a deliberate strategy, while the attraction effect seems to be a more perceptual effect that happens outside of awareness.
- A theory of context- and counterfactual-sensitive valuation* Kamenica, Emir (Harvard U); Prelec, Drazen (MIT) Presenter: Prelec, Drazen (MIT)

We present a model of context-sensitive choice, with emphasis on situations where a single alternative generates a counterfactual context. The treatment of counterfactuals is adapted from Norm theory, and formalized via a counterfactual function that maps alternatives into counterfactual context sets. A value function then evaluates the alternative relative to its induced context. The model provides a unified explanation of several behavioral anomalies that are usually treated as separate: between-within design preference reversals, classic \$-bet vs. P-bet preference reversals, insensitivity to scale and scope, and coherent arbitrariness of valuation. We estimate and compare the size of the context effects across these cases.

4. Mis-prediction and mis-choice due to joint-separate evaluation inconsistency Hsee, Christopher K. (U of Chicago); Zhang, Joe (U of Chicago) Presenter: Hsee, Christopher K. (U of Chicago)

When people choose between alternatives, they are in joint evaluation (JE) of these options. But after an option is chosen, people who experience it are usually in separate (single) evaluation (SE) of that option. The difference in JE and SE may make choosers' utility functions differ from experiencers'. Our data suggest that choosers' utility function is generally steeper except around the reference point. Consequently, choosers may overpredict the impact of some values and underpredict the impact of others, and may choose an option that fails to deliver the best experience. This work has potential implications for decision/experienced-utility and affective forecasting.

Monday 8:50-10:10

5A Decision Strategies Hyatt – Regency A

Decisions By Rules: Disassociation Between Preferences And Willingness To Act	Amir, On (Yale); Ariely, Dan (MIT)
We investigate a general decision making mechanism, whereby individuals consider not only their preferences, but also moral-like rules as guiding principals for their behavior. We suggest that these rules are used whenever they are cognitively available, and thus may lead people to choose alternatives that do not fit their preferences, resulting in lesser happiness. A series of experiments demonstrates that people follow such rules, even when disassociated from their preferences; that people use the rules simply because they are invoked; and that invocation can result from external situational cues. These findings may explain some systematic inconsistencies in consumers' behavior.	
Escaping the tyrannies of choice	Fasolo, Barbara (Max Planck Inst of Human Development); McClelland, Gary H. (U of Colorado at Boulder); Todd, Peter M. (Max Planck Inst of Human Development)
Can the tyranny of too much choice be escaped by providing fewer rather than more attributes for the options available? By means of simulations and analysis of real-world choice problems we show that one attribute is enough to select a reasonable option within 90% of the highest value possible so long as the choice environment permits, namely so long as interattribute correlations are positive and attributes are subjectively unequally important. Tyranny persists just in cases where attributes are equally important and negatively related (hence trade-offs are needed). Implications for future experimental studies and applications are discussed.	
How do People Select Strategies in Decision Making	Rieskamp, Joerg (Max Planck Inst for Human Development); Otto, Philipp E. (U of Warwick)
If people possess a repertoire of strategies for the judgment and decision problems they face, it needs to be specified how appropriate strategies are selected. We propose a theory that predicts a strategy selection process based on learning. In three studies people improved their inferences substantially through learning. In all studies the strategy that performs best in solving the inference problem was best to predict participants' inferences after sufficient experience. A simple learning model predicts that individuals form expectancies for the strategies they possess and update these expectancies based on experience. This learning model successfully predicts the observed learning process.	
"Sensemaking" in interviews	Dawes, Robyn M. (Carnegie Mellon U); Dana, Jason (Carnegie Mellon U)
Interviews leave one susceptible to "sensemaking" on a post hoc basis, leading to illusory validity. To test the importance of sensemaking, we had participants interview other students and predict their GPAs for a given semester, giving them as baseline information prior cumulative GPA. In half of these interviews, responses were pseudo-random half of the time, ensuring an inconsistent presentation. Judges were unperturbed, appearing more confident in their impressions in the random condition. Interviews were given strong implicit weight, despite telling judges that prior GPA itself made the best predictions. The resulting predictions were worse than those of unmodified prior GPA.	

5B Temporal Issues Hyatt – Regency B

Expediting versus Deferring Utility: The Effect of Temporal Perspective on Sensitivity to Prospective Duration	Zauberman, Gal (UNC Chapel-Hill); Malkoc, Selin (UNC Chapel-Hill)
This work examines individuals' timing preferences when experiencing events, and specifically, their sensitivity to time horizon (prospective duration) and temporal framing (deferring or expediting). Most importantly, we find that sensitivity to time horizon depends on the temporal frame: greater decline in discount rates when deferring than expediting. The results are robust to an elaboration manipulation, making the time horizon less salient, and using monetary and non-monetary outcomes. Moreover, differential time horizon sensitivity is independent of changes in utility and depends only on the temporal perspective.	
Comparative discounting: A new model of intertemporal choice	Read, Daniel (London School of Economics); Scholten, Marc (Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada)
Conventional models of time discounting hold that future outcomes are weighted by a discount factor that is independent of what is being discounted. Numerous studies have shown that this assumption is incorrect. We propose a comparative discounting model, which incorporates an outcome-dependent, sigmoid weighting function over perceived differences between delays (intervals). This model predicts	

most major findings, including the delay effect, sign effect, and magnitude effect, and predicts new results. The model is tested and supported in three experiments. Of particular interest is the finding that time discounting is superadditive for small perceived intervals and subadditive for larger ones.	
Testing the isolation-integration explanation of dynamic inconsistency	Barkan, Rachel (Ben-Gurion U); Busemeyer, Jerome (Indiana U)
Dynamic inconsistency demonstrates reversals between planned and actual choices. Experiencing anticipated gain leads to unpredicted risk aversion and experiencing anticipated loss leads to unpredicted risk seeking. One explanation suggests prior outcomes are isolated during planning and integrated when actual choices are made. Accordingly, framing that emphasize integration of prior outcomes should solve the inconsistency, and framing that emphasize isolation of prior outcomes should enhance the inconsistency. Contrary to this logic, the findings revealed that isolation decreased the inconsistency and integration increased the inconsistency. We suggest alternative explanations and test other ways to help decision makers predict their own preferences.	
Reconciling Impulsiveness with Self-Control: Explaining Differential Impatience toward Hedonic and Utilitarian Consumption	Urminsky, Oleg (Columbia U); Kivetz, Ran (Columbia U)
Intertemporal decisions often involve tradeoffs between costs and purchase timing. We demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, consumers are more impatient for hedonic (luxury) goods than utilitarian (necessity) goods. However, when making actual purchase decisions involving cost-timing tradeoffs, the effect is reversed and consumers are more willing to bear a cost for faster receipt of a utilitarian than hedonic good. We observe more pronounced reversal effects for consumers with high "luxury guilt", and argue that guilt gives rise to enhanced use of self-control when purchases are not easily justified. These effects are eliminated when costs can be justified or guilt is reduced.	

5C Regret Hyatt – Regency E

Are decision regret and outcome regret different?	Wright, Chris (City U, London); Ayton, Peter (City U, London); Djemal, Ceyda (City U, London)
Decision Justification Theory (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) proposes two components of regret: regret about decisions and regret about bad outcomes. Each of these two components supposedly varies independently of each other – with both contributing to overall feelings of regret. Three experiments explored whether the components are separate in people's minds. The results indicate that the components are distinct; increasing justifiability reduced rated decision regret but not rated outcome regret. However correlational analyses revealed that the two components are not independent concepts. Contrary to Decision Justification Theory, decision-regret and outcome-regret both correlated strongly with decision justifiability and with outcome seriousness.	
Inaction Conversion and Inaction Inertia: How regret can lead to more customers at worse prices	Anderson, Christopher J. (Temple U); Zeelenberg, Marcel (Tilburg U)
In an analogue to the inaction inertia effect, inaction conversion occurs when individuals are more likely to act on an offer after failing to act on another, worse, offer because they want to avoid regret. Thus, regret appears to lead to bias in that sellers can take advantage of emotions by offering initial sales that are less attractive than later sales and obtain more customers at an ultimately lower sale price.	
Coping with disappointing outcomes: Retroactive pessimism and the motivated suppression of counterfactual alternatives	Tykcinski, Orit (Ben Gurion U); Steinberg, Noa (Ben Gurion U)
Having failed to achieve a desired goal people may use the retroactive pessimism defense mechanism and decide that they never had a chance to succeed. To make this judgment one must inhibit counterfactual alternatives suggesting that success was actually highly likely. Facing a bitter disappointment the perceiver is motivated to block these upward counterfactuals, thus increasing the perceived inevitability of failure and finding solace in accepting inescapable fate. The hypothesized link between counterfactuals inhibition and retroactive pessimism was demonstrated in two experiments that included variables designed to promote both the availability of counterfactuals, and the psychological need to suppress them.	
(Nonexistent) Chemical Warfare in the Persian Gulf War: The Problem of Unbelieving False Positive Chemical Warfare Alarms	Brewer, Noel T (Rutgers U); Hallman, William K. (Rutgers U)
Medical tests can offer false information that may cause patients to pursue health problems consistent with the erroneous diagnosis. The present study examined whether the false-positive-prone chemical warfare alarms used in the Gulf War can explain the otherwise inexplicable medical problems reported by veterans. Interviews with 620 Gulf War veterans showed that chemical alarms were related to symptoms, a relation that was fully mediated by beliefs in (nonexistent) chemical warfare exposure. The alarm-symptom hypothesis is bolstered by the finding that higher alarm specificity predicted lower symptoms. The results of the study suggest that false positive tests can be harmful.	

Monday 10:30-11:50**6A Framing Hyatt – Regency A**

Do decision makers want to be told what to do? An investigation of alternative forms of advice.	Gibbons, Alyssa Mitchell (U of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Sniezek, Janet A. (U of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); *Note: The first author's JDM student membership should appear under the name Alyssa A. Mitchell
In a simulated decision scenario involving human decision makers and advisors, offering a specific recommendation (the traditional definition of advice) was both preferred (expected) and enacted significantly less than other types of advice. Types of advice most preferred by decision-makers were self-insight, information or reasoning, emotional support, and decision process support (helping to structure the decision). Emotional support was the type of advice most frequently given. While advisors correctly identified the types of advice that decision-makers preferred, they did not appear to tailor their behavior to match these preferences. Implications for future study of alternative forms of advice are discussed.	
Diversification and Partition Dependence in Choice and Allocation	Fox, Craig (U of California at Los Angeles); Ratner, Rebecca (U of North Carolina); Daniel Lieb (Duke U)
We find that consumers' bias toward diversified choices (e.g., Simonson, 1990) can lead to different choices depending on how they subjectively partition the set of options available to them. In a series of studies we demonstrate that choices tend to be distributed evenly among the categories into which the set of options are grouped (by attribute, hierarchically, by time of consumption, or physically). We demonstrate further that partition dependence decreases with strength and salience of preferences among the items in the choice set, and it diminishes when decision makers are under cognitive load.	
Different Scales for Different Frames: The Role of Subjective Scales and Experience in Explaining Attribute Framing Effects	Cooke, Alan (Univ. of Florida); Janiszewski, Chris (Univ. of Florida); Silk, Tim (Univ. of Florida)
Attribute framing effects are often attributed to the affective associations evoked by each frame. We contend that framing effects also depend on the range and level of reference values used to evaluate attribute information. When the range of reference values is narrower for a positive frame than a negative frame, attribute values above expected performance levels favor the positively framed information and attribute values below expected performance levels favor the negatively framed information. When the range of reference values is wider for a positive frame, the opposite pattern emerges. Experience reduces the range of reference values recruited for judgment.	
Self-deception: How we come to believe we are better than we truly are	Norton, Michael I. (MIT); Mazar, Nina (MIT); Ariely, Dan (MIT)
Individuals overestimate their talents compared both to their peers and to their actual abilities, viewing themselves as better than they truly are. Such self-deception has been explored in the aggregate (e.g., 80% of people report above average intelligence), but little research has captured self-deception in the moment. In a series of studies, individuals were or were not given the opportunity to cheat on IQ tests. Those with the option to cheat performed better but deceived themselves into thinking this was due to their innate ability, and thus inflated predictions of future performance, even when this inaccuracy led to monetary loss.	

6B Risk Hyatt – Regency B

Attention, frame condition, and decision making under risk: An empirical test of the Contingent Focus Model using an eye gaze recorder	Fujii, Satoshi (Tokyo Inst of Technology); Takemura, Kazuhisa (Waseda U)
We applied the Contingent Focus Model to an explanation of the framing effect. The model hypothesizes that a risk attitude depends on the attention on possible outcomes and probabilities, and the attention is, in turn, contingent on the frame condition. These hypotheses were tested using an eye gaze recorder. The data indicated that the effect of the frame condition on decision making under risk was mediated by the relative frequency of gazing possible outcomes to gazing probabilities. This implies that the framing effect may be explained by the contingency of attention on the frame condition, as hypothesized.	
When Goals are Counter-Productive: The Effects of Violation of a Behavioral Goal on Subsequent Performance	Soman, Dilip (HK U of Science and Technology); Cheema, Amar (Washington U)
A considerable body of research supports the idea that individuals who set behavioral goals perform better than others who set no goals. We propose that in addition to the positive effects, goals may also have a counter-productive effect. Specifically, we propose that violating one's goal may cause a deterioration of subsequent performance as compared to individuals who have no goals. In situations where the violation of one's goal is coded as a failure, it can result in demotivation, negative emotion, and consequently a poorer performance. We report the results of two experiments that demonstrate these effects.	
Modeling Behavior in a Clinically-Diagnostic Sequential Risk-Taking Task	Wallsten, Thomas S. (U of Maryland); Pleskac, Timothy J. (U of Maryland); Lejuez, Carl W. (U of Maryland)
The Behavioral Analogue Risk Task (BART), a sequential laboratory risk-taking task (Lejuez et al., 2002), correlates well with self-reported real-world risk-taking. To model an individual's behavior in the task, we conceptualized performance as consisting of learning, option evaluation, and response selection. We present multiple stochastic dynamic models, differing in the assumptions they make about the distinct underlying processes. Results suggest that DMs update their beliefs with experience in the task, while focusing on the gains and losses of outcomes. Additionally, the modeling process indicates BART's correlations with risk-taking may be attributable to attitudes towards outcomes rather than judgments of probabilities.	

Decision Making without Judgment	Rottenstreich, Yuval (U of Chicago); Kivetz, Ran (Columbia U)
Most theories of decision making under uncertainty begin with a probabilistic premise; they assume that in making decisions people judge the likelihood of relevant uncertain events. The probabilistic premise is appealing because it is indeed clear that people often do judge likelihood. However, we present experiments suggesting that people also often do not judge likelihood; in such situations people make decisions by relying on ad-hoc rules. Thus, we argue that real-world situations are of two types. In situations eliciting a probabilistic mindset, people rely on judgments of likelihood. In situations eliciting a non-probabilistic mindset, people rely on ad-hoc rules instead.	

6C Considering Others in Decision Making**Hyatt – Regency E**

How are expectations formed and how do they influence our choices? The game, the cue and our social knowledge	Abele, Susanne (Erasmus U of Rotterdam); Ehrhart, Karl-Martin (U of Karlsruhe)
In public good situations expectations concerning other persons' move are important. But how are these expectations built? We show that subtle cues affect expectations concerning others and also whether we consider others. Participants of public good experiments, who moved simultaneously, made high contributions and expected their opponent to make high contributions. However, participants, who were moving pseudo-sequentially (hence one after the other, but without knowledge of previous moves) expected their opponent to make medium-sized contributions but made almost no contribution themselves. Results as well as earlier evidence on timing-effects are discussed and explained by a social cognitive approach.	
Choosing the less attractive option to get a better outcome	Bereby-Meyer, Yoella (Ben Gurion U); Moran, Simone (Ben Gurion U); Chen-Idson, Lorraine (Harvard U); Grosskopf, Brit (Harvard U); Chugh, Dolly (Harvard U); Bazerman, Max (Harvard U)
The study explores decision-makers' tendency to underweight or ignore the actions of others, and different mechanisms that may influence this tendency. In study 1, two hundred participants were offered participation in either a \$250 or \$500 lottery, with the winners splitting the prize. Although participants could not coordinate actions, they behaved efficiently and showed no focusing bias. This result was replicated with different amounts of money in a different population. In a third experiment, in which the winner was randomly selected among all winners, participants exhibited focusing bias. Thus the bias depends on the mechanism of outcome generation.	
Paying \$1 to lose \$2: Misperceptions of the value of information in predicting the performance of others	Moore, Don (Carnegie Mellon); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon); Weber, Roberto (Carnegie Mellon)
Research on the "curse of knowledge" (Camerer, Loewenstein, & M. Weber, 1989) shows that sometimes having more information can lead to worse decisions. Our paper shows that people tend to be unaware of this "curse" and are willing to pay for information that hurts them. In the first experiment, a significant number of participants pay for information – the solution to a puzzle – that hurts their ability to predict how many others will solve the puzzle. In the second experiment, a majority of participants choose to "hire" informed – rather than uninformed – agents, leading to lower earnings.	
Profit Maximization versus Disadvantageous Inequality in Joint Evaluation: Social Category-Based Preference Reversals	Garcia, Stephen (U of Michigan); Bazerman, Max (Harvard U); Tor, Avishalom (Harvard U); Miller, Dale (Stanford U)
Research on separate versus joint evaluation of payoff allocations has found that individuals prefer an equal allocation between themselves and another person (e.g. self - \$500 / other - \$500) to an alternative allocation with a higher absolute but disadvantageously unequal outcome (e.g. self - \$600 / other - \$800) when these alternatives are evaluated separately. Under joint evaluation, individuals prefer profit maximization. This paper reveals, however, that profit maximization in joint evaluation is limited to those instances where recipients share social identity. When recipients differ in social identity, individuals forgo profit to minimize disadvantageous inequality, even under joint evaluation.	

SJDM Sunday Poster Session 1 – Fairmont: Pacific Ballroom, Conference Level

<i>Proportion Dominance in Joint and Separate Evaluation</i> Bartels, Daniel M. (Northwestern U)
<i>The Influence of Expectations and Outcomes on Moment-to-Moment Emotions, Emotional Consequences, and Summary Evaluations</i> Bee, Colleen C. (U of Oregon); Madrigal, Robert (U of Oregon)
<i>Expert bias in frequency judgments: Intuition as de-biasing strategy</i> Betsch, Cornelia (U of Heidelberg, Germany); Plessner, Henning (U of Heidelberg, Germany); Haberstroh, Susanne (U of Erfurt, Germany)
<i>French Translation of the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale</i> Blais, Ann-Renée (CIRANO and Defence R&D Canada Toronto); Montmarquette, Claude (CIRANO and U of Montreal); Weber, Elke U (Columbia U)
<i>Predecisional Distortion in the Evaluation of Risky Choices</i> Bond, Samuel D. (Fuqua School of Business, Duke U); Carlson, Kurt A. (Fuqua School of Business, Duke U)
<i>Rank Dependence in Pay Satisfaction</i> Brown, Gordon D.A. (U of Warwick); Gardner, Jonathan (Watson Wyatt LLP); Oswald, Andrew (U of Warwick); Qian, Jing (U of Warwick)
<i>Variability and following streaks</i> Burns, Bruce D. (Michigan State U)
<i>Impulsive Aggression Can Provide Pleasure</i> Cabanac, Michel (Université Laval, Québec); Bonniot-Cabanac, Marie-Claude (Université Laval, Québec); Ramirez, J. Martin (Universidad Complutense, Madrid)
<i>Egocentric Predictions of Task Performance</i> Chambers, John R. (U of Iowa); Paul Windschitl, Don Moore
<i>Decision Biases Predict Bad Decisions</i> Chapman, Gretchen B. (Rutgers U); DiBonaventura, Marco D. (Rutgers U)
<i>A Peircean Pragmatist Accepts Hammond's Challenge</i> Chiasson, Phyllis (The Davis Nelson CO)
<i>Omission bias in vaccination decisions</i> Connolly, Terry (U of Arizona); Reb, Jochen (U of Arizona)
<i>Perceived Fungibility and Repeated-Play Decisions</i> DeKay, Michael L. (Carnegie Mellon U); Kim, Tai Gyu (Carnegie Mellon U); Tuma, Nadia C. (Carnegie Mellon U)
<i>The Confident Conscience: The Effect of Incidental Confidence on Ethical Decision Making</i> Dunn, Jennifer R. (U of Pennsylvania); Schweitzer, Maurice E. (U of Pennsylvania)
<i>Get it out of me: The role of context in omission and action biases</i> Fagerlin, Angela (U of Michigan, Ann Arbor VA); Zikmund-Fisher, Brian J. (Ann Arbor VA); Ubel, Peter A. (U of Michigan, Ann Arbor VA)
<i>Adolescent Risky Decision-Making: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Analysis</i> Fankem, Sonia M. L. (U of Arizona); Reyna, Valerie F. (U of Arizona); Poirier, Kristin (U of Arizona); Adam, Mary B (U of Arizona); LeCroy, Craig (Arizona State U)
<i>The Development of a Rule-based and Principle-based Measure of Decision Making</i> Fernandez, Nicholas A (The U of Texas at El Paso); Morera, Osvaldo F (The U of Texas at El Paso); Braun, Gary P (The U of Texas at El Paso); Hosch, Harmon M (The U of Texas at El Paso)
<i>Can I Learn to be Aware? What Affects Learning Situation Awareness in Dynamic Decision Tasks</i> Gonzalez, Cleotilde (Carnegie Mellon U); Wimsberg, Jacob (Kobi) (Carnegie Mellon U)
<i>All Numbers are not Created Equal: Negative Random Events and Personalized Random Numbers</i> Goodman, Joseph (U of Texas at Austin); Irwin, Julie (U of Texas at Austin)
<i>Simulated Reactive Decision Strategies as Indicators of Theory of Mind Deficit</i> Grushka, Avi (Ben Gurion U); Fischer, Ilan (Ben Gurion U); Meiran, Nachshon (Ben Gurion U); Kofman, Ora (Ben Gurion U)
<i>De-biasing Vague Probabilities</i> Hadar, Liat (Ben Gurion U of the Negev); Fischer, Ilan (Ben Gurion U of the Negev)

<i>Depth of Processing and Need for Cognition as Moderators of Risky Choice Framing</i> Halleran, Jennifer G. (Drew U); Fagley, Nancy S. (Rutgers U); Simon, Andrew F. (Seton Hall U)
<i>Power, Information, and Personality: Where strategy ends and fairness begins in ultimatum bargaining.</i> Handgraaf, Michel (Tilburg U); Van Dijk, Eric (Leiden U); Wilke, Henk (Leiden U); Vermunt, Riel (Leiden U); De Cremer, David (Maastricht U)
<i>How do emotions affect confidence and skilled performance in men and women?</i> Hardman, David (London Metropolitan U)
<i>How Does it Feel to Play Ultimatum and Dictator Games?</i> Haselhuhn, Michael (U of California, Berkeley); Mellers, Barbara (U of California, Berkeley)
<i>The point illusion: Incorrect weighting of absolute and relative performance in self-assessments</i> Jeffrey, Scott (U of Waterloo)
<i>A unified framework for comparing models of individual preferential choice</i> Johnson, Joseph G. (Indiana U); Busemeyer, Jerome R. (Indiana U)
<i>The Use of Recognition in Group Decision Making</i> Katsikopoulos, Konstantinos V. (Max Planck Inst for Human Development); Reimer, Torsten (Max Planck Inst for Human Development)
<i>Intervening versus observing in multiple cue learning</i> Lagnado, David A. (U College London); Newell, Ben R. (U College London)
<i>Are Judgemental Forecasts Impacted By The Source Of The Advice?</i> Lawrence, Michael (U of New South Wales, Australia); Warren, Melissa (UNSW, Sydney, Australia)
<i>Examining the Relationship Between Individual Differences in Working Memory Capacity and Judgments of Probability and Frequency</i> Lehman, Amber M. (U of Maryland); Dougherty, Michael R. P. (U of Maryland)
<i>Matters of Life and Death: Unequal Value of Life as Revealed by Judgments of Wrongful Death</i> Lenton, Alison P. (U of Cambridge (UK))
<i>Do we perchance see the difference? Perceptual biases in randomness judgments</i> Lev, Dror D. (Ben-Gurion U of the Negev); Leiser, David (Ben-Gurion U of the Negev)
<i>Reframing the Frame: Extending the Attribute Framing Paradigm</i> Levin, Irwin P. (U of Iowa); Gaeth, Gary J. (U of Iowa); Lauriola, Marco (U of Rome "La Sapienza"); Lucidi, Fabio (U of Rome "La Sapienza"); Russo, Paolo (U of Rome "La Sapienza")
<i>Attitude toward Ambiguity as a Predictor of Responses to Uncertainty in Different Domains</i> Levin, Irwin P. (U of Iowa); Lauriola, Marco (U of Rome); Hart, Stephanie S. (U of Iowa)
<i>From Unpacking to Refocusing: Frames, Evidential Support and Probability Judgment</i> Mandel, David R (U of Victoria)
<i>Optimism/Pessimism and Risk Taking</i> Martin, Nicey E. (U of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra L. (U of South Florida)
<i>Cognitive Models and Multi-Agent Systems for Interactive Decision-Making</i> Marzo, Francesca (U of Siena)
<i>Independent Assessment Methods for Improving Probability Judgment Accuracy</i> Merkle, Edgar C. (Ohio State U); Sieck, Winston R. (Ohio State U); Van Zandt, Trisha (Ohio State U)
<i>Measurement Invariance of the Decision Making Styles Inventory</i> Morera, Osvaldo F. (Department of Psychology; Univ. of Texas at El Paso); Nygren, Thomas E. (Department of Psychology; The Ohio State U); White, Rebecca (Department of Psychology; The Ohio State U); Fernandez, Norma P. (Department of Psychology; Univ. of Texas at El Paso); Skewes, Monica C. (Department of Psychology; Univ. of Texas at El Paso)
<i>Building of trust: The signaling effects of voluntary provision of monitoring and self-sanction</i> Nakayachi, Kazuya (Tezukayama U); Watabe, Motoki (Kyoto U)

<i>Naive Causal Models and Mental Correlations: Why $r(A \text{ to } B)$ is not equal to $r(B \text{ to } A)$</i> Nayakankuppam, Dhananjay (U of Iowa); Mishra, Arul (U of Iowa)
<i>The Impact of Perceived Animacy on Causal Judgments</i> Nikonova, Olga (Southern Illinois U (Carbondale)); Young, Michael E. (Southern Illinois U (Carbondale))
<i>Decision Making Styles and Betting Strategies</i> Nygren, Thomas E. (Ohio State U); White, Rebecca J. (Ohio State U)
<i>The Cognitive Theory of Noise</i> Pearlman, Philip (Rational Trading Inst)
<i>Applying the Dual-Process Model of Decoy Effects to Context Effects in Social Judgment</i> Pettibone, Jonathan C. (Southern Illinois U Edwardsville); Zeitlin, Deborah (Southern Illinois U Edwardsville)
<i>Assessment of Risk to Food Safety Hazards</i> Raacke, John (Kansas State U); Friel, Brian (Kansas State U); Gordon, Joye (Kansas State U)
<i>The rise and fall of stock market predictions: A test of symmetry</i> Rasouli, Maria (Carleton U); Khan, Shamima (Carleton U)
<i>Regulatory Focus and Risk as Feelings</i> Reid, Aaron, A. (Ohio U)
<i>Context shapes preference: Choice set composition and temporal discounting</i> Reimers, Stian (U of Warwick); Stewart, Neil (U of Warwick); Chater, Nick (U of Warwick)
<i>The Role of Personal and Situational Relevance on the Sunk Cost Effect</i> Renner, Catherine Hackett (West Chester U); Corby, AnneMarie (West Chester U)
<i>The Illusion of Market Stability</i> Rude, Dale (U of Houston)
<i>A Role for Multiple Stakeholder Perspectives in the Perception of Business Risks</i> Schwarzkopf, David L. (Bentley College)
<i>The Reliability of Disaggregated Ratings Versus Holistic Ratings</i> Shaffer, Victoria A. (Ohio State U); Arkes, Hal R. (Ohio State U)
<i>Risk attitude, Win Loving and the Evaluation of Lotteries: An Experimental Study.</i> Shavit, Tal (Ben-Gurion U); Sharabani, Shosh (Emek Israel College); Ben-zion, Uri (Ben-Gurion U)
<i>Overconfidence Reduces the Use of Statistical Equations to Aid Judgment</i> Sieck, Winston R. (Klein Associates); Arkes, Hal R. (Ohio State U)
<i>The Group Size Effect on Personal Risk Judgments: A Result of Using a Numerosity Heuristic?</i> Smith, Andrew R. (California State U, Fresno); Price, Paul C. (California State U, Fresno); Lench, Heather C. (U of California, Irvine)
<i>Communicating low-probability risk information: Modeling graphical vs. numerical formats</i> Stone, Eric R. (Wake Forest U); Schirillo, James A. (Wake Forest U)
<i>Risk perception, trust, and policy preference: A lesson from nuclear power plant trouble in Japan.</i> Takemura, Kazuhisa (DeparWaseda U); Fujii, Satoshi (Tokyo Inst of Technology); Kikkawa, Toshiko (Keio U); Horii, Hideyuki (U of Tokyo)

<i>Spatial Perspective and Styles of Cognition</i> Thomas, F. Dennis (U of Connecticut); Holzworth, R. James (U of Connecticut)
<i>Decision quality of fast & frugal heuristics in multiattribute decision environments</i> Thomas, Rickey (Carnegie-Mellon Univ); Shanteau, James (Kansas State Univ.)
<i>Group vs. Individual Judgments and the Inclusion-Exclusion Discrepancy</i> Tindale, Scott (Loyola U Chicago); Dick, Erin (Loyola U Chicago); Dykema- Engblade, Amanda (Loyola U Chicago); Smith, Christine (Grand Valley State U)
<i>When Marketers Benefit from Consumers Feeling Regret: Untangling the Effects of Regret and Reference Prices</i> Tsiros, Michael (U of Miami); Hardesty, David (U of Miami)
<i>The effect of cognitive load on spontaneous discounting.</i> Van Os, Neal (Stanford U); Oppenheimer, Daniel M. (Stanford U); Monin, Benoit (Stanford U)
<i>Effects of distribution type and individual differences in sample-size tasks</i> Vaughn, Kathlea (U of Connecticut); Holzworth, R. James (U of Connecticut)
<i>Strategic use of asymmetrical information in small group bargaining games</i> Vazquez, Fernando (UNAM)
<i>Price Predicting Behavior in the Stock Market</i> Wang, Zhigang (Carleton U); Tavakoli, Mahin (Carleton U)
<i>Regret Proneness in Decision Making</i> Washburn, David A. (Georgia State U)
<i>Theoretical Explanations of the Allais Paradox: an Overview</i> Weber, Bethany J. (Rutgers U)
<i>Explanation and Evidence in Juror Decision-Making: Epistemological Understanding and the Dual Processes</i> Weinstock, Michael (Ben-Gurion U of the Negev)
<i>The relationship between suggestibility and decision making</i> Weller, Joshua (U of Iowa); Kotov, Roman (U of Iowa); Bellman, S. Beth (U of Iowa)
<i>Perception of the Influence of Mood upon Decision Making</i> White, Rebecca (Ohio State U); West, Patricia (Ohio State U)
<i>The Role of Defensiveness in Entrapment</i> Zhang, Liqing (Case Western Reserve U); Baumeister, Roy, F. (Florida State U)
<i>Evaluability issues affect patients' preferences for doctors, but are physicians any better?</i> Zikmund-Fisher, Brian J. (VA Ann Arbor Healthcare System); Fagerlin, Angela (U of Michigan); Ubel, Peter A. (U of Michigan)
<i>Focusing as a Cause of Myopic Social Comparison Integrating science and values in decision making: The use of structured preference assessments</i> Don Moore (Carnegie Mellon U)

SJDM Sunday Poster Session 2 - Fairmont: Pacific Ballroom, Conference Level

<i>Using Decision Science to Model and Prevent Suicidal Behaviors</i> Amsel, Lawrence (Columbia U); Pilpel, Avital (Columbia University)	<i>The Relevance of Base-Rate and Case-Specific Information for Probability Judgments of Disease Occurrence</i> Hinsz, Verlin B. (North Dakota State U); Heimerdinger, Sarah R. (North Dakota State U); Henkel, Jordan M. (North Dakota State U); Spieker, Casey J. (North Dakota State U)
<i>The Effects of Context and Experience on Cheater Detection</i> Bayn, Danni (U of MN); Johnson, Paul E. (U of MN); Fletcher, Charles R. (U of MN); Pardo, Jose V. (VA Medical Center, MN)	<i>Effect of Speaking Order on Group Deliberation</i> Itzkowitz, Jesse (U of Florida); Sorkin, Robert D. (U of Florida); Luan, Shenghua (U of Florida)
<i>A Signal Detection Analysis of Confidence Judgments</i> Briggs, Nancy (Ohio State U); White, Rebecca (Ohio State U)	<i>To whom does historical information matter more: Culture and judgments</i> Ji, Li-Jun (Queen's U); Zhang, Zhiyong (Beijing U)
<i>Travel risks in times of terror: Evidence for risk-as-feelings.</i> Bruine de Bruin, Wändi (Carnegie Mellon U); Fischhoff, Baruch (Carnegie Mellon U); Perrin, Wendy (Condé Nast Traveler); Downs, Julie (Carnegie Mellon U)	<i>Improving The Slope Index As A Discrimination Measure</i> Karafa, Matthew T. (Cleveland Clinic Foundation); Dawson, Neal V. (Center for Healthcare Research and Policy at MetroHealth)
<i>Ambiguity and conflict aversion: Insurers' attitudes to imprecise probabilities</i> Cabantous, Laure (U of Toulouse 1)	<i>Training and Individual Difference Effects on Visual Discrimination Ability of Serially-Presented Graphics</i> Kramer, Elizabeth A. (U of Connecticut); Holzworth, R. James (U of Connecticut)
<i>Strategies in a Naturalistic Diagnosis Task</i> Chandler, C.C. (Washington State U); Bogren, S. (WSU); Shouse, R. (WSU); Smitherman, B. (WSU); Stewart, K. (WSU); Darbous, M., & Fielding, L.	<i>Predicting One's Future: Links with Self-esteem, Affect, and Locus of Control</i> Krizan, Zlatan (U of Iowa); Windschitl, Paul D. (U of Iowa)
<i>Changes in Risk Preferences over Repeated Decisions</i> Chen, Yuh-Jia (Middle Tennessee State U); Corter, James E. (Teachers College, Columbia U)	<i>Judgment of ingroups and outgroups in integrative negotiation: The moderating role of interdependent self-construal in judgment timing</i> Lee, Sujin (Cornell U Johnson School of Management)
<i>Evaluating Indifference Between One Lottery and Its Edited Two Components</i> Cho, Young-Hee (California State Univ., Long Beach); Luce, R. Duncan (U of California, Irvine); Haneda, Miki (California State Univ., Long Beach)	<i>The majority heuristic in information integration</i> Luan, Shenghua (U of Florida); Sorkin, Robert D. (U of Florida); Itzkowitz, Jesse (U of Florida)
<i>The Role of Aspiration in Choice over Continuously Distributed Outcomes</i> Davies, Greg B (U of Cambridge)	<i>The Roots of Procedural Fairness</i> Markoczy, Livia (UC Riverside); Goldberg, Jeffrey (none)
<i>Information Distortion and Utility Reversals in Precautionary Reasoning</i> DeKay, Michael L. (Carnegie Mellon U); Fischbeck, Paul S. (Carnegie Mellon U); Echeverri, Daila P. (Carnegie Mellon U)	<i>Effects of Secondary Associations On Brand Value Judgments</i> Masandaviciute, Santa (Latvia U. of Agric); Lanseng, Even J. (Agric. U. of Norway)
<i>Effects of counterfactual thinking on prisoners' judgments of blame and fairness</i> Dhami, Mandeep K. (U of Victoria); Mandel, David R. (U of Victoria)	<i>Evidence of heuristic reasoning errors in U.S. avalanche accidents</i> McCammon, Ian (Nat'l Outdoor Leadership School)
<i>Cognitive load and conflicts between the head and the heart</i> Dickert, Stephan (U of Oregon); Peters, Ellen (Decision Research and U of Oregon); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research and U of Oregon)	<i>Effects of Framing, Need for Cognition, and Faith in Intuition on Choices of Educational Administrators</i> Miller, Paul M. (St. John's U)
<i>Social and Base Rate Comparisons Affect Intentions to Take Precautions</i> Enkerud, Kristine (WSU); Chandler, Carla (WSU)	<i>The Generation Effect and False Memories in Sworn Testimony</i> Mojardin, A.H. (Universidad Autonoma de Sinaloa, Mexico); Velazquez, Jose.H. (U of Arizona); Cajiga, S. (Universidad Autonoma de Sinaloa, Mexico); Apodaca, A. (Universidad Autonoma de Sinaloa, Mexico); Romero, A. (Universidad Autonoma de Sinaloa, Mexico)
<i>Computerized decision support systems in medical practice</i> Faregh, Neda (Carleton U)	<i>Something smells fishy: Effects of causal structure format on reasoning ability.</i> Mulligan, Elizabeth J. (U of Colorado at Boulder); Fasolo, Barbara (Max-Planck Inst of Human Development); Hastie, Reid (Graduate School of Business, U of Chicago)
<i>Choosing on Impulse: The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Food Choices by Obese and Non-Obese Individuals</i> Finucane, Melissa L. (Kaiser Permanente Center for Health Research Hawai'i); Holup, Joan (Kaiser Permanente Center for Health Research Hawai'i); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)	<i>Reasoning mode and conjunction errors: A dual-reasoning mode perspective</i> Neace, William P. (Pacific Inst for Research and Evaluation); Edgell, Stephen E. (U of Louisville)
<i>The impact of a narcissistic personality on paradoxical betting on confidence</i> Goodie, Adam S. (U of Georgia); Campbell, W. Keith (U of Georgia); Foster, Joshua D. (U of Georgia)	<i>The Contingent Utility Of Confidence Intervals And Other Forms Of Uncertainty Information In Forecasting And Decision-Making</i> Nelson, Michael (U of New South Wales); Lawrence, Michael (U of New South Wales); O'Connor, Marcus (U of Sydney)
<i>How bad is a 10% chance of losing a toe? Judgments of probabilistic conditions by doctors and laypeople.</i> Gurmankin, Andrea (U of Pennsylvania); Baron, Jonathan (U of Pennsylvania)	<i>Which is the best communications media to use?: the case of SMS.</i> O'Connor, Marcus (U of Sydney); Foong, John (McKinsey's); Dick, Geoff (U of New South Wales)
<i>The endowment effect and the formation of intended uses for possessions</i> Hagan, Colette (U of Leicester); Bolger, Fergus (U of Leicester)	<i>Searching for the Sweet Spot: The Impact of the Opening Offer in Distributive Bargaining</i> Oesch, John (Rotman School of Management, U of Toronto); Whyte, Glen (Rotman School of Management, U of Toronto)
<i>Personnel Placement vs. Personnel Selection - How different conceptualisations of the same task frame decision making</i> Hagmayer, York (U of Goettingen, Germany); Sachse, Katharina (U of Goettingen, Germany)	<i>Intuitions about Social Projection in Others</i> Oskarsson, An (U of Colorado); Van Boven, Leaf (U of Colorado)
<i>Influence of numeracy upon patients' prostate cancer screening outcome probability judgments</i> Hamm, Robert M. (U of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center); Bard, David E. (U of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center); Scheid, Dewey C. (U of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center)	<i>A psychophysical explanation for the ratio-bias phenomenon</i> Parker, Andrew M. (Virginia Polytechnic Inst and State U); Stone, Eric R. (Wake Forest U)
<i>Biases and Heuristics in Children's Decision Making</i> Hart, Stephanie S. (U of Iowa); Curtis, Kelly (U of Iowa); Levin, Irwin P. (U of Iowa)	<i>A Test Of Constant Proportional Person Tradeoff</i> Perry, Michael J. (U of Washington); Miyamoto, John M. (U of Washington); Doctor, Jason N. (U of Washington)

<i>Numeric Courage: mortality rates overshadow risk salience and framing.</i> Pracejus, John (U of Alberta); Brown, Norman (U of Alberta)
<i>Price Attractiveness Perception: Evidence for Multiple Reference Points</i> Qian, Jing (U of Warwick); Brown, Gordon D A (U of Warwick)
<i>Cooperative behavior in dyadic negotiation games</i> Ramirez, Jimena (UNAM); Vazquez, Fernando (UNAM)
<i>Regret, Norms, and Decision Process Quality</i> Reb, Jochen (U of Arizona); Connolly, Terry (U of Arizona)
<i>Quantifying Central-route Persuasion Effects in Consumer Product Trade-offs</i> Reid, Aaron, A (Ohio U); Gonzalez-Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio U); Mitchell, Elizabeth, C (Ohio U); Funderburk, Brent, A (Ohio U)
<i>The Use of Superstitious Beliefs By college Athletes</i> Renner, Catherine Hackett (West Chester U); Colarusso, Elizabeth A. (West Chester U)
<i>The Role of Personal and Situational Relevance on the Sunk Cost Effect</i> Renner, Catherine Hackett (West Chester U); Corby, AnneMarie (West Chester U)
<i>Qualitative Gist Versus Quantitative Estimates of Sexual Risk Among Adolescents: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Analysis</i> Roberts, Jennifer L. (U of Arizona); Metz, Kirsten C. (U of Arizona); Reyna, Valerie F. (U of Arizona); Poirier, Kristin L. (U of Arizona); Adam, Mary B. (U of Arizona); LeCroy, Craig
<i>Are Causal and Counterfactual Judgments Mediated by the Same Mechanisms?</i> Savelli, Sonia (U of Washington); Miyamoto, John (U of Washington)
<i>Similarity, Conflict, and Choice: A Double-Mediator Hypothesis</i> Scholten, Marc (Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada); Sherman, Steven J. (Indiana U)
<i>Will I like a banana or a chocolate tomorrow afternoon? Modelling enjoyment derived from food consumption with Herstein's value functions</i> Sevdalis, Nick (U College London); Harvey, Nigel (U College London)
<i>Social Comparison and Public Goods Provision in the Field</i> Shang, Yue (Jen) (U of Pennsylvania); Croson, Rachel (U of Pennsylvania)
<i>Decision by Sampling</i> Stewart, Neil (U of Warwick); Chater, Nick (U of Warwick); Brown, Gordon D. A. (U of Warwick)
<i>Mechanisms Underlying the Asymmetric Dominance Effect in Choice</i> Tai, Joanna C. (Brown U); Sloman, Steven A. (Brown U); Sobel, David M. (Brown U)
<i>Mental Simulation of the Future: An Explanation-based Account</i> Tate, Chuck (U of Oregon); Malle, Bertram F. (U of Oregon)
<i>Is the unpacking effect sensitive to question format?</i> Templin, Sara E. (U of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Budescu, David V. (U of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

<i>In the long run: Economic versus biological rationality</i> Thorngate, Warren (Carleton U)
<i>Cue Utilization In Quantity Judgments: Primacy Effects In A Dynamically Increasing Information Setting</i> Tschirhart, Michael (U of Michigan)
<i>Relative Judgement Strategies in Sequential vs. Simultaneous Recognition Tasks</i> Van Wallendael, Lori (UNC-Charlotte); Hilton, Gary (UNC-Charlotte)
<i>Hedonic Tone of Self-Framing and Choices at Risk</i> Wang, X.T. (U of South Dakota)
<i>Variants on the Allais Paradox: Testing the Certainty Effect Account</i> Weber, Bethany J. (Rutgers U); Marks, Melissa (Rutgers U)
<i>A Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT) – continued</i> Weber, Elke U. (Columbia U); Blais, Ann-Renée (Defence R&D Canada Toronto)
<i>Assurance and Trust on eBay: Two Routes to Buyers' Reliance on Sellers</i> Weidenbacher, Drew (Western Washington U); Cvetkovich, George (Western Washington U)
<i>Why do kids start to smoke? Comparing Chinese and American adolescents</i> Weiss, Jie Wu (U of Southern California); Weiss, David J. (California State U, Los Angeles)
<i>Missing Information in Multiple-Cue Probability Learning</i> White, Chris M. (U of Waterloo); Koehler, Derek J. (U of Waterloo)
<i>Asymmetric compatibility effects in choice and reject</i> Willemsen, Martijn C. (Eindhoven U of Technology); Keren, Gideon (Eindhoven U of Technology)
<i>The Restoration of Diluted Judgment</i> Youmans, Robert (U of Illinois at Chicago); Stone, Eric (Wake Forest U)
<i>Gambling and Investment Decision Making: A Comparison of Similar Situations</i> Young, Matthew Maclaren (Carleton U)
<i>The Role of Justification in Purchase Decisions of Hedonic Luxuries versus Utilitarian Necessities</i> Zheng, Yuhuang (Columbia U Graduate School of Business); Kivetz, Ran (Columbia U Graduate School of Business)
<i>Delay Discounting and Alcohol Consumption among Adolescents</i> Zuniga, Alejandra (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico); Bouzas, Arturo (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico)
<i>Leader of the Packed: The Benefits and Costs of Perspective Taking in Group Endeavors</i> Naïve diversification in allocation among risky prospects: Partition-dependence, unitdependence, and procedure-dependence Nonconscious Priming of Decision Goals Eugene M. Caruso (Harvard U.)